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Abstract
In this dissertation I investigate the phenomenon of what have come to be known
as 'specific' indefinites.
The atypical scope- and discourse-related properties of this kind of noun
phrases have led researchers to posit a variety of recent analyses. I show that
nothing special needs to be said about specific indefinites once we assume a pre-
dynamic model of natural language which takes as a starting point the proposals
of Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982) that indefinites are not inherently
quantificational.
One core assumption of this dissertation is that indefinites that are
interpreted as specific (or that otherwise exhibit atypical scopal properties) are
always topic marked in the sense of von Fintel (1994) (but see also Diesing 1991).
The phenomenon of topic marking is quite independent of specific indefinites
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and is generally the cause of existence presuppositions associated with
quantificational noun phrases-which are argued not to be intrinsically
presuppositional.
The presuppositions associated with topic marking are shown to follow the
same projection patterns as standard presuppositional expressions; thus the
semantic and pragmatic properties of specific indefinites are expected to exhibit a
parallel behavior with respect to, e.g., presuppositions of the kind generated, by
definite noun phrases. The model proposed thus subsumes the apparently
puzzling scope-taking options of indefinites under an independently available
theory of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. No recourse to task-specific devices
is assumed.
The model proposed assumes a maximally constrained theory of syntax.
Thus it is compatible with theories which assume the clause-boundedness of
quantifier raising, including those models which assume that there is no
independently occurring quantifier raising operation.
Thesis Supervisor: Irene Heim
Title: Professor, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1. Are Indefinites Ambiguous?
Indefinite noun phrases (DP's)' have been studied quite extensively in the
semantic literature. They present numerous puzzles that have led researchers to
posit various kinds of ambiguities. Below I give a general overview of the kinds
of issues involved.
Milsark (1977) originally introduced a classification of noun phrases into
'weak' vs. 'strong', to distinguish those DP's that can occur in the postcopular
position of a there be _ sentence from those that can't. Typically, definite DP's and
universally quantified DP's are labeled 'strong' because they cannot occur in
such constructions, while indefinites would appear to be allowed in these
environments, and would thus be classified as 'weak'. However, Milsark noted
that an indefinite will not always behave as a weak DP in this sense. To support
this observation, he discusses the contrast between unstressed some-notated
'sm'-and certain readings of a fully stressed s6me (see also Postal 1966):
(1) a. Sm salesmen walked in.
b. S6me salesmen walked in.
c. Some of the salesmen walked in.
1 I use the term 'noun phrase' to refer to any nominal constituent that can occupy an argument
position of a predicate. In recent years, it has become common practice to label these constituents
'DP' (for 'Determiner Phrase'), following Abney (1987). The earlier label 'NP' will be reserved for
any nominal subconstituent of DP, and will not in general be identified with the term 'noun
phrase'.
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(2) a. There are sm people in the bedroom.
b. + There are s6me people in the bedroom.
c. * There are some of the people in the bedroom.
Milsark observes that while (la) is simply a "statement that an act of entering has
transpired, and that it was performed by some indeterminate but probably not
large number of salesmen ... [(lb)] asserts that of the class of salesmen, some
subset of appropriate size to be referred to as 'some' has performed the action of
entering, and carries a strong suggestion that some other group, by contrast,
remained outside ... In this reading, the sentence is very nearly synonymous
with [(lc)]. [p. 18]" This is seen to correlate with a difference in grammaticality
between (2a) and (2b), when (2b) is interpreted as in the ungrammatical (2c).
Thus, he suggests, "The 'sm' reading of some classes with the weak determiners,
the 's6me' sense classes with the strong ones. [p. 20]"
This observation was later taken up by numerous authors, and the notion
that indefinite noun phrases are ambiguous between a weak (or 'existential')
reading and a strong (or 'partitive') reading has come to be widely
acknowledged. In particular, Kratzer (1989b) and Diesing (1992) argue that weak
readings contrast not only with 'partitive' (or 'specific') readings, but also with
generic readings. These contrasts, in turn, are shown to be correlated with the
readings associated with arguments of stage level vs. individual level predicates
(in the sense of Carlson 1977),2 and with scrambling in languages such as
German and Dutch.
2 The stage/individual level distinction can already be found, under a different terminology, in
Milsark (1974).
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(3) a. ... weil Professoren jadoch verftigbar sind.
sitnce professors 'indeed' available are
'... since (in general) professors are available.'
b. ... well ja doch Professoren verftigbar sind.
since 'indeed' professors available are
'... since there are professors available.'
(4) a. ... weil Wildschweine ja.doch intelligent sind.
since wild boars 'indeed' intelligent are
'... since (in general) wild boars are intelligent.'
b. * ... well ja doch Wildschweine intelligent sind.
si'nce 'indeed' wild boars intelligent are
The position of the subject with respect to the underlined adverb in the German
examples above is taken to indicate whether scrambling has taken place. The
generalization that emerges is that generic readings obtain when the relevant DP
is scrambled, and in particular the subject of an individual level predicate must
be scrambled-cf. the contrast in (4). On the other hand, existential readings
obtain with subjects of stage level predicates when the DP is not scrambled.
Diesing proposes that scrambled DP's are always 'strong', in Milsark's sense, and
that (nongeneric) strong DP's are inherently quantificational. DP's that are not
scrambled, on the other hand, are not quantificational, and must be bound by
existential closure at the VP level; thus they cannot scramble. She further
suggests that 'specific' DP's will pattern with the 'strong' category (see also de
Hoop 1992), being associated with a presuppositional restrictive clause, just like
true quantifiers. She discusses examples like the Dutch (5), adapted from
Reuland (1988), and the Turkish (6), taken from Eng (1991): 3
3 The glosses in (5) and (6) are as given by Reuland and Ens, respectively. Since I am not a native
speaker of Dutch or Turkish, I calnnot provide more detailed information on the meaning of these
sentences.
(5) a. Fred denkt dat twee koeien op het dak liggen.
Fred thinks that two couws on the roof lie
'Fred thinks that two ('specific') cows are lying on the roof.'
b. Fred denkt dat er twee koeien op het dak liggen.
Fred thinks that there two cows on the roof lie
'Fred thinks that there are two cows lying on the roof.'
(6) a. Ali bir kitab-i aldi.
Ali one book-ACC bought
'A book is such that Ali bought it.'
b. Ali bir kitap aldi.
Ali one book bought
'Ali bought some book or other.'
The DP tzoee koeien 'two cows' in the Dutch examples is assumed to be in SpecIP
in the case of (5a), and inside VP in the case of (5b), the reason being that the
lexical item er 'there' occupies SpecIP in the latter case but not in the former. This,
Diesing argues, indicates that this DP is scrambled in (5a) but not in (5b); and, as
it turns out, in the first case this DP is interpreted as being a 'covert partitive' (in
Reuland's terms), while in the second case it is interpreted existentially. With
regard to the Turkish examples, the 'specific' vs. 'nonspecific' character of the
object DP appears to be correlated with the presence of an overt accusative
marker on this DP. Enq (1991) argues that accusative marking in Turkish is used
to encode 'specificity', and correspondingly, a 'specific' DP is semantically
interpreted as partitive. Diesing speculates that accusative marking on Turkish
objects should also be correlated with some form of scrambling, plausibly in the
LF component.
The generalization, then, is that indefinites are inherently ambiguous. So, in
most cases, a given DP of this class will have two distinct translations: one where
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it corresponds to a true quantifier, and as such its descriptive content is
associated with a presuppositional restrictive clause; and another where the
indefinite is not inherently quantificational, and must end up bound by some
unselective operator, such as VP-level existential closure. In all cases, any
indefinite which does not receive an existential reading will scramble out of its
VP, either in the syntax or at LF.
Now, this kind of ambiguity, if it exists, should presumably be attributed to
lexical properties of determiners, and not of DP's. The idea of positing lexical
ambiguity at the level of a constituent as large as a DP, it seems to me, is
somewhat implausible. Once we postulate this kind of ambiguity, we have to
wonder why it does not seem to obtain for other phrasal constituents-say, VP or
CP. But even the assumption that indefinite determiners are lexically ambiguous
may lend itself to criticism. There is a risk of overgenerating lexical entries that
may not be attested as distinct morphological items in natural languages. And
even when such items seem to be attested (consider, for instance, the case of the
Dutch sommige lenkele pair-translatable roughly as s6me vs. sin, as suggested by
de Hoop 1992), their behavior could be accounted for by means other than a
general hypothesized quantifica tonal /nonquantificational ambiguity.4 After all,
the English all/every/each trio also correlates with significant semantic
distinctions, but these distinctions are usually not assumed to be due to such a
basic notion as whether or not something is a quantifier.
Even aside from conceptual issues, the idea of treating strong or 'specific'
indefinites as true quantifiers may be unsatisfactory on empirical grounds. Fodor
and Sag (1981) argue at length that some indefinites-in fact those which are
commonly referred to as 'specific'--differ substantially from run-of-the-mill
4 For instance, their different morphology could be correlated with a more or less marked
tendency to raise, say, for Case-related reasons (see, e.g., Chomsky 1993). This might then
correlate with the semantic properties associated with scrambling.
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quantifiers in many respects. Their strongest argument against treating these
kinds of DP's as quantifiers is that they appear to be capable of taking scope
outside of constituents (like the rumor-phrase below) which behave as scope
islands with respect to regular quantifiers:
(7) a. Each teacher overheard the rumor that a student of mine had been called
before the dean.
b. Each teacher overheard the rumor that every student of mine had been
called before the dean.
In (7a), the indefinite a student of mine can take scope outside of the rumor-phrase
and above the matrix subject. In (7b), however, the quantificational noun phrase
(QNP) every student of mine cannot take scope outside of this constituent, and
much less above the subject. (7b) illustrates a typical case of the restrictions that
certain constituents impose on the scope of QNP's. Since 'specific' indefinites
regularly violate these constraints, perhaps they should not be treated as QNP's.
In any case, Fodor and Sag propose an ambiguity-based analysis of these
facts, which is in some ways the opposite of what Diesing proposes. For them,
there are two kinds of indefinites: those which take strictly narrow scope and
never violate island constraints, which are analyzed as true QNP's; and those
which take 'extra-wide' scope, which are analyzed essentially as referring
expressions. Thus, on a purely conceptual level, this analysis is no more
parsimonious than Diesing's. On an empirical level, there are some nontrivial
problems that have been pointed out by numerous authors, including Diesing
herself. I will not discuss these problems here, since these will be taken up in
Chapter 2. What I wish to point out here is that Fodor and Sag's observations
about contrasts like that in (7) should be taken seriously, if we wish to
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understand the restrictions on quantifier scope. In this respect, Diesing's analysis
will not help.
In this dissertation I will present an analysis of indefinites which assumes
no form of lexical ambiguity at the DP level. In essence, my analysis is a version
of those proposed by Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982), whereby indefinites are
uniformly non-(inherently)-quantificational, and can be bound at a distance by a
c-commanding quantifier. So, for instance, (7a) will be represented roughly as in
(8)-an option which is not allowed for (7b).
(8) i [ Each teacher overheard [ the rumor that [a student of mine], ... ]
I will further argue that the weak/strong distinction can be captured by a
mechanism of topic marking, in the spirit of von Fintel (1994). This analysis will
also explain why these DP's enter into more scope configurations than regular
QNP's. Thus, in general, the presuppositional character of scrambled DP's, as
well as the possibility of 'specific' readings, will be argued to be a derived
property, which is regulated by discourse-related factors and variable binding
configurations which may affect these DP's.
As far as concerns the scope of this dissertation, I will concentrate my
attention essentially on monotone increasing singular indefinite noun phrases.
My analysis, I believe, can be extended with no great effort to plural (mont)
indefinites, which exhibit the same general pattern as the singular ones; I will not
deal with plurals here, however, since these DP's also exhibit a wealth of
properties (e.g., distributive vs. collective ambiguities) which are relatively
inconsequential to the analysis, yet would require an additional set of
assumptions, taking us too far from the task at hand.
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Monotone decreasing and non-monotone indefinites are a different case.
They do exhibit a weak/strong ambiguity, but they don't (as far as I am aware)
exhibit island escaping properties of the kind seen in (7a). I will simply assume
that these DP's are regular quantifiers; thus I will deliberately intend to exclude
these kinds of DP's when making generalizations about the class of indefinites
that fall under my analysis.5 Finally, I will also exclude English bare plurals from
the discussion-although I believe my analysis is (or can be made) compatible
with current theories of genericity.
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 1 present an overview
of the scope possibilities that indefinites have. I will discuss Fodor and Sag's
paper and some of the problems it raises. I will then discuss a proposal by
Abusch (1993), which is intended to account for the scope of indefinites by means
-of a variation on the Kamp/Heim model, as I myself advocate. Abusch's
proposal, however, also assumes an added mechanism that lifts the descriptive
content of an indefinite to a position strictly local to its binder, effectively making
it into a restricted quantifier. This mechanism is argued to be necessary by the
author, who illustrates a productive set of cases where the occurrence in a
sentence of an indefinite bound at a distance by an existential closure operator
causes the sentence to have intolerably weak truth conditions. I will argue, contra
Abusch, that this extra mechanism is not immune from serious problems of its
own, both conceptual and empirical (see Ch. 2, §3.2). As a result, I argue, the
general Kamp/Heimn approach should be retained, but without carrying out the
indefinite description. This, of course, leaves me with the task of trying to show
that the problem of weak truth conditions can be overcome in an alternative way.
In Chapter 3 I explore three possible strategies, and conclude that the best by far
5 One may speculate, however, that mon,[ and -mon indefinites are quantificational by virtue of a
combination of a regular 'Heimian' indeiinite and an appropriate 'affective' operator, perhaps in
SpecDP. So we may not need to posit an essential ambiguity even in these cases.
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is to assume a version of von Fintel's topic marking mechanism, applied to
scrambled indefinites. This general strategy entails a presuppositional treatment
of the targeted indefinite, since topics by their nature presuppose their
descriptive content. Furthermore, by explicitly adopting a Strawsonian notion of
presupposition (whereby the assignment of a truthvalue to an assertion is
contingent on its presuppositions being fulfilled), I eschew the opposite problem,
i.e., generating expressions whose truth conditions are too strong-a problem
that the alternative approach cannot avoid. Finally, in Chapter 4 I discuss in
some detail the mechanics of presupposition projection, and tentatively propose
a model roughly in the spirit of Belnap (1970), that generates presupposition/
assertion pairs of the appropriate kind. This model is significantly simplified
compared to, e.g., the system proposed by Karttunen and Peters (1979).6 Yet, as I
will show, it can handle a variety of well known problems in the relevant
literature, as well as all the cases that were problematic under Abusch's
approach, as discussed in Ch. 2, §3.2.
2. Formalities
In general, I will be implicitly assuming a two-sorted type theory (cf. Gallin 1975)
with notational conventions similar to those used by von Stechow (1993) and
Heim and Kratzer (to appear). In other words, for any lexical item which is
translated as a function of type (s, ') (for any type r), the item is subscripted with
its world variable at LF.7 Thus, for instance, a sentence like John met Mary could
be represented roughly by the LF in (9).
6 This is partly due to my conclusions in Ch. 3, section 1, that even quantifiers like every are not
(inherently) presuppositional. Whether one can get away in all cases with the rather streamlined
system I propose for presupposition projection is left for future research.
7 Individuals are assumed to be of type e and, somewhat simplistically, to exist across possible
worlds. Hence they are not annotated with a world variable at any level of representation.
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(9) IP
DP VP
John
V DP
met,, Mary
(9) is then translated as the expression met,(John, Mary), which is short for
met(w)(Mary X John), and is true just in case John met Mary in world w.8 Of
course, nominal predicates (e.g., cat, professor) are also subscripted with a world
variable. However, to anticipate a bit the arguments given in Chapter 2, this
world variable will have different options from those assumed for world
variables associated with verbal predicates. Without going into details, I assume
the convention in (10).
(10) World Variables
In LF, all predicates are annotated with a world-variable subscript. The
world variable of a verbal predicate-notated w, w', w", etc.-is bound
by the closest intensional operator or C(omp). The world variable of a
nominal predicate-notated w', we', w*", etc. may be bound or free. A
world variable that remains free at the matrix IP level is assigned the
default value wo, the utterance world.
To illustrate (10), consider the sentence in (11a). We might associate this sentence
with the lIF in (1lb), which, by (10), will be assigned the translation in (1lc).
8 Temporal variables will be mostly ignored in this dissertation.
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(11) a. Every cat meowed.
b. IP
DP VP
D NP V
every cat,,. meowed,
c. (Vx: cat,.(x)) meow,(x)
Since both we and w are free in (11c), they are both assigned the default value wo0.
So (11c) is equivalent to (11d).
(11) d. (Vx:. cat~k,(x)) meow,,(x)
To illustrate a case of where the 'w*' vs. 'w' difference might become relevant,
consider (12a). This sentence could have an LF as in (12b), where the resolution of
the de re/de dicto ambiguity of (12a) is left up to the option provided for in (10) to
let the predicate cath,. end up having its world variable free or bound by the
embedded Comp. 9 This means that the LF in (12b) actually corresponds to two
LF's: one where cat,. is actually caty, a predicate which is true of things that are
cats in John's belief world(s); and another LF where catk,. is instead catH,-
ultimately catw, a predicate which is true of things that are cats in wo. The two
translations are given in (12cl) and (12c2), respectively.
9 I am not claiming here that these kinds of ambiguities simply boil down to a choice of world
variable associated with embedded DP's. I believe, however, that the conlvention on (10) iii
relatively innocuous in these cases; and furthermore, as I will argue in Chapter 2, something like
(10) appears to be necessary to account for various phenomena, not all of them involving
indefinites.
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(12) a. John thinks that every cat meowed.
b. IP
DP VP
John
V CP
thinks,,,
C IP
DP VP
D NP V
every catw,. meowed w
cl. think,i(John. Xi' [(Vx: cate(x)) meoww(x)])
c2. think;,(John, Xv' [(Vx: cat4,(x)) meoww(x)])
The interpretation mechanism presupposes a compositional semantics which is
guided by the following methodology (see also Bittner 1993):
(13) Composition
A node whose two daughters translate as oa and 3 (linear order
irrelevant) translates as ao*p, where
Xa*P is a general abbreviation for any of the following: a(p), aC(P),
Va(p), vo(^Cp); or, if both ao and P are of type (x, t) (for any type r):
kvT [a(vt) A P(v)], V a variable of type or.
Furthermore, since the semantics I utilize is read off of an LF syntax which
assumes movement of constituents, I assume a modality of interpretation of
movement structures as in (14) (see also Reinhart 1983, Rooth 1985, Heim 1993,
Cresti 1995).
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(14) Movement Indices
XP ~,
Structures of the form XPi YP are rebracketed as i YP, and i YP
translates as i-t.a, where a is the translation of YP and i. is the same
variable that was chosen for the translation of ti inside YP.
These two principles are rather straightforward. I will briefly illustrate their
application by reconsidering sentence (11a) under the VP-internal subject
hypothesis:
(15) a. Every cat meowed.
IP
DPI VP
D NP tj V
every cat,,,. meowed1,,
IP
DP ,-- \
VP
D NP
every cat,,. t1  V
meowed ,
c. XQ[(V.r. cat (w* Xx)) Q(wX )] (LsOr. meow(wiXx,)) = (Vx cat(w Xx)) meow(wsX x)
XwXPXQ [(V.r: P(wXx)) Q(wXx)] (0s) (Lw.cat (w))
= XQ(V.rx cat(wv'vXx)) Q(wXx)
Xx meow(wXx1)
XwvkPXQ(V.c P(wXx)) Q(wXx) cat (w)
x, meow(w)
d. (Vx: cat,.(x)) reoww(x) =- (Vx- cata(x)) meow,(x)
In cases where only the extensional aspect matters, I will sometimes drop the
world subscript. In such cases, all predicates are assumed to be evaluated in the
utterance world wo.
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b.
Finally, I introduce a device for interpreting DP's in their 0-positions. This
device is not strictly necessary for the purposes of this dissertation, although it
allows a more uniform interpretation of VP-internal and VP-external DP's. I will
refer to this mechanism as 'Theta Grid Saturation'. Essentially, verb meanings are
assumed to have their 0-grid filled by 'dummy' 6-roles, e.g.,
sell W,( A,, 8,,, OM , 8m2), the Q being 'placeholders' for constants or variables of
the appropriate semantic type: type e for DP arguments, type (s, t) for CP
arguments, etc. At each Vn node, a V 'expects' a DP meaning (or CP meaning,
etc.) to fulfill the appropriate O-role, thus behaving as a 1-place predicate, in the
following manner:10
(16) Theta Grid Saturation
VP
VP ~> DP ,-- ,
DP 0 VP
V VP
DP ... -
DP Z X02
V DP DP
V(01,0 2, 03) Xe3
By the mechanism in (16), any DP--be it of type e or of type ((s, (e, t)), t)--can be
interpreted directly in its base position. The derivation in (17) illustrates this fact:
10 Note, incidentally, that I have used the label 'VP' as an abbreviation of 'the translation of VP',
'DP' for 'the translation of DP', etc. I will be using this kind of abbreviation in various parts of this
dissertation.
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(17) a. Al gave every hat to Sue.
b. VP
DP
Al V VP
gave ,
DP
tv DP
every hat,. (to) Sue
c. XO, [(Vx. hatw.(x)) givew,(O, x, Sue)] (Al)
= (Vx: hatw,.(x)) give ,(Al, x, Sue)
Al
P [(Vx: hat,.(x)) Pýx)] (Xw X 2.givew(,, 02, Sue))
= (V.x: hat .(x)) give w(0,, x, Sue)
XP(Vx:hat.(x)) P,,(x) X02
%03.give ,(, 0, 02, 3)(Sue)
= givew(01,, 02, Sue)
ue
givew(6,, 02, 03) X03
With this much in mind, let us move on to the interesting part of the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
WIDE SCOPE INDEFINITES
1. Fodor and Sag (1981)
In a 1981 paper on indefinites, Janet Fodor and Ivan Sag (henceforth F&S) argue
that certain kinds of singular indefinites-which are commonly referred to as
'specific'-are not to be treated as quantificational elements, but must be
analyzed as directly referential in the sense of Kaplan (1989). Thus specific
indefinites are likened to demonstratives, whose denotation depends exclusively
on the context of utterance, and not on the structural position in which they
occur.
F&S's argument is based on various observations to the effect that
indefinites appear to have scope possibilities which are usually not allowed for
regular quantifiers. Their 'critical' evidence comes from the ability of indefinites
to escape scope islands, such as complex noun phrases like the rumor-DP in (1)
and the antecedent clause of a conditional, as in (2).
(1) a. Each teacher overheard the rumor that a student of mine had been called
before the dean.
b. Each teacher overheard the rumor that every student of mine had been
called before the dean.
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(2) a. If a student in the syntax class cheats on the exam, every professor will
be fired.
b. If any student in the syntax class cheats on the exam, every professor will
be fired.
In the (a) examples above, the italicized indefinite can be understood as having
matrix scope, while the quantificational noun phrases in the (b) examples clearly
cannot. For instance, while (la) can be understood as stating that there is a
(unique) student of mine such that every teacher heard the rumor that this
student had been called before the dean, (ib) cannot mean that each of my
students is such that John overheard the rumor-a different rumor for each
student-that the student had been called before the dean. But more importantly,
F&S argue, the indefinites in (la)-(2a) do not exhibit the full range of scope
relations that would be predicted by a theory that analyses these elements as
quantificational. Such a theory would have to stipulate that indefinites are
immune to island constraints, but at the same time it would have to explain why
an indefinite, once it escapes from an island, is apparently only allowed to take
maximal scope with respect to any operators outside the island. So, considering
the examples above, F&S claim that (la) cannot have the reading where a student
of mine has scope outside the rumor-DP but within the scope of every teacher. And
similarly, (2a) cannot have a reading where for each professor there is a (possibly
different) student such that if that student cheats, that professor will be fired.
Thus they conclude:
This missing-reading observation is a clear indication that the 'island-
escaping' interpretation of an indefinite is not in fact an instance of a
quantifier that manages to escape the island, but is an instance of something
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very like a proper name or demonstrative which does not participate in the
network of scope relations between true quantifiers, negation, higher
predicates, and the like... [A purely quantificational treatment of indefinites],
even if it assumes that there can be island-escaping quantifiers, offers no
explanation at all for the absence of the intermediate scope readings in such
examples. The normal principles governing quantifier scope would have to
be considerably complicated in order to account for this observation, and the
fact that these complications correlate exactly with the properties of
referential phrases would not be captured. [p. 375]
Unfortunately, the very argument that F&S consider decisive in motivating their
referential treatment of wide scope indefinites does not hold up to a closer
examination of the facts. It has been shown that intermediate readings of
indefinites do exist. (3), for instance, is a variant of an example cited by Partee
and Rooth (1982), who attribute it to Irene Heim:
(3) Each teacher overheard the rumor that a student of hers had been called
before the dean.
This sentence differs minimally from (ib). Here the pronoun hers, which can be
construed as bound by each teacher, facilitates an intermediate reading where the
italicized indefinite is interpreted outside of the rumor-phrase but under the
subject. Another very clear case of an indefinite taking intermediate scope is an
example due to Angelika Kratzer, quoted by Rullmann (1989) and by Diesing
(1992):
(4) Each writer overheard the rumor that she didn't write a book she wrote.
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In the most salient reading of (4), the DP a book she wrote must have scope outside
the rumnor-DP, since the latter is not understood as a self-contradicting rumor; on
the other hand, the indefinite must also be within the scope of each writer,
because it contains a pronoun bound by that quantifier.
As a matter of fact, there are even counterexamples to F&S's claim that there
can be no intermediate readings for an indefinite embedded in the antecedent of
an if- or when- clause. Abusch (1993) provides the following examples:
(5) a. Every professor got a headache whenever a student he hated was in
class.
b. Every professor got a headache whenever there was a student he hated
in class.
(5a) has a reading where for every professor, there is a student he hates such that
whenever that student is in class the professor gets a headache. Under this
reading the indefinite takes scope outside of the whenever-clause but within the
scope of every professor. In contrast, a student he hated in (5b) can only take narrow
scope. This is because the indefinite is not only inside the whenever-clause, it is
also in the postcopular position of a there be_ construction. It is known, at least
since Milsark (1974), that indefinites in these positions cannot take wide scope.
Hence, as Abusch notes, in a situation where some professor A-who hates
students B and C-does not get a headache when B is in class, but does when C is
in class, (5b) is understood as intuitively false but (5a) can still be true
(depending on the state of affairs with respect to other relevant professors and
students).
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The examples in (6) below, 1 which contain various kinds of sentential
modifiers, are additional evidence that an indefinite can get an 'intermediate
scope' reading of the kind F&S claim does not exist. In some of these cases the
intermediate reading-where the indefinite takes scope outside of a relative
clause island, but not outside of the modifier-is even the most prominent:
(6) a. In every town, every girl that a boy was in love with married an
Albanian.
b. Usually, every penny a shoesalesman earns goes for paying bills.
c. In most respected institutions, every word that a professor speaks is
promptly written down by her students.
d. In 80% of the experiments, every test that had been run by a sleepy
graduate student had to be discarded.
e. During an earthquake, most heavy items belonging to a household must
be left behind.
All these sentences have a reading where the italicized indefinite is within the
scope of the temporal/locative/event adverbial, but takes scope outside of the
DP which contains it. For instance, (6b) is naturally understood as meaning that
in most situations involving a shoesalesman, every penny this individual earns is
spent on bills; similarly, (6e) is easily understood as saying that in all situations
(which fit certain prescriptions and) which involve an earthquake and a
household, most heavy items belonging to that household are left behind.
Sometimes the intermediate reading is not the most prominent, but it's still
available. (6d), for instance, can mean that 80% of the experiments were such that
some sleepy graduate was involved, whose tests had to be discarded.
I (6a) is taken from Abusch (op. cit.),
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Schematically, these readings would seem to be derived from LF's such as those
in (7), where the indefinite has moved out of the RC island:
(7) a. [ In every town [a boy]i [,,cevery girl that ti was in love with
married an Albanian] ]
b. [Usually [a shoesalesman]i [Rc every penny that ti earns idoes for
paying bills] ]
c. [ In most respected institutions [a professor]i [Rc every word that ti
speaks is promptly written down by heri students] I
d. [ In 80% of the experiments [a sleepy graduate student]i [Rc every test
that had been run by ti had to be discarded] ]
e. [ Must, during an earthquake [a household]i [,,c most heavy items
belonging to ti be discarded] ]
If we replace the indefinite in any of (6) with a quantificational DP, these
'intermediate' readings are lost:
(8) a. In every town, every girl that noone was in love with married an
Albanian.
b. Usually, every penny most shoesalesmen earn goes for paying bills.
c. In most respected institutions, every word that most professors speak is
promptly written down by their students.
d. In 80% of the experiments, every test that had been run by every sleepy
graduate student had to be discarded.
e. During an earthquake, most heavy items belonging to every household
must be left behind.
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Compare, for instance, (8b) to (6b) above. This sentence might be expected to
have a reading roughly paraphrasable as follows: in most situations, most
shoesalesmen are such that every penny they earn is spent on bills. (8b),
however, does not have this reading; rather, it has a somewhat odd meaning
where the subject is understood approximately as 'every penny which is
(collectively) earned by a majority of shoesalesmen'. In a similar way, (8e) does
not have a reading which might be considered parallel to (6e), viz.: in all
situations of a certain kind that involve an earthquake, and for every household
(in this kind of situation): most heavy items belonging to that household are left
behind; (8e) instead seems to be understood as having to do with heavy items
that somehow belong to all households (collectively). Sometimes the
intermediate reading is not the most prominent, but it's still available. In other
words, the QNP's in (8) cannot take scope outside of the RC island, as shown
below:
(9) a. * [ In every town [noone]i [Rcevery girl that ti was in love with
married an Albanian] ]
b. * [ Usually [a shoesalesman]i [,c every penny that ti earns idoes for
paying bills] ]
c. * [ In most respected institutions [a professor]i [,c every word that ti
speaks is promptly written down by heri students] I
d. * [ In 80% of the experiments [a sleepy graduate student]i [Rc every test
that had been run by ti had to be discarded] ]
e. * [ Must, during an earthquake [a household]i [Rc most heavy items
belonging to ti be discarded]]
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The issue then is: even if we assume that some indefinites are directly referential,
we still need to explain why indefinite DP's that are clearly not referential may
also escape scope islands (as in (3)-(6)), whereas regular QNP's cannot.
Presumably, once we've found an account of these latter facts, we can extend this
account to cases like (1) and (2), thus making the referential treatment redundant.
This is the project of the rest of this section.
2. Indefinites are Variables
Suppose we distinguish indefinite noun phrases from other noun phrases by
treating them as expressions containing a free variable, in the spirit of Kamp
(1981) and Heim (1982). On this approach, indefinites are not intrinsically
quantificational, but they gain quantificational force by being indexed to
quantifiers which c-command them.
In particular, an existential quantifier can be inserted at certain levels in the
structure---what is known as existential closure. I will assume that this operation
applies at least in two places: (a) at the 'text' level, which is by definition the
highest node in a sentence (or string of sentences); and (b) right above VP (cf.
Diesing 1992, Kratzer 1989b). 2 Scopal ambiguities are derived by means of
different LF configurations, not necessarily obtained by Quantifier Raising (QR).
So for instance, sentence (8) has two distinct readings: one where every man saw
a (possibly different) cat, and one where a single cat is such that every man saw
it.
2 Diesing and Kratzer only assume VP-level existential closure, and explicitly reject the text level
option. This correlates with the observation that indefinites that are outside of VP (at LF) are
never interpreted existentially. Thus VP-external indefinites should not be existentially quantified
through 3-closure; rather, they should be analyzed as providing their own quantificational force
and their own presuppositional content. I will ignore these issues here, since ultimately the
system I develop will account for strong readings of indefinites by different means.
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(10) Every man saw a cat.
Both readings can be obtained in principle with no QR. The DP a cat remains
inside VP, while every man is in the specifier of IP (=-AgrsP). For the first reading,
existential closure applies to the VP, yielding the LF in (11a), which is interpreted
straightforwardly as in (11b). 3
(11) a. IP
DP,
^
every, man
32 VP
t Z
saw DP2
a at
b. (Vx,: man(x,)) 3xcat(x,) A saw(x,, x)
For the second reading, existential closure applies at the text level, yielding the
LF in (12a). This LF is interpreted as in (12b). 4
3 The structures in (11) and (12) are not exactly the same as those proposed by Heim, since she
assumes that quantificational noun phrases and indefinites always undergo NP-Prefixing (i.e., a
particular version of QR), for purposes of interpretation. Given the system outlined in Chapter 1,
this movement is not necessary (at least not for the sake of interpretability), since all DP s of type
((e, t), t) can be interpreted in situ.
4 That the equivalence in (12b) holds can be shown by the fact that, by existential instantiation,
(12b) becomes an equivalence of the form (Vy. Fx) [P A Gx] c* P A (Vx- Fx) Gx. This is one of the
so-called con!finement lanws of predicate calculus.
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TIP
DPI VP
every1  man t, '
saw DP2
a at
b. 3x2 (Vx,: man(x)) [cat(X2) A saw(x,, x2)]
c=- 3x4cat(x) A (Vx,: man(x,)) saw(x,, x2]
So the general proposal here is that indefinites are intrinsically different from
true quantifiers, and that their apparent scope is determined by a mechanism of
unselective binding that need not have the same properties as QR. I will show
that this system can lend itself in a natural way to an analysis of the special
behavior of indefinites. For parposes of illustration, let us suppose that-for
some reason-the indefinite a cat in the example above is not allowed to raise
over the subject. We may assume that the ambiguity of (10) is captured by the
fact that there are two occurrences of '3' in the LF of (10), and that each can
optionally bind the indefinite, as in (13):
T b.
IP
DP,
every man
T
2 IP
DP,
every man 3 VP
tI
saw DP2
a at
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(13) a.
3
wwý I
(12) a.
(13a), of course, is interpreted as in (11lb), and (13b) is interpreted as in (12b).
Alternatively, we could assume that any 3-closure operator must
obligatorily capture all free variables in its c-command domain. In this case, we
can still obtain a wide scope reading by letting the indefinite scramble minimally
at LF to escape the VP-level 3-operator and again end up bound by the text level
3-operator. So instead of (13b) we would have a structure as in (13c).
(13) c. T
IP
DPI XP
every man
DP2 IV
a yat 3 VP
saw t2
As the reader can easily verify, the translation of (13c) is the same as that of (13b).
This methodlIogy can be applied to the more complex cases involving
scope islands. It must be kept in mind, however, that if we assume that 3-closure
is obligatory in the sense mentioned above, we will also have to postulate that
scrambling applies not only to DP s but also to larger constituents, like CP
complements of a verb (see later). I will then assume, for simplicity, that 3-
closure is optional, at least when it binds across a CP node.
Now, consider the following sentence, where an indefinite is embedded
inside a CP complement of a factive:
(14) Every cat forgot that a rat had been arrested.
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This sentence has at least three readings. One where a rat takes narrow scope; the
meaning is roughly: for every x1 that is a cat in the utterance world wo, x, forgot
that some rat or other had been arrested. This reading is easy to obtain on
anyone s theory In the current system, all we need is a structure like (15a), which
is interpreted as in (15b).
(15) Narrow scope of a rat:
a. IP
DP, VP
every cat,,.. V CP
forgot,.
C IP
x.l'
e
v
V
arrested ,,
b. (Vx,: cat 1 1,(x,)) foget, ,(x,, Xw3x, [rats,(x2) A arrested 'x])
Next, there is a reading of (14) where a rat takes intermediate scope: for every x,
that is a cat in wo, there is an x2 which is a rat in wo, and xl forgot that x2 had been
arrested. To obtain this reading, we must make sure that the denotation of a rat is
evaluated in the base world, wo, even if the indefinite remains inside the
embedded CP. 5 This should not be taken as a wild assumption. Consider, in fact,
a situation where a QNP is blocked inside a typical scope island, such as the
rumor-phrase below:
5 See Enq (1986) for arguments that DP denotations can be evaluated independently of the tense
of their clause,
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(16) Meg heard the rumor that every one of her hats had gotten wet.
In (16) the DP every one of her hats clearly does not take scope outside the rumor-
DP, i.e., (16) cannot mean that Meg heard a (possibly) different rumor for each of
her hats. Nevertheless, the hats in question are Meg's hats in the utterance world,
not 'rumored' hats or hats rumored to be Meg's. Hence (16) should get an
interpretation roughly as in (17):
(17) hear,}Meg, THEp: rumor,(p) Ap= AXw(Vx,:her, -hat,,( 2)) wtx)
Now, given this fact, we would actually predict two 'intermediate' readings for
our sentence (14): one which is obtained from a structure such as (15a), but with a
rat evaluated in wo; and another which is obtained from a structure where a rat
has scrambled outside of its VP and is captured by a higher 3-closure operator.
The difference, in principle, should be that in the first reading, there is a rat for
every instance of forgetting, while in the second reading there is a forgetting
event for every rat. The first reading is illustrated by (15c).
(15) c. (Vx;: cat (x,)) forget(x,, w Bx2 [ra(x 2) A arrestedx 2)])
Admittedly, I'm not sure whether this particular reading exists. However, if we
substitute the DP a rat in (14) with the plural two rats, the resulting sentence
(Every cat forgot that two rats had been arrested) seems to be more easily understood
as depicting a situation where every cat forgot one thing: namely, that two rats
(in wo) had been arrested. In any case, what we are interested in at this point is
that there exists at least one 'intermediate' reading for (14), rather than none.
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The second predicted reading is perhaps a more literal rendition t' the
prose description given right underneath (15b). A situation appropriate for this
meaning is one where there are two cats, Fifi and Sally; Fifi forgot that a friend of
his, the rat Sammy, had been arrested, while Sally forgot that her mortal enemy,
the rat Slimey, had been arrested. This reading can be obtained by scrambling a
rat outside of its VP so that its variable ends up bound by the 3-operator on the
matrix VP; and, of course, by evaluating its descriptive content at wo:
(18) Intermediate scope of a rat:
a. IP
DP VP
every cat1,. 32
V DP
forgot,,
C IP
%w
DP 2
aIratw. 3 VP
t2 V
arrested,
b. (Vx,: cat,(x,)) Bx2forget,(x1 , Xw[rat,(x2) A arrested,~x)])
The question arises, at this point, as to whether (18b) accurately expresses the
appropriate meaning of (14). In other words, is (18b) equivalent to the more
conventional (19)?
(19) (Vx,: catz(x,)) Bx[ratw(x 2) ^  forget•,(x,, Xw.arrestedd~x2))]
The issue here is rather delicate. For suppose that for everything that is a cat in
w0 there is an entity which is not a rat in w0 e.g., the cat s supper dish. In this
34
case, the expression in (18b) will entail (20a), while the expression in (19) will
entail (20b):
(20) a. (Vx,: catw(x,)) 3x2forget(x, 1, w[O A arrestedJx 2)])
S(Vx,: cat4,,(x,)) 3x2 forgetO(x,, Xw.O)
b. (Vx,: cat,,(x,)) 3x2[0 A forget, (x,, w.arrestedx 2))] = 0
In the above expressions, '0' represents a statement that is always false (under a
given variable assignment), and 'Xw.0' represents the impossible (i.e., false in all
worlds) proposition. (20a), then, asserts that every cat forgot the impossible
proposition, while (20b) is just false. This latter case is what we would expect,
since it represents (an intermediate reading of) (14) under a variable assignment
that does not satisfy the descriptive content of a rat, viz. rat),(x2). This simply
reflects the character of existential quantification: clearly, there are assignments
that don't satisfy rat,,,(x), but presumably there are also assignments that do. So
(19) cannot be falsified by the mere existence of things that aren't rats in wo0 -
thou .h it will be evaluated as false if there exist no rats in wo0.6 (20a), on the other
hand, presents a problem. In fact, it shows us that (18b) will not be false under an
irrelevant variable assignment. In other words, (18b) will be equivalent to the
assertion that 'every cat forgot the impossible proposition' with respect to any
object that does not satisfy rat,(x2). This is clearly not a desirable result.
Fortunately, in this particular case we are dealing with the factive verb forget.
Since factives presuppose their complement, we can assume that the
subexpression [ratw,(x 2)A arrestedx2)] in (18b) must be satisfied for some x2
6 One might find this fact slightly at odds with the intuitive meaning of (14), under an
intermediate reading, since the e, Ance of a rat for every cat seems to be somehow taken for
granted in this case. I will discuss Ls kind of issue at some length in Chapter 3.
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(and for some w ). Hence x2 must be a rat in w0 for all relevant variable
assignments. In this case, (18b) is indeed equivalent to (19).
Finally, there is a reading of (14) where a rat takes matrix scope: there is an
x2 which is a rat in wo, and every cat heard the rumor that x2 had been arrested.
This reading is again obtained by scrambling a rat outside of its VP, but this time
having it bound by text level existential closure, as in (21a).
(21) Wide scope of a rat:
a. T
IP
DP,
every cat,,. 3 VP
V CP
forgot,
C IP
DP2
a rat, . 3 VP
t2 V
arrested,
b. 3x2 (Vx 1:cat%(x,)) forget x,, w[rat,,)2A arrested )
Here, as with (18b) above, we need to consider whether (21b) is equivalent to an
expression like the following:
(22) x, [rat,(x2) A (Vx,:cat(x)) forget,(X, w.arrested w(x2))]
If we assume that ratJ(x2) must be satisfied due to the presuppositions
associated with the factive predicate, then (21b) will be equivalent to (22). So all is
well concerning this example. We will see later, however, that this kind of issue
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will emerge in a great variety of environments, most of which cannot be
dismissed as easily as this particular case.
To recapitulate, in the intermediate and wide scope readings of (14), the
descriptive content of the DP a rat is evaluated with respect to the utterance
world, and not with respect to the 'forget' world(s). But since we are assuming
that QR is restricted, and in fact presumably clausebounded, we do not want to
raise the indefinite out of the embedded CP. In all cases, we have respected this
constraint by interpreting the indefinite inside its CP, and the appearance of wide
scope is determined by which existential operator ends up binding it.
It should be noted that, if we assume that 3-closure obligatorily captures all
free variables in its scope, the CP complement of forget must itself scramble in
order to obtain the wide scope reading of a rat in (21), or the CP complement of
hear in (23a) below will have to scramble to obtain the wide scope reading of a
rat, as in (23b). If, on the other hand, we do not assume obligatoriness of 3-
closure we do not have to assume extensive applications of scrambling, but we
will expect to find cases where one 3-operator binds into the domain of another
3-operator, as shown in (23c) below:
(23) a. Everyone heard from a friend of his that a (certain) rat had been
arrested.
b. 2 Everyone1 [c ...[a rat]2 ...]3 3 [p heard t 3 fr. [a frienr of hisl] 4
c. -2 Everyone1l 4 [P heard [- ... [a at]2 ...] fr. [a fri nd of his] 4
Note that the VP-level 3 in (23) cannot be omitted, since the indefinite a friend of
his needs to be bound at that level. Yet we cannot allow this operator to bind the
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indefinite a rat inside the CP, since the reading we are considering is one where
this DP takes matrix scope. In any case, the optional vs. obligatory status of
existential closure is not an issue which affects this general proposal in any
important way, as far as I can see; so I will leave this issue open, for the time
being.
This general approach would seem quite promising, up to this point: if it
works, is will account for the attested interpretations are without violating any
island constraint, and without assuming any kind of ambiguity in the
interpretation of indefinite noun phrases. Furthermore, it will correctly predict
that the scope possibilities represented by, e.g., the higher occurrences of 3x2 in
(18) and (21) are unavailable to conventional quantificational noun phrases
(QNP's). This is because conventional QNP's are true quantifiers; hence their
scope is still determined by their position in the syntax of LF, where the standard
constraints on QR apply.
So far, the system can elegantly account for the 'atypical' scopal properties
of indefinites. No extra stipulations are needed to derive the attested readings.
Unfortunately, there are some potentially severe problems with this approach.
One of these problems is discussed at length by Abusch (1993). For Abusch, the
system just described is just the beginning of a theory of indefinites. In the
following subsections I will discuss this problem and the approach that she takes
to overcome it.
3. The Problem of Weak Truth Conditions
In the preceding section I have presented a basic proposal that would allows us
to account for the 'exceptional' scope taking properties of indefinite DP's,
without burdening the grammar with ad hoc stipulations about putative
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differences in QR patterns. This proposal simply consists in analyzing indefinites
as unambiguously non-quantificational, and assuming that they may be bound
by an a c-commanding quantifier, which could be text level existential closure,
but can also be some other appropriate operator. This analysis, as presented
above, relies on the idea that indefinites, as variables, can be bound at a distance
by an unselective quantifier without having to actually raise outside of a scope
island. Thus the descriptive content of an indefinite may be evaluated at quite a
distance with respect to the site where its variable is introduced (by the
unselective operator). Abusch shows that this nonlocal evaluation may cause
unreasonably weak truth conditions for expressions with embedded indefinites. 7
She presents two sets of data to make this point.
The first case is illustrated by wide scope indefinites embedded in the
antecedent of an if-clause:
(24) a. Things would be different if every senator had grown up to be a rancher
instead.
b. Things would be different if a senator had grown up to be a rancher
instead.
As already noted for the example in (2b), (24a) cannot have a reading where every
senator is interpreted with wide scope with respect to the conditional. In other
words, (24a) cannot mean that every senator is such that, if (s)he had grown up
to be a rancher, things would be different. By contrast, (24b) can mean that there
is a particular senator such that things would be different if that person had
grown up to be a rancher.
7 This problem was already noticed by Heim in her dissertation (p. 149). Her solution, however,
relies on a more liberal theory of movement than the one assumed by Abusch and myself.
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According to the method sketched above, (24b) is predicted to have an extra
possibility that (24a) does not have. This is because every senator in (24a) is a true
quantifier, and-like any other DP-it cannot escape the if-clause island; on the
other hand, the indefinite a senator in (24b) can be bound from outside of the
island by text-level existential closure. Hence (24a) can be interpreted as in (25a),
but not as in (25b), which would involve on'ing every senator out of the island:
(25) a. (WOULD ,:(Vx: senator,,i(x)) rancherx)) things-are-different,,
b. # (Vx: senator, (x)) (WOULD,: rancher,(x)) things-are-different,,,
(24b), on the other hand, is predicted to have a narrow scope reading where the
indefinite is bound by the modal operator as shown in (26a) below (as mentioned
earlier, an indefinite can be bound by an operator other than existential closure);
and it also has a wide scope reading where the indefinite is bound by text-level
3-closure, as shown in (26b):
(26) a. (WOULD, x: senator,,(x) A rancherx)) things-are-different,
b. 3x (WOULD: ' senator, (x) A rancherj(x)) things-are--different4,
Note that, as seen earlier, the property of being a senator is evaluated with
respect to the base world wo in all the expressions above. This is because in all
relevant readings of (24a-b) we are considering individuals who are senators in
this world, not in any counterfactual world.
But now a problem arises. The problem is that in (26b) the indefinite
description senator,(x) is buried inside the antecedent of a conditional, while its
binder is outside of the conditional; this fact, Abusch points out, will cause (26b)
to have inappropriate truth conditions. The reasoning goes as follows: in the
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translations for (24), the if-clause is treated as the restriction of a quantifier (see
Lewis, Kratzer, etc.). Under standard assumptions about restricted universal
quantification, an empty restriction will cause the larger quantificational
expression to be evaluated as (trivially) true. Thus, for instance, in a world (wo)
with no senators all of (25)-(26) will be evaluated as true. This is a result we can
live with.
However, as Abusch notes, in (26b) the situation is not so easily tolerable. In
(26b), in fact, the conditions under which the restriction of would is not satisfied
are much more generalized, and in fact are quite independent of the existence of
senators in the base world. We read (26b) as:
(27) There is an x such that: in every counterfactual world w where [x is a
senator in wo and x is a rancher in w] things are different in w.
Now, typically a base world (wo) will contain a huge number of entities that are
not senators, like this crack in the wall, this lamp, that cup of coffee. Now, any of
these things will make a statement like (27) true when assigned as a value to x .
So (27) would become, for instance: "This crack in the wall/lamp/cup of coffee is
such that: in every counterfactual world w where [this crack/lamp/cup is a
senator in wo and a rancher in w] things are different in w." Obviously, the first
conjunct of the restriction is not satisfied by any of these entities, so the whole
restriction is evaluated as false. Since the restriction is not satisfied, the
conditional is evaluated as true. This is clearly an unacceptable result.
Abusch further observes that this problem is not restricted to intensional
contexts. Consider the following examples:
41
(28) Professor Himmel rewarded every student who read a book he had
recommended.
We're interested here in the reading where Himmel recommended one particular
book, and we're evaluating the truth of the statement that he rewarded every
student who read this book. Again, our nonlocal binding approach would yield
an expression where the indefinite is inside the restriction of a quantifier:
(29) 3x (Vy: stud(y) A read(y, x) A book(x) A recomm(H, x)) reward(H, y)
This translation of (28) has.exactly the same problem that (26b) had. For any
object which we assign as a value to x, and which is not a book (or was not
recommended by Himmel), (29) will come out true. The problem of weak truth
conditions obtains exactly in those cases that we were originally hoping to
account for;8 thus the system proposed in section 2, as it stands, does not
constitute a solution to F&S's scope puzzle.
To overcome this difficulty, Abusch argues that an indefinite description
must always be interpreted in the vicinity of its binder, fsif the DP had actually
raised. She then proceeds to construct a mechanism that will achieve this result,
which I will discuss below.
8 Some exceptions to this might be definite complex noun phrases, which could be assumed to
presuppose their descriptive content, and hence be treated in a similar way as the factive case
discussed earlier. In general, however, it is not the case that scope islands can be treated as
presuppositional, as we will see in Chapter 3.
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3.1. Abusch's proposal
The problem just outlined is potentially fatal to the proposal sketched above.
Nevertheless, Abusch argues that the basic Kamp-Heim approach-roughly in
the form illustrated above 9 -should not be given up. Since the problem of weak
truth conditions is caused by the restriction of the 3-closure operator being
bound at a distance, Abusch proposes to add a device to the system that will
derive local configurations from nonlocal ones. Clearly, in order to maintain the
generalization that no noun phrase can QR out of a scope island, a mechanism
different from QR must be used. So Abusch develops a variation on the Kamp-
Heim method, as follows.
(I) the basic idea that indefinites are free variables, which gain
quantificational force by being coindexeci to unselective operators is retained; but
at the same time (II) Abusch proposes that there is a mechanism which
automatically passes up all variables-with their associatec, descriptions-along
the tree, a mechanism roughly similar to the storage techniques commonly used
in 'non-movement' frameworks (see in particular Cooper 1983). Finally (III), a
general rule will determine the site of the interpretation of an indefinite when its
description is local to a coindexed operator.
I will now give an idea of how Abusch's method works. The semantics for
definite and indefinite noun phrases can be roughly deduced from the
translations of the following sentences:
9 Abusch apparently assumes that 3-closure will only optionally capture free variables in its c-
command domain. Hence in her system there is no need for scrambling, but presumably there are
instances of quantifiers binding into each other's c-command domain (see discussion of ex. (23)
above).
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(30) a. A manl arrived ~> arrive(x,) : ((xI, man(x,))}
b. The man 1 arrived -> arrive(x,) : (
The LF's that Abusch uses are maximally similar to those in Heim (1982). The
lowest S node in the LF's of (30a-b) are both interpreted as the open formula
arrive(x,) while the highest S node is interpreted as the pair p:U, where p is
arrive(x,) (viz., the conventional interpretation of the sentence minus its
descriptive noun phrases), and U is a set that contains the pair (xi, man(x,)) in the
case of (30a) and is empty in the case of (30b). Moving up the tree, the union of
the U-sets of the relevant daughter nodes is inherited by the mother node, as
stated in the appropriate composition rule. When an operator is found which
binds some variable in U, the corresponding element is removed from the set and
added to the expression (p. A simple example of how this works is illustrated in
(31).
(31) a. A man arrived and a woman left.
b.
31.2 S
S S
a manl arrived and a woman2 left
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S 31.2 man(x,) A woman(x2) J (x,, man(x,)) (x,, man(x,))2 arrive(x,) A leave( 2) (x2, woman(x2)) (x2, woman(x2) )
= ,[man(x,) A woman(x 2) Aarrive(x,) leave(x)]: (
x( man 
(x))
31.2 arrive(x,) A leave(x2) :\(x 2, woman(,) f
arrive(x,) : ((xi, man(x,))) leave(x 2) : (x 2, woman(x2))}
In (31b-c) the text level 3 binds all variables free in its scope; hence the
restrictions man(x,) and woman(kr) are brought up and 'discharged' in the
vicinity of this operator. At the same time, they are removed from the U-set of
the text node. This means that, had there been more structure above that node,
these restrictions would not have been available to higher unselective binders.
More generally, any elements of a U-set which are not (yet) in the vicinity of their
binder are passed up beyond other operators, until the appropriate binder is
found-i.e., the binder that bears the relevant indices. So this mechanism insures
that all indefinites will be interpreted locally with respect to their binder.
Note that, even in Abusch's system, the existential quantifier is not the only
operator that can target a free variable. In particular, a quantificational
determiner can also have this effect. Consider the following example:
(32) Every person who likes everyone who likes a cat likes the cat.
We are interested in the intermediate scope reading of a cat, viz. for every person
x such that: there is a cat such that x likes everyone who likes this cat, x likes the
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cat. Abusch obtains this reading by copying the index of a cat onto the higher
every, as shown in (33).
(33) s
every 1,3 e0
e, VP
rnlikes [the cat] 3person who
every 2  NP0
ei  VP
NP2  CP
._ one likes e2one who
who S
[a cat] 3  e2 likes e3
Another assumption that Abusch borrows from Heim (1982) is that a simple
noun phrase out of which a quantifier has raised is interpreted in the same ,way
as an indefinite; in Abusch's system, the translation of this constituent will also
become an element of the U-set of its mother node. In particular, the
(determinerless) head of a relative clause will undergo this treatment. Given this
much, we can now see how (33) is interpreted in Abusch's system:
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pers(xl,) A cat (x) A
(34(x Vx: pers(x,)Aclate(xx)A like(x, Ike
every 3  2 like(x 2) like(x.): (like (xr, x,) (XI.ct (X3
S((x,, pers(x,))>
(Vx2 llke(x2,.r,)A like (x,, x2) : ((xA.9 cat (x3.))
I , f "N.
every 2  lKe(x2,3) ( mtx, XV )
: ((x2 pers(X2))> like(x2, xI): (XI, cat (x)))
In this example, the restriction cat(x3) is passed up all the way to the top tripartite
quantificational structure (note the presence of the element (x3, cat(x3)) in all the
U-sets of the subject of (34), going up from the bottom-most occurrence of
cat(x3)). On the other hand, the restriction pers(x2), for instance, is immediately
captured by its quantificational deteminer, every2. Hence every description ends
up interpreted in a local configuration with its binder.
To see that this system is immune from the problem of weak truth
conditions discussed above, it is sufficient to note that the problematic cases (24b)
and (28), repeated below, will now receive the translations in (35) and (36),
respectively:
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(24) b. Things would be different if a senator had grown up to be a rancher
instead.
(35) 3x [senator ,(x) A (WOULD,: rancher,,(x)) things-are-different,]
(28) Professor Himmel rewarded every student who read a book he had
recommended.
(36) x[book(x) A reconun(H, x) A (Vy: stud(y) A read(y, x)) reward(H, y)]
Recall that the problem with the translations in (21b) and (24) above was that the
mere existence of an entity which didn't satisfy senator,,(x) or
'book(x) A recomm(H, x)' (resp.) would lead to excessively weak truth conditions.
(35) and (36), however, will be evaluated as false for any assignment(s) to x
which do not satisfy these restrictions. And if there is at least one assignment (in
each case) which satisfies senator,,(x) or 'book(x) A recomm(H, x)', then the truth
conditions will quite reasonably be evaluated with respect to what actually is the
case concerning a certain senator, or a certain book recommended by Himmel.
It should be kept in mind that this treatment of determinerless NPs as
variables will not allow regular quantifiers to escape scope islands, since in any
case the relevant description will be eliminated from the U-set as soon as its
associated quantificational determiner is encountered. On this issue, Abusch
remarks:
[W]e could say that scope of NP quantification is determined by the LF
position of the quantificational determiner, without assuming (as Heim does)
that a quantificational determiner and its source NP are sisters in LF. Since
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this version of the theory would still assume movement of the determiner,
islands predictions would presumably not be affected. [p. 29]
This theory then explicitly posits two distinct but simultaneous mechanisms for
representing scope configurations. While some theories assume that such
configurations are uniformly achieved by movement and others assume that they
can be captured exclusively by means of a storage-and-percolation technique, the
claim made here is that both mechanisms are operative at the same time; the
difference between the two is that movement is sensitive to islands constraints,
while percolation of noun phrase descriptions isn't. One might wonder whether
there couldn't be a less costly way of constructing a theory of quantifier scope.
On the other hand, the interpretations obtained appear to be the correct
ones (cf., e.g., (35) and (36)), 10 and the undesirable effects discussed at the
beginning of this section are avoided. Yet, the general idea of lifting out the
restriction of an indefinite is not immune to certain problems. These problems
will be discussed in the following section.
3.2. Problems with Abusch's Proposal
In this subsection I will not be concerned with the details of Abusch's approach. I
will rather take issue with what can be considered a family of approaches that
would have the effect of carrying up all indefinite descriptions to a position local
to their binder. I will call this general line of analysis the 'Locally Restricted
Quantifier' (LRQ) approach. The question that I want to address now is the
following: are the representations generated under an LRQ approach really the
10 But see my discussion at the end of Chapter 3 for a criticism of the truth conditions of these
expressions.
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correct ones? I will argue that they aren't, and that the descriptive content of an
indefinite must be interpreted within the clause from which it originates.
As I mentioned earlier, this 'restricted-movement' implementation of a
Kamp-Heim analysis of indefinites seems attractive enough to maintain (in its
unembellished form), even in the face of the problem of weak truth conditions
discussed at the begirming of this section. In order to save this analysis one could
proceed in either of two ways: (a) by assuming a presuppositional treatment of
specific indefinites, or of certain constituents which may contain specific
indefinites-typically, and for our purposes here, the restriction of a strong
quantifier; or (b) by bringing the indefinite description closer to its binder. The
latter approach is the one taken by Abusch. The former remains to be explored.
In what follows, I will first give a number of arguments against the general
approach of the (b) type, and then proceed to construct various attempts of a
solution along the lines of (a), ultimately proposing an account that exploits the
topical nature of specific indefinites. This account will be seen to overcome the
problem of weak truth conditions, without invoking a semantics that has
excessively strong truth conditions.
3.2.1. Indefinites and Weak Crossover
It has often been observed that specific indefinites do not behave like regular
quantifiers with respect to Weak Crossover. The following examples are from
Hornstein (1984, pp. 25-26): "
11 Hornstein actually speaks in terms of the Leftness Condition (cf. Chomsky 1976, Higginbotham
1980). This constraint states that a variable cannot be coindexed with a pronoun to its left.
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(37) a. * Hisi being sent to the front doesn't bother every good soldieri.
b. Hisi being sent to the front doesn't bother a (certain) good soldieri.
c. * That he i might be sent to the front doesn't bother every good soldier .
d. That hei might be sent to the front doesn't bother a (certain) good
soldieri .
Chierchia (1993) suggests that whatever constraints are responsible for WCO
effects must be active at a level of the grammar which follows (semantic)
reconstruction, i.e., presumably in the interpretive component. I cannot hope to
do justice to Chierchia's (rather complex) set of arguments here. But one in
particular is worth mentioning.
Consider the following example:
(38) When iti is hungry, a cati usually meows.
Chierchia provides several arguments to show that this sentence must be
assigned the structure in (39), where the when-phrase is generated right-adjoined
to I' and has raised to left-adjoined to IP:
(39) IP
CPk IP
when iti is hungry DP I'
a cati
I' tk
usually TP
ti meows
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Thus (38)-(39) would appear to be a WCO/leftness condition violation. However,
Chierchia argues, there is no violation if we assume that the relevant principle
regulating WCO effects applies after reconstruction has taken place. Such
reconstruction would 'correspond' to a structure as in (40).12
IP
DP I'
a cati
I'
usually TP
ti meows
CP
when iti is hungry
But reconstruction, in Chierchia's system, is done by means of X-conversion,
hence it must apply not directly to the LF but to its translation. Consequently,
WCO effects must be checked at that (post-syntactic) level.
If Chierchia is right, it is hard to see how Abusch's system would be able to
discriminate between the illformed cases in (37a-c) and the grammatical cases in
(37b-d). This is because the interpretations that her system would assign to these
sentences would all fall under the same general format:
12 The same reasoning, at least as far as concerns the leftness condition, would apply if we
assumed structures for (38) as in (i.a) and (i.b) in lieu of (39) and (40), respectively:
(i) a. IP b.
CPk
when iti is hungry e I'
I' tk
usually TP
a cati meows
IP
e I'
CP
usually TP
when iti is hungry
a cati meows
52
(40)
(41) a. * (Vx: good-soldier(x)) -bother(^sent-to-the-front(x), x)
b. 3x [good-soldier(x) A -bother(^sent-to-the-front(x), x)]
Note that even if Abusch had chosen to treat the subject clause of (37a-b) as a
russelian definite description, she would not be able to discriminate between the
two cases, since her translations in this case would presumably be as in (42).
(42) a. * (Vx: good-soldier(x)) (THE p: p = ^sent-to-the-front(x)) -,bother(p, x)
b. 3x[good-soldier(x) A (THEp: p = ^sent-to-tohe-front(x)) 
-bother(p, x)
In my system, the indefinite does not have to be local to its binder. Hence, if
Chierchia's generalization proves correct, I could easily account for the WCO
facts by adopting a russelian analysis of definite descriptions in the conte>. t of my
current proposal. In such case, my translation of (37a) would still be as in (42a),
while my translation for (37b) would be as in (43).
(43) 3x(THE p: p = ^sent-to-the-front(x)) [good-soldier(x) A -bother(p, x)]
Even aside from whether or not definite descriptions should be given a russelian
analysis, it suffices for us to assume that their interpretation should reflect their
structural position at LF. This issue will be taken up in Chapter 3.
3.2.2. Functional Readings of Indefinites
Another problem for Abusch's account concerns situations where an indefinite
must be decomposed in one way or another, so that one part of it needs to take
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matrix scope, while another part must be interpreted in situ, since it contains a
bound variable. The clearest cases of this kind are functional readings of
indefinites. Hintikka (1986) illustrates the issue quite clearly. Consider the
following sentence:
(44) I know that every true Englishman adores a certain woman.
Under one reading of (44) it is understood that there is a certain woman (e.g. the
Queen) that is such that I know every true Englishman adores her. In this reading
the whole indefinite is interpreted as having matrix scope, which Hintikka
represents roughly as in (45).
(45) x [woman(x) A know(I, (Vy: true-Engl(y) adore(y, x))]
But there is also one reading where a certain woman is interpreted as a function of
every triue Englishman. For instance, (44) can be understood as "I know that every
true Englishman adores his mother." In this case, the indefinite must take scope
outside of the epistemic predicate know, but within the scope of the universal
quantifi er, since the value of the function depends on it. But at the same time, the
quantifier must 1-e within the scope of know. This gives rise to an apparent linear
paradox. Hintikka proposes to solve this paradox by existentially binding a
function from individuals to individuals at the matrix level. The function applied
to the variable of every true Englishman is then taken to be the interpretation of a
certain woman in the embedded direct object position:
(46) 3f know(I, (Vy: true-Engl(y)) adore(y, f(y)))
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The issue applies more generally to monoclausal sentences like (47a), as well as
in the-by now familiar-cases of conditionals and complex DPs, as in (47b-c-d).
(47) a. Every true Englishman adores a certain woman.
b. Things would be different if everybody would listen to a certain voice
inside his head [e.g., the voice of his conscience].
c. Every city that has a certain problem that afflicts its streets [e.g., dogshit
on the sidewalks] could adopt this program.
d. Everybody heard the rumor that a certain relative of his [e.g., his uncle]
had won the Nobel Prize.
Let us adopt the technical part of Hintikka's proposal.13 The functional reading
of (47a) would then be represented as in (48) below.
(48) 3Jf (Vy: true-Engl(y)) adore(y, f(y))
This expression depicts the appropriate scopal relations in the relevant reading of
(47a), but it seems a bit impoverished. The fact that the range of f is restricted to
women appears nowhere in (48). Clearly, we must allow the indefinite in (47a) to
correspond to any kind of function-depending on context-from Englishmen to
13 There are some aspects of the discussion in Hintikka (1986) that have been criticized. In
particular, Higginbotham (1994) argues that the notion that "a certain is used to indicate that [the
identity of the thing or person in question] is known but not divulged [Hintikka 1986, p.335]"
cannot be right. I agree with Higginbotham here. The example in (i) below is evidence that
indefinites with a certain, even when they take matrix scope, can easily be used by a speaker even
when she or he has no knowledge whatsoever of the identity of the object in question:
(i) Everybody is convinced that things would be different if a certain senator had
resigned from office, but I'm not sure which senator they're talking about.
This sentence can be uttered by someone who is aware that one particular senator is under
discussion, but could not divulge this senator's identity because s/he simply does not have this
knowledge.
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women, but there can be no context where f (in the case of (47a)) can be
understood as a function from Englishmen to, say, saltshakers. And to assume
that there is another place in the grammar where all functions are appropriately
restricted in their content seems not only more cumbersome for the grammar
itself but uninsightful, since the descriptive content of the indefinite is overt and
can be easily accomodated by our standard compositional semantics. For
instance, (48) can be replaced by (49).
(49) 3f (Vy: true-Engl(y)) [woman(f(y)) A adore(y, f(y))]
(49) says that there is a function such that, for every true Englishman, this
function yields a woman that this Englishman adores. This seems appropriate
enough. Now, a theory of the LRQ kind would have to carry out the restriction
woman(f(y)) in (49). This is not necessary for the sake of (49) itself, but rather
because of the more general fact that an indefinite interpreted as a function will
behave no differently from any other indefinite in cases like (47) with respect to
the problem of weak truth conditions, as one can easily verify. So an LRQ theory
might generate a representation like (50) below. The problem is, in this case the
formula obtained is not wellformed, since the variable y in the restriction of the
indefinite fails to be bound:
(50) # 3f [woman(f(y)) A (Vy: true-Engl(y)) adore(y, f(y))]
In order to overcome this difficulty, the restriction on th? indefinite would have
to be manipulated by a rule that could 'look inside' it and universally bind a
selected subset of its free variables. In the case at hand, we might obtain a
(wellformed) representation as in (51).
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(51) 3f [vx[woman(xx)) A (Vy: true-EngI(y);) adore(y, f(y))]
(51) says that there is a function that maps everything onto something which is a
woman, and every true Englishman adores the result of that function applied to
him. This kind of translation is reminiscent of those used for functional questions
in Engdahl (1986). For instance, Engdahl translates the sentence in (52a)-under a
functional reading where every author recommends a different book, e.g., his
latest book--essentially as in (52b):
(52) a. Which book did every author recommend?
b. •p 3f [Vx [book(f(x))] A p= ^(Vy: author(y) recommend (y, (f(y)))]
This general format is borrowed from Cooper's (1979) treatment of certain
anaphoric pronouns, like the 'paycheck' pronoun in (53).
(53) John gave his paycheck to his dog.
Everybody else put it in the bank.
According to Cooper's proposal, the second sentence in (53) is translated as in
(54), where the appropriate assignment function assigns John to uo and u's
paycheck to So.14
14 Cooper's rule for interpreting these kinds of pronouns is as follows:
(i) P rx vy[J (InJ(y) e  = x] JAP(x)
where P is a property-denoting expression
containing only free variables and parentheses.
Cooper also proposes to use this treatment for donkey-pronouns, which under our current
approach are already accounted for without any special rule.
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Vy[[So(u)l(Yy) -+ y = x](54) (Vu: person(u) ^Au uo# ) 3x (54) put-in-the-bank(u, x)
(54), under the appropriate assignment, says that for every person u distinct from
John, there is a unique x that is u's paycheck, and u put x in the bank. This idea
constitutes a precedent for Engdahl's treatment of functional wh, and as a matter
of fact Engdahl has some further arguments to justify interpreting the wh-
restriction at the matrix level (and hence the necessity of this extra universal
quantification).
First of all, Engdahl observes that separating off the restriction of a wh-
phrase is not desirable from a compositional point of view, since "it involves
semantically splitting up a constituent which syntactically behaves like a unit. [p.
250]"15 Furthermore, she argues, if we interpret a wh-phrase description as part
15 Engdahl also argues that the decomposition approach will run into trouble exactly in those
cases where we have a functional interpretation of a wh-phrase, as in (i.a), which she assumes
would be translated as in (i.b):
(i) a. Which woman does every Englishman admire most?
(His mother.)
b. Xp3F p= (Vx . Engl(x)) (Vy: F(womanXy))admire(x, y)]
Engdahl observes that (i.b) does not give us the required meaning, since the denotation of the
common noun woman does not contain a variable bound by every Englishmcn; this means that
F(woman) will pick out a fixed set of women, and (i.b) will be the set of propositions of the form
"Every Englishman admires every y that is a member of a certain set of women."
This argument does not hold, however, if we translate the relevant reading of (i.a) as in (ii).
(ii) Xp3f[p= (Vx- Engl(x)) [woman (f(x)) A admire (x, (f(x)))]]
But this, Engdahl argues, amounts to treating common nouns as "inherently [functional],
containing one or more free individual variables [p. 251], but I see no independent motivation for
this move." It will turn out, however, that Cooper's pronoun rule is not needed, and hence the
rule no longer counts as 'independent motivation' for Engdahl's 'universally-quantified
specification' approach. At this point, I see no harm in assuming that common nouns-or other
parts of a DP-may in general contain (covert) free variables, rather than having the variables
inserted by a rule.
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of the propositions that constitute the question, we predict that a sentence like
(55) should mean that John is wondering about a tautology:
(55) John wondered which of the students were students.
In other words, if we don't interpret the entire content of the phrase which of the
students outside of the embedded IP, we get a meaning which is roughly "John
bears tee wonder relation to a set of propositions of the form: for what x: x is a
student and x is a student." Clearly, this is not the most salient reading of (55).
With respect to the first point, it has been shown by a number of authors
(e.g., Higginbotham 1993, Cresti 1995a, 1995b) that wh-phrases (most notably how
many-phrases) often need to be decomposed in order to yield correct
interpretations; these are cases where the meaning of a significantly large
subconstituent of these DP's must be reconstructed to a pre-movement position.
As to the second point, we have seen in our discussion of the rumor examples in
section 2 that a DP can be interpreted independently of the tense or world index
of its clause, hence an 'in situ' interpretation of (55) would plausibly be more like
the following: "John bears the wonder relation (in wo) to a set of propositions (i.e.,
a set of sets of worlds w) of the form: for what x: x is a student in w0 and x is a
A potentially more serious problem for a 'decomposition' approach is mentioned by
Engdahl in a footnote (and credited to Groenendijk and Stokhof 1981). Suppose a sentence like
(iii.a) is assigned a translation as in (iii.b) or (iii.c).
(iii) a. Which picture of herself did no girl send in?
b. p F [p = ^(Nor. girl(x)) (Vy: F(plt-of-xy)) send-in(x, y)]
c Xp3f[ p= A(NO grl(x)) [plct-or-x(f(x)) Asend-in(x, (f(x)))]]
(iii.b) is a set of propositions of the form "No girl sent-in every y that is a member of a certain set
of her pictures," while (iii.c) is a set of propositions of the form "There is an f such that for no girl
x, f(x) is a picture of herself and x sent-in f(x)." Clearly, neither of these translations is an
appropriate rendition of the meaning of (iii.a). This general problem will be discussed in detail in
section 4.
59
student in w." Now, this does not mean that John is wondering about a
tautology. So the problem boils down to whether there is some other significant
difference between expressions like (56a) and (56b) as candidate translations for
the de re reading of (55), and if so, which one is a more appropriate translation of
this reading:16
(56) a. wonder,.John, p 3x [ student(x) Ap = Xw.studentw(x)]
b. wonder (John. Xp Bx p= Xw [student (x) A studentw(x)1])
It seems to me that there is no crucial difference between (56a) and (56b). Neither
has weak truthconditions of the kind discussed earlier, since as long as there
exists one entity which is a student in wo the corresponding set will contain at
least one (true) proposition. If, on the other hand, there exist no students in wo,
both (56a) and (56b) will be interpreted essentially as the assertion that John is
wondering about the impossible proposition:
(57) a. wonderj,(John, Xp3x[OAp = ~w.studentw(x)])
= wonder,., (John, Xp.O) = wonder %,(John, (X w.O})
b. wonder ,(John, AXp3xp = w [0 A studentw(x)]])
= wonder(,,(John, ({•w.0})
This result seems to be of no particular consequence, hence the motivations
behind a choice of representations like (56a) over representations like (56b) can
be considered sufficiently weak to not be decisive. In any case, it seems to me
16 The fact that sentences like (55) exhibit a de re/de dicto ambiguity is discussed in some detail by
Groenedijk and Stokhof (1982), who actually propose structures more similar to (56b) than (56a).
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that phrases like which of the students should be treated as presuppositional; thus
student1 ,,(x) would have to be satisfied by some entity in order for (56a) or (56b)
to have a truthvalue at all. Since this option will be discussed in great detail and
in a more general setting in the next chapters, I will not comment further on it
here.
It seems to me, then, that there are no strong reasons in favor of interpreting
wh-phrase descriptions outside of their proposition. Although the purpose of this
chapter is not to propose a particular analysis of questions, I think it is
sufficiently clear at this point that a universal quantification device (as seen, e.g.,
in (52)) need not be invoked in these cases. So, a fortiori, it appears unnecessary
to add this device to the interpretation of indefinites that have a (wide scope)
functional reading. All we need to do in these cases (pace the problem of weak
truthconditions) is bind a function variable at the appropriate level while leaving
the indefinite description (nearly) in situ, as in (49).
Finally, it should be noted that the contribution of certain does not in and of
itself guarantee maximal scope. Consider the following example:
(58) Many ethnomusicologists claim that every person who is bitten by a
tarantula will react to a certain tune, different from all others he or she
has heard, by beginning to dance to that tune. (Of these
ethnomusicologists,) some say that the tune is the one preferred by the
particular tarantula which bit the victim and which allegedly possesses
his body, while others say that the preference is latent in the victim's
mind.
In (58) the contribution of a certain is to highlight the fact that there is some kind
of 'preferential' relation between a victim of a tarantula bite and a (particular)
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tune. It is also suggested that this salience relation is claimed to be the same for
all victims. At the same time, however, there is disagreement among
ethnomusicologists as to what salience relation is at stake. In other words, for any
ethnomusicologist xi (of the ones mentioned in (58)), the claim can be viewed as
stating that there is a function ft such that for every victim vj, vj will react to a
particular tune identified by fi(vj), i.e., the tune that is salient to vj in accordance
with the function ft. Given the continuation of (58), we know that for some xi , fi
is approximately equal to 'the tune preferred by the tarantula that bit vj', while
for other xi, ft is roughly 'the tune that vj prefers (on some subconscious level)'.
Hence in the first sentence of (58) the function variable does not take matrix
scope; rather, we have a representation of the kind in (59):17
(59) (MANYx: ethnom,,,,(x)) 3f Xw (V v: victim ,.(V))v, f AV))[react z(v, f ( ))I~
3.2.3. Specific Indefinites and Bound Variables
Aside from functional interpretations of indefinites, one can also find 'simple'
wide scope indefinites which contain a pronoun bound by a quantifier within
their scope. A few examples follow:
17 Although I treat many as a strong quantifier here, my proposal can be extended to plural
indefinites; so eventually many should be analyzed as a cardinality predicate. In any case, my
current argument is not affected by whatever treatment one chooses for many.
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(60) a. If every Italian in this room could manage to watch a certain program
about his Country (that will be aired on PBS tonight), we might have an
interesting discussion tomorrow.
b. No doctor believed the claim that a (certain) member of her profession
had been arrested.
c. Everyone who used the bathroom between 2 and 4 pm was questioned
about a sink that &1E could have broken.
In (60a) the indefinite can refer to a single program, in (60b) it can refer to a single
person, and in (60c) it could refer to a single sink. Although the entity in question
remains constant, its description tells us that one of its properties is 'quantified
into' by the c-commanding subject. Suppose we have a simplified version of
(60b):
(61) No doctor respects a (certain) member of her profession.
Here a functional interpretation would be inappropriate, since the indefinite
pidks out just one individual. So now we have a puzzle: if we translate (61)-
under the wide scope bound-pronoun reading-as in (62b), as Abusch would
have it, we obtain an ill-formed logical representation where the variable y in the
indefinite description is not bound; but if we translate (61) as in (62b), as I am
proposing, we again obtain an expression that has excessively weak
truthconditions: 18, 19
18 This is so because any expression of the form no ep is made true by a state of affairs where (in
set theoretic terms) <p'nr' = 0. Cf. the discussion of monotone decreasing quantifiers in Chapter
3.
19 As mentioned earlier, DP's of the form no CN are best analyzed as true quantifiers.
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(62) a. # 3x[member-of -y's-profession(x) A (Noy: doctor(y)) respect(y, x)
b. 3x (Noy: doctor(y)) [member-of-y's-profession(x) A respect(y, x)
Here the indefinite description cannot be carried out over the scope of the
quantifier-by any means-because the logical representation itself requires that
the variable in the indefinite description be bound by this quantifier. So (62a) is
hopelessly inadequate as a representation of the meaning of (61). What we need
to do, then, is maintain a representation along the lines of (62b) and try to find a
solution to the problem of weak truthconditions.
This issue, of course, is completely general. In the next chapter, I will
discuss various options for interpreting indefinites approximately in situ while
overcoming the problem of weak truthconditions. All these options rely on some
kind of presuppositional account for the sentences involved. The first of these
accounts will end up being too strong, and both the first and the second will be
argued to not cover the whole range of attested possibilities. The third option
will overcome the difficulties observed with the first two, and in addition will
provide an interesting insight on the issue of why indefinite DP's appear to
exhibit a 'weak'/'strong' ambiguity.
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CHAPTER 3
CAN WIDE SCOPE INDEFINITES BE INTERPRETED IN SITU?
1. Hypothesis 0: Quantifier Restrictions Cannot be Empty
Having concluded that the LRQ approach is not satisfactory, we are left with the
problem of weak truth conditions discussed in section 3 of the previous chapter.
Recall that the problematic examples were of the general tripartite form (where
RC = 'Restrictive Clause', NS = 'Nuclear Scope'):
every RC NS(1) would or, equivalently:
every RC
would
If we follow the general strategy of analyzing quantifier meanings as relations
between sets, we obtain maximally simple definitions where the universal
quantifiers like every and would express a relation of inclusion, in which the
restrictive term may or may not be the empty set; at the same time, existential
quantifiers are explicitly defined as relations between nonempty sets: 1,2
1 (2a) are essentially the definitions of Barwise and Cooper (1981); (2b) roughly correspond (in set
theoretic notation) to the definitions of the 'O-+ ' and 'O-- ' operators of Lewis (1973).
2 The relational definition of some cannot be used (compositionally) in a system where existential
closure is not adjacent to its restriction. But this need not bother us here, since the definitions in
(2) are only used for illustrative purposes.
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(2) a. [every] = (XRcXNs) E P(E)xga(E) IXRc C XNs )
cf. [somelj = (XRC.XNS) a p(E)xp(E) IXRC, n XNS •0>
b. [would]] = (4CIcOs) e P(W)xgP(W) IVC (4s
cf. [might = (4(c,, ac gp(W)xp(W) 1 c n (qs 0
This means that the universal quantifiers in (24) and (21b) from sect. 3-repeated
here as (3) and (4) resp.--will contain pairs of which the first member is the
empty set; i.e., every in (3) will contain the pair (0, (y: reward(H, y) )), and would
in (4) will contain the pair (0, (w: things-are--different},)):
(3) 3x (Vy: stud(y) A read(y, x) A book(x) A recomm (H, x) ) reward (H, y)
RC NS
(4) Bx (WOULD w: senator ,(x) A rancher,(x) ) things-are-differentw
RC NS
So, if {y: stud(y) A read(y, x) A book(x) A recommn(H, x)) = 0 because, say, x is not
a book, the tripartite structure in (3) will be (trivially) satisfied; and similarly for
(4), if w: senatori(x) A rancherw(x) = 0 because x is not a senator in wo.
The first idea that comes to mind is to treat restrictions on (universal)
quantifiers as presuppositional, i.e., to disallow altogether pairs like
(0, (y: reward(H, y)) in (3) or like (0, (w: things-are-different,>) in (4). In
other words, we could treat every and would as quantifiers which express the
same relations as in (2) above but are only defined for XRc -0 and cx • 0,
respectively. This way, expressions like (3) and (4) would only be evaluated for
values of x which satisfy the RC expressions; hence they would never be true for
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irrelevant entities such as this cup of coffee, and the problem of weak truth
conditions would not arise. The question that arises now is: can we
independently justify this presuppositional treatment of (universal) quantifier
restrictions?
1.1. A Strawsonian Approach
The idea that subject descriptions in general are presuppositional is originally
found in Strawson (1950, 1952). In an effort to elucidate-and perhaps
reconcile-the discrepancies between modern formal logic and "the logical
features of ordinary discourse [1952, Pref.]," Strawson engages in a defense of
traditional (Aristotelian) logic, which is argued to be more consonant with
natural intuitions than its modern counterpart. In particular, Strawson discusses
the Aristotelian laws of the Square of Opposition, which modem logic rejects.
According to Aristotelian logic, the following holds:
(5) For any predicates (p, W:
a. Every (p is y and No cp is y is a contradiction;
A E
b. Some rp is y or Some 9p is not y/ is a tautology;
I 0
c. A entails I;
d. E entails O.
In general, our 'uneducated' intuitions about sentences taking these forms would
seem to confirm the statements in (5). So, for instance, (6a) below is understood
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as a contradiction, (6b) is understood as a tautology, and the inferences from (6c)
to (6c') and from (6d) to (6d') are judged valid.
(6) a. Every philosopher is hungry and no philosopher is hungry.
b. Some cats are black or some cats are not black.
c. Every student is stressed out.
c' Some student is stressed out.
d. No elephant is a carnivore.
d' Some elephants are not carnivores.
But a modern logician would point out that, on a formal level, this cannot be
correct, and that our judgements are simply misguided, perhaps because we
naturally fail to consider all possible models in which these statements can be
evaluated. In fact, the modern logician says, it is always the case that in a model
where the subject term of A, E, I, or 0 is not satisfied, (5) does not hold. For
instance, in a world with no philosophers (6a) is true; in a world with no cats (6b)
is false; in a world with no students (6c) is true but (6c') is false, and similarly for
(6d-d') when evaluated in a world with no elephants. In other words, (5) is
incorrect exactly in those cases where--as we would say in the context of this
chapter--the restrictions of its subject terms (i.e., the qp's) are empty.
However, Strawson objects, one must be careful not to force this observation
onto natural language; it is rather the (modern) logical system that fails to
account for our intuitions about subjects of sentences, and hence must be
modified:
Suppose someone says "All John's children are asleep." Obviously he will not
normally, or properly, say this, unless he believes that John has children (who
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are asleep). But suppose he is mistaken. Suppose John has no children. Then
is it true or false that all John's children are asleep? Either answer would
seem to be misleading. But we are not compelled to give either answer. We
can, and normally should, say that, since John has no children, the question
does not arise. ... The more realistic view seems to be that the existence of
children of John's is a necessary precondition not merely of the truth of what
is said, but of its being either true or false. ... What I am proposing, then. is
this. There are many ordinary sentences beginning with such phrases as
'All...', 'All the...', 'No...', 'None of the...', 'Some...', 'Some of the...', 'At
least one...', 'At least one of the...' which exhibit, in their standard
employment, parallel characteristics to those I have just described in the case
of a representative 'All...' sentence. That is to say, the existence of members of
the subject class is to be regarded as presupposed (in the special sense described)
by statements made by the use of these sentences; to be regarded as a
necessary condition, not of the truth simply, but of the truth or falsity, of such
statements. [1952, pp. 173-176; e.a.]
Along the same lines, Belnap (1970) argues that the subject-predicate relation is
in general not symmetrical, because the subject of a sentence is always
presupposed. He observes that the sentences in (7a-b) do not have the same truth
conditions, despite the fact that some is usually assumed to express a
symmetrical relation:
(7) a. Some unicorns are animals.
b. Some animals are unicorns.
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While (7a) is, in Belnap's terms, 'nonassertive', since the descriptive content of its
subject cannot be satisfied by any individual (in a given world), (7b) is just plain
false.
The general claim, then, is that subjects are presuppositional. If this is true,
it could be a good starting point for beginning to treat quantifier restrictions as
presuppositional. However, while on one level it does more work than we need
for our present purposes-since we only need to show that universal (or strong)
quantifier restrictions are presuppositional, on another level it does not do
enough. This is because the claim is only made about subjects;3 hence the
proposal, as it stands, would not cover cases like (23) of the previous chapter,
where the DP every student... is in object position. Furthermore, we need to
explicitly justify extending this idea to adverbs of quantification like would. For
our present purposes, we should try to show-at the very least-that all
universal quantifiers generate a presupposition that their restriction is not empty.
With respect to the first point, a promising strategy could be to try to show
that certain quantificational determiners are inherently presuppositional. An
early attempt at this kind of generalization is found in Hausser (1973, 1976) (see
also van Fraassen 1968). Hausser argues that a certain class of determiners is in
general presuppositional, independently of the syntactic position of the noun
phrases in which they occur. He proposes that this property can be tested by
means of the conventional strawsonian test for presupposition (viz., 'p
presupposes q iff both p and its negation entail q'), with one proviso: that the
environments tested contain the appropriate noun phrase and are otherwise
'neutral' with respect to presuppositional content. This, according to Hausser,
3 More precisely. Strawson (1952) and Belnap (1970) only take into consideration the subject-
predicate relation; thus they make no claim at all about nonsubjects. But see Strawson (1964),
where it is argued that presuppositionality is associated with topical noun phrases.
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ought to insure that the existence presupposition is generated by the noun phrase
itself, and in fact by its determiner. For instance, consider the pairs in (8) and (9).
(8) a. John watched every video at the party.
b. John didn't watch every video at the party.
(9) a. John watched a video at the party.
b. John didn't watch a video at the party.
(10) There were videos at the party.
According to the test, the determiner every is presuppositional, since both (8a)
and (8b) entail (10), and (supposedly) no other element in these sentences could
be held responsible for the entailment. On the other hand, Hausser argues, the
determiner a is not presuppositional, since (9b) (under one reading) does not
entail (10).
Crucially, the claim made here is that presuppositionality is not merely a
property of canonical subjects, since, e.g., every video in (8) is not in subject
position. Rather, Hausser argues, it is a (lexical) property of determiners like
every that their restriction must be nonempty. Hence we are justified in adding
this stipulation to the lexical entry for the meaning of these determiners. So
Hausser's meaning for every is roughly as follows:
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For any variable assignment g:
everyx I = 1 iff there is at least one x-alternative g' of g
such that [•4g=1l, and for all g' such that
E01"g=11 ,[TEg=1;
= 0 iff there is at least one x-alternative g' of g
such that [J]g' -= 1 and [Tlg' = 0;
undefined otherwise.
The very first clause of (11) will ensure that an expression like (3) is not made
true when the restriction of every is not satisfied, since for any variable
assignment that would cause this to happen, the quantificational expression
would fail to receive a truthvalue.
There are several problems with this approach, however. First of all, the test
is not well suited to 'negative' noun phrases of one kind or another, since we
usually don't find a productive alternation between a sentence and its negation
in these cases:
(12) a. * John watched any videos at the party.
b. John didn't watch any videos at the party.
(13) a. John watched no videos at the party.
b. # John didn't watch no videos at the party.4
4 Unless otherwise noted, I assume judgements to be given for the variety of English called
'Standard American English' (as I believe Hausser was assuming). In this dialect, (13b) is only
grammatical (with certain focus patterns) under a 'double negation' reading.
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(11)
In any case, (12b) and (13a) do not entail that there were videos at the party; in
view of this fact, Hausser concludes that any and no are non-presuppositional. 5
But the determiner no (or the adverb never) can easily participate in problematic
'weak truthconditions' cases like those seen above; in fact, the problems with
negative quantifiers and monotone decreasing environments are even more acute
than those noted for universal quantifiers. In the next section I will illustrate the
problems related to no, never, and not.
In any case-and whatever approach we choose to analyze negative
quantifiers-it is not even clear that every itself is inherently presuppositional.
Consider the sentences below, uttered in a world where there are no purple
frogs:
- (14) a. Every purple frog is smart.
b. Every purple frog visited me yesterday.
c. John offended every purple frog.
d. John saw every purple frog last night.
e. Every purple frog is absent/missing.
The judgements for these sentences are less than uniform. (14a) and, to some
extent, (14e), are judged by some speakers to be vacuously true, while (14b), (14c)
and (14d) are variously judged neither true nor false, or even, as a matter of fact,
false.6 If every were invariably presuppositional, we would not expect such a
5 More recently, authors like Molly Diesing and Angelika Kratzer have argued that no is
ambiguous with respect to its (non-)presuppositional status. In any case, for our present purposes
it is sufficient to note that no cannot be treated as unambiguously presuppositional.
6 How could we explain these latter judgements? Our expectations concerning sentences like
those in (14) do not include the possibility that they might be judged false (i.e., if every is assumed
to be presuppositional, we predict these sentences to lack truthvalues; otherwise we predict them
to all be true). One possible explanation could be that (some) DP's with every might contain a
[+definite] component, and subsume them under a nonpresuppositional (or 'semi-
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range of judgements. But there are cases where one can truthfully utter a
universally quantified sentence without necessarily expecting the restriction of
the quantifier to be satisfied. In some of these cases one may attribute these
effects to the presence of an (implicit or explicit) modal operator, as in the
following examples:
(15) a. All eligible freshpersons should apply for this grant.
b. This is the best Vodka Martini I've ever had.
Quite reasonably, (15a) can be uttered truthfully in a context where there happen
to be no eligible freshpersons; and (15b) is an actual utterance I've heard from a
person who had never before had a Vodka Martini. In the first case, there is
obviously a modal element; Diesing and Kratzer have argued that cases like this
are indeed presuppositional, but because of the modal context the
presuppositions do not involve existence in the actual world. The second case
arguably involves universal quantification over Vodka Martinis the speaker has
had, other than the one he is referring to (see Heim 1994). Here it might still be
claimed that there is an implicit 'modal' element, or-even more simply-that
the failure of presupposition is exactly what accounts for the ironic character of
presuppositional') treatment of definite descriptions. Data like those in (19) are reminiscent of the
facts observed by Strawson (1964) and Lappin and Reinhart (1988):
(i) The exhibition was visited yesterday by the King of France. [Str.]
(ii) A: What are some examples of famous contemporaries who are bald? [Str.]
B: The King of France is bald,
(iii) a. Every American King appeared at my party. [L&R]
b. Lucie was introduced to every American King.
The examples above are often judged to be false, rather than undefined (or true, in the case of
(iii)). The authors argue that this lack of presupposition failure might be due to topic-focus
considerations. The idea here, very roughly speaking, is that a focused DP somehow 'implies' the
assertion that the set it lives on is not empty--an assertion that may be true or false.
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the assertion. In other cases, however, it seems less clear that there is any
modality involved. Consider the following examples:
(16) a. Everyone who needed a tetanus shot came in yesterday.
b. I did all the work I had to do.
(16a) can be truthfully uttered in a situation where nobody came in the day
before, but in fact nobody needed a tetanus shot; and (16b) can also be true in a
situation where the speaker didn't have any work to do, at a given time. Here we
would be hard pressed to try to explain what kind of 'modality' is involved. It
seems to me that there is no irony involved in (16a) and (16b), which seem rather
to convey, quite matter-of-factly, whether some routine task was (even trivially)
fulfilled at a given time. For instance, suppose I utter (16b) on the evening of May
24, 1995. On this day, the 'work-I-have-to-do' consists of doing a certain amount
of laundry, fixing the toilet, and making some progress on this dissertation. Since
I completed the first two tasks, but spent the rest of the day worrying about the
dissertation rather than making any progress on it, I will have made a false
statement by uttering (16b) at the end of the day. But suppose I make the same
statement on the evening of July 24, 1995, which I have consecrated as my
personal 'nothing-to-do' day. Thus, whatever I do on this day, I can truthfully
assert (16b)-no irony here.
I think these cases are actually quite productive in real life. Another 'task'-
situation could be the following: suppose a certain doorperson has the duty to
check everybody's identification at the entrance to a building. If nobody entered
the building during a certain time period, the doorperson can confidently claim
to have done her duty by answering 'yes' to the question: "Did you check
everybody (who entered)'s ID during that time period?" Clearly, an affirmative
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statement can be made in this context regarding an actual time period, an actual
checking, and the actual people who entered. Or, also, suppose I make a promise:
"I will do everything I can to help." If, at the relevant future time there happens
to be nothing I can do to help, and hence I do nothing, I believe it is reasonable to
say that I did not break my promise.
These observations indicate that we would probably do better not to treat
quantifiers as intrinsically presuppositional. This leaves us with the task of
explaining why in some cases they generate existence presuppositions, and in
other cases they don't. But perhaps this task should be taken up at a different
level. The claim here is that the lexical content of quantifiers need not be
burdened with stipulations about effects that may be essentially pragmatic in
nature (see Grice 1968, Lappin and Reinhart 1988).
Another problem with a presuppositional treatment of quantifier
restrictions is whether it can be extended to modals and quantificational adverbs
in general. If this were possible, we would of course be able to treat cases like the
senator example from the previous chapter on a par with 'extensional' examples
like the 'Professor Himmel' example, as suggested earlier. In other words, we
could treat (17b) like (17a), in virtue of the similar inclusion relations they
express, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter.
(17) a. Professor Himmel rewarded every student who read a book he had
recommended.
Bx (Vy: stud(y) A read(y, x) A book(x) A recomm(H, x)) reward(H, y)
b. Things would be different if a senator had grown up to be a rancher
instead.
3x (WOULD 4 ,: senator,1 (x) A rancher.(x)) things-are-different.,
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Indeed, if in order to avoid excessively weak truthconditions in (17a) we assume
that XRC = {y: stud(y) A read(y, x) A book(x) A recomm(H, x) cannot be empty,
then we should be inclined to apply the same reasoning to (17b), and similarly
stipulate that 4c =  w: senator,(x) A rancherkx) cannot be empty. For the
latter case, this corresponds to the requirement that the antecedent of a
conditional must always be made true in some world accessible from the
utterance world.
But it is far from obvious that this would be a desirable move. Stalnaker
(1968) assumes that a conditional whose antecedent cannot be made true (in any
possible world) is evaluated with respect to an 'absurd world' X, "the world in
which contradictions and all their consequences are true. [p. 103]"
Lewis (1973) also explicitly addresses this issue, in a section entitled
"Impossible Antecedents" [pp. 24-26]. His particular definitions of the meanings
of would (L-4) and might (0--) are worked out so that the two operators are
interdefinable, in analogy with V and 3 (respectively). The former is thus allowed
to be vacuously true, while the latter is not. Whether this is a correct move is not
entirely clear, however. Lewis himself notes that the same considerations that
enter into the choice of allowing impossible antecedents for would can be
reproduced for might.
There is at least some intuitive justification for the decision to make a would
counterfactual with an impossible antecedent come out vacuously true.
Confronted by an antecedent that is not really an entertainable supposition,
one may react by saying, with a shrug: If that were so, anything you like
would be true! [p. 24]
77
But later he observes that his reasons are "less than decisive", and discusses two
different operators-- '0•' for would and '0 -' for might--of which the latter but
not the former can be vacuously true:
One might perhaps motivate this weakened might in much that same way as I
motivated the original, weak would: confronted with an antecedent that is not
really entertainable, one might say, with a shrug: If that were so, anything
you like might be true! [p. 25]
So, if there exist real life situations where we can appropriately (and truthfully)
assert a counterfactual (of either kind) that contains an impossible antecedent, 7
then we cannot claim that would or might are inherently presuppositional.
A decisive verdict on this issue is rather difficult to reach, due to the
complex nature of conditionals. The notion of accessibility also plays an
important role, here. A counterfactual conditional will generally be easier to
evaluate when the counterfactual worlds set up by the restriction are more
accessible to the actual world. Consider, for instance, the pair in (18):
(18) a. If I had gone to Med School, I would be making more money than I am
making now.
b. If I had gone to Med School, I would be making less money than I am
making now.
In this case (assuming that I refers to Diana Cresti, linguist), most people would
agree that (18a) is true while (18b) is false. But now consider the pair in (19):
7 Lewis suggests that this may be the case with reductio arguments, where a counterfactual is
asserted whose antecedent must be considered "... not only false but impossible. [p. 24]" A
possible example could be If there were a largest prime, ...
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(19) a. If cats could talk, they would criticize us.
b. If cats could talk, they would praise us.
We may imagine that worlds where cats talk are less accessible to our base world
than worlds where I have gone to Med School. The evaluation of these sentences
might thus be expected to be more difficult, presumably dependent on people's
different opinions about cats. Now consider the following:
(20) a. If this keyhole puncher were made of light, it would be more efficient.
b. If this keyhole puncher were made of light, it would be unusable.
.I would guess that worlds where keyhole punchers are made of light are
significantly more difficult to access than worlds where I went to Med School, or
even than worlds where cats can talk. It might be the case that my imagination
cannot be stretched far enough to access any of these worlds. Thus I would have
to admit to having no opinion about the truth or falsity of these sentences; or
perhaps I could concede that either of them might be true. How do we decide
whether 'having no opinion' is best represented as accepting that the
counterfactual is vacuously true or as not assigning it a truthvalue at all? We may
want to reserve the undefinedness account for cases that are more seriously
illformed than the examples in (20).
Clearly, the last word on the nature of conditionals has not been said, and it
is not my purpose here to provide a detailed analysis of these issues. I hope,
however, that this brief discussion can serve to highlight potential problems with
a presuppositional treatment of quantificational elements, be they adverbs or
determiners. I will thus maintain the more cautious view that, in general,
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quantifier restrictions can be empty. In the next subsection we will see that in any
case, even if we were to assume that quantifier restrictions are presuppositional,
we would still not be safe from the problem that we set out to solve.
2. Indefinites in Downward Monotone Environments
We have seen that the problem of weak truth conditions of indefinites embedded
in the restriction of a quantifier could be overcome by assuming that natural
language quantifiers--or at least strong quantifiers-are presuppositional, in the
sense that they must have non-empty restrictions. But we have also seen that this
assumption may ultimately be too strong.
The case of negative quantifiers, however, is more decisive in showing that
the presuppositional approach is inadequate with respect to the problem at hand.
Consider the following examples:
(21) a. Nobody who had spoken to an old friend of mine called Ed was
impressed with him.
b. Nobody was impressed with an old friend of mine called Ed.
(22) I never get bored, when a friend of mine called Ed shows up at a party.
Now, a relational theory of quantifiers would plausibly include definitions like
the following, for no and never:
(23) a. [no = {(XRcXNs) E g(E)xo(E) IXRc nXNs= )
b. [neverI = ((Rc, ~NS) e go(T)xgo(T) kRc n ~Ns = •
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Here, the quantificational expression will be satisfied whenever the RC or the NS
are empty. This means that our current interpretations for the sentences in (21)
and (22) are extremely easy to make true. And the problem does not merely
affect the restrictions of these quantifiers:
person(y) A
A spoken-to(y, x)
RC NS
b. 3x (NOy: person (y)  [f.o.m.(x) A call .Ed (x) A impressed (x, y)]
RC NS
(25) 3x (NEVER,: f.o.mb(x) A call .Ed ,b(x) A show-up,,(x) ) get-bored,,,(I)
RC NS
Consider, as usual, a situation where x is assigned an individual that is not a
friend of mine called Ed. In this case, the XRC and oc terms in (24a) and (25)
(resp.) will be empty, thus satisfying the conditions for truth for no- and never-
expressions given by (23). Worse yet, the XNS term of (24b)-in the situation
considered-will also be empty; and since the definition of no in (23a) is
intersective, we will have the same exact problem as we had in (24a) and (25).
The only difference is that these latter cases could be saved by a stipulation to the
effect that all quantifier restrictions are presuppositional, while in the case of
(24b) such a stipulation will have no effect. And it seems to me that it would be
undesirable to require nuclear scope denotations to be nonempty, since in such
case we would fail to assign truthconditions to simple sentences that are
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intuitively easy to evaluate (e.g., a sentence like Nobody is immortal would be
predicted to have no truthvalue if the set of things that are immortal is empty).
Aside from the case of negative quantifiers, there is at least one other
context where the problem of weak truth conditions may arise. Consider the
following sentence:
(26) a. John does not assume that I convinced Sue to speak to a (certain)
professor.
b. John does not assume that I convinced Sue to speak to every professor.
(27) a. Nobody believes that I have seen a certain Bufuel movie.
b. Nobody believes that I have seen most Buiiuel movies.
We can assume that in (26a) the indefinite a (certain) professor has not raised over
the matrix negation, since a QNP like every professor in (26b) appears unable to
QR in that way. Nevertheless the indefinite can take matrix scope. According to
our current assumptions, we would assign the following interpretation to (26a):
(28) 3x -assumeb John, Xw.convince w I, Sue, Xw' pe 0()$' b Lspeak ,,(Sue, x)
(29) 3x (NOy: person(y)) believew(y, Xw [Buiiuel-moviewo() A seen.~l, x)])
Literally, (28) states that there is an x such that: it is not the case that: John
assumes that I convinced Sue1 [PROi to speak to x and x is a professor in wj]. So, if
there exists something which is not a professor in w0-- e.g., this sheet of paper,
that pen over there-then from (28) it will follow that
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(30) -nassumeb (John, Xw.convince,(I, Sue, Xw'.0))
where Xw'.0 is the impossible proposition (cf. discussion in Chapter 2). Now, our
dilemma earlier on was that if these kinds of situations are allowed to occur, e.g.,
if someone could be convinced of the impossible proposition, (30) would come
out true in a situation where (there exists something which is not a professor in
w0 and) John does not assume that I convinced Sue of the impossible
proposition-a very likely situation, of course. If, on the other hand, we assume
that the lexical meaning of convince does not allow its sentential complement to
be Xw'.0, we may suppose that the complement of assume could also be Xw.0-
i.e., from (30) it would follow that -assumew,(John, Xw.0). Concomitantly, we
may suppose that someone cannot assume the impossible proposition; s thus it
could turn out that the value 'true' is assigned to the assertion that John does not
assume Xw.0. And this in turn would put expressions like (28) at a risk of having
excessively weak truthconditions. What we would need to do would be to
stipulate that both convince and assume (and presumably a good number of other
CP-embedding verbs) are undefined for a sentential complement which is
translated as Xw.0.
A similar situation arises with the expression in (29). This expression, at
least according to our definition (23a) above, asserts that the intersection of the
set of people with the set of entities that believe [that I've seen x, x being a Bufiuel
movie in w0], is empty. Now, if there exists an x which is not a Bufiuel movie in
wo, from (29) it will follow that
8 This example, which involves negation attached to a CP-embedding verb, highlights a potential
problem with a semantics that requires meanings that are everywhere defined. If, for instance, the
statement 'a cannot assume Xw.O' is interpreted as meaning 'the expression assume(a, w,.0) can
never be true', we automatically predict that the negation of such an expression,
-assume(a, kw.0), will always be true.
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(r,(y: person(y)) believe,,b(), Xw.O)
Again, in a situation where the set of entities that believe the impossible
proposition is empty (rather than nonexistent) (29) will be evaluated as true (with
respect to any irrelevant object which does not satisfy the indefinite description).
This situation clearly generalizes to a significant number of cases where a
wide scope indefinite has its restriction embedded inside a monotone decreasing
environment. Here, unfortunately, we can no longer appeal to a partially defined
quantificational structure since the indefinite description is apparently not inside
the restriction of any quantifier:
(32) a. Indefinite in the RC of a strong QNP: 3x ... (V: [0,... Px ... ) [ ... i
b. Indefinite in the scope of negation: 3x ... -, [,... Px...
c. Indefinite in the NS of a monI QNP: 3x ... (No: ... ) [, ... Px ... ]
Even if we could maintain that expressions of the kind in (32a) must have a non-
empty 4, we could not extend this idea to expressions of the kind in (32b), for the
very simple reason that the F constituent in these structures needs to be
evaluated as false whenever its negation is true. For instance, (26a) can clearly be
true in some situations, but if the VP headed by assume we.  stipulated to be
either true or undefined, we would never be able to derive the truth of (26a).
Yet it is not obvious that the 4) constituents in (32b) and (32c) are entirely
non-presuppositional. Is it safe, for instance, to assume that negation is
unrestricted? In the next few sections I will explore the possibility that, under
certain conditions, an expression which is embedded in a monotone decreasing
environment could be analyzed as forming a tripartite quantificational structure.
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If this possibility turns out to be viable, we may be able to argue that all
indefinite descriptions of the kind we are interested in are indeed embedded in a
presuppositional restrictive clause, thereby saving Ho from the shortcomings
noted in this section.
3. Hypothesis 0.1: Association with Focus
It has been observed, at least since the late sixties,9 that focus effects must be
taken into consideration when evaluating the truthconditions of a sentence. An
example commonly used to illustrate this comes from Rooth (1985):
(33) a. I only introduced BILL to Sue.
b. I only introduced Bill to SUE.
Essentially, (33a) says that the only person I introduced to Sue is Bill, while (33b)
says that the only person I introduced Bill to is Sue. As Rooth observes, in a
scenario where I introduced Bill and Tom to Sue, and no other introductions took
place, (33a) is false and (33b) is true.
On the level of discourse, focus marking corresponds to new information. In
particular, there is a clear division of labor between focused and non-focused
elements question-answer pairs; for instance:
(34) A: Who did you invite to the party?
B: I invited BILL to the party.
9 Some early discussions of the semantic effects of focus can be found in Fischer (1968) and
Bowers (1969). A more commonly cited source is Jackendoff (1972).
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As exemplified by the exchange in (34), a question typically triggers a reply
where the whz-constituent of the question is replaced by a focused phrase of the
same category. This phrase clearly corresponds to new information; the
surrounding material can be thought of as old information.
According to Rooth, an expression (p will have, in addition to its ordinary
semantic value-notated [(]pr, a focus semantic value, notated [pit , which is
the set of alternatives to [cp]O0 with whatever focused element it contains
replaced by a variable of the appropriate type. For instance, the VP in (33a) will
have as its ordinary semantic value the property kX-.introduce(x, Bill, Sue); and,
since Bill in this VP is focused, the focus semantic value of this VP will be a set of
properties of the form Xx.introduce(x, y, Sue)--one for each individual y that may
be contrasted with Bill in a given context. This will allow (33a) and (33b) to be
distinct in their focus semantic values, as shown below:
(35) a. Iintroduced BILL to Sue] 0 = Xx.introduce(x, Bill, Sue)
[introduced BILL to SueII = Xx.introduce(x, y, Sue) I y e EE
b. [introduced Bill to SUEIO = Xx.introduce(x, Bill, Sue)
[introduced Bill to SUEIlf = X.introduce(x, Bill, z I z e E
The focus semantic value is associated with an anaphoric element, introduced by
a two-place operator, ~ (cf. Rooth 1992). In the case of (33a) and (33b), this
anaphor is adjoined to the VP, and has its antecedent in the domain10 of the
adverb only:
10 For only the relevant domain is generally provided by the context of utterance.
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(36) a. IP
DP VPI
onlyc  VP
DPP v DP0  DPintroduced Bill Sue
b.
DP p
VP -C
V DP DPF
introduced Bill Sue
The function of the ~ operator is to specify that a certain relation holds between
the anaphor and the semantic values of its sister. What is of particular interest
here is that this operator generates certain presuppositions, as shown in (37c).
(37) a. [(w- CIO = (no effect on assertion)
b. [(p - C = ([q0f) (closes off focus)
is a subset of the set of properties of introducing someone to Sue; (ii) the property
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of introducing Bill to Sue is a member of [C]]o; and (iii) there is at least one
property in [CIf0 that contrasts with the property of introducing Bill to Sue. In
the case of (35b), jC]]O must be a subset of the set of properties of introducing
Bill to someone, etc. When the meaning of only is fleshed out, the full translations
of (35a) and (35b) become:
(38) a. VP [ P E CIAP(I) -- P = Xx.introduce(x, Bill, Sue)]
where [C]]O (Xx.introduce(x, y, Sue) I)y E)
b. VP [P e [C]o A P(I) -- P = Xx.introduce(x, Bill, Sue)]
where [C]O c (x.introduce(x, Bill, z) 1Z E E)
(38a) says that any property of introducing something to Sue that applies to the
speaker is the property of introducing Bill to Sue, while (38b) says that any
property of introducing Bill to something that applies to the speaker is the
property of introducing Bill to Sue. So, ignoring additional restrictions on C that
may be contributed by the context, we can rewrite the expressions in (38) as
follows:
(39) a. (Vy: introduce(I, y, Sue)) introduce(I, Bill, Sue)
b. (Vz: introduce(I, Bill, z)) introduce(I, Bill, Sue)
According to this particular implementation of Rooth's system, a focus sensitive
operator is associated with a tripartite quantificational structure. If we can extend
this idea to other putatively focus sensitive operators, we might be able to
analyze certain semantic constituents, such as certain parts of the monotone
decreasing environments discussed earlier, as associated with a restrictive clause
of some kind. With some luck, we might be able to argue that H 0-- the hypothesis
88
that quantifier restrictions are presuppositional-applies exactly in those cases of
indefinites embedded in monotone decreasing environments that seemed
problematic in our earlier discussion.
Kratzer (1989a,) employs a quantificational treatment of association with
focus in her treatment of negation. She argues that negation can be treated as an
operator that associates with focus (see also Jackendoff 1972):
[W]e should quite generally conceive of negation as an operator which is
intimately connected to focus. ... Consider now representations like [40a] and
[40b].
(40) a. Paula isn't registered in PARIS.
b. PAULA isn't registered in Paris.
Preserving the spirit of previous analyses of focus while emphasizing the
similarity with restricted quantifier structures, we are led to the following
logical forms for [40a] and [40b].:
(41) a. (Not: x is a place and Paula is registered in x) Paula is registered in
Paris.
b. (Not: x is a person and x is registered in Paris) Paula is registered
in Paris.
If this analysis of negation is correct, we may attempt to extend our
presuppositional account of quantifier restrictions to cases like those discussed in
section 2. What follows is not a treatment of negation that either Rooth or Kratzer
advocate. The hypothesis that nonfocused material is presuppositional is in
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general too strong (see, e.g., Rooth 1995). But the purpose of adopting it here is to
show that, even in this strong form, this idea will not solve our problem of weak
truthconditions.
I will assume that negation c-commands all -(reconstru-ctable) material in-its
clause at LF, including subjects. For concreteness, suppose that in a structure like
(42a) below the T constituent is copied into a position adjoined to not (see
Chomsky 1993 on the notion of movement as a copying process), and the focused
element 'F in the adjoined copy is replaced with an empty category, ei , which is
coindexed with not. This yields the structure in (42b):
(42) a. b.
not T T
noti N
So Q in (42b) is identical to T, with the exception that ' is replaced by ei. This
empty category is translated as vi-a variable of the same type as [iql. So F,
which corresponds to the unfocused part of the clause, is taken to be the
restriction of not. We can now construct a rule for the interpretation of structures
like (42) which encodes the stipulation that the restriction of not must be non-
empty, as in (43).
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(43) For any variable assignment g:
not Q = 1 iff there is at least one v-alternative g' of g such
that [4]D"=l1, and 11[Tj9 = 0;
= 0 iff there is at least one v-alternative g' of g such
that -,F' = 1,and [yl[ = 1;
undefined otherwise.
According to the definition above, the following focused sentences will have the
meanings assigned by the paraphrases given:
(44) a. Mary didn't see BILL.
Of all the things Mary saw, none were Bill.
b. MARY didn't see Bill.
Of all the individuals who saw Bill, none were Mary.
c. Mary didn't SEE Bill.
Of all the relations holding between Mary and Bill, none are the
relation of seeing (i.e. of the former seeing the latter).
d. MARY DIDN'T SEE BILL.
Of all the things that occurred, none are an occurrence of Mary seeing
Bill.
All these sentences entail that Mary didn't see Bill, provided that their
presuppositions are satisfied. To see that this is in fact the case--even with our
focus-sensitive treatment of negation--consider the structures that are assigned
to (44a) and (44b):
91
(45) a. b.
not, • noý,,  O' ft,
• " Mary saw Bill j Mary saw Bill
Mary saw x y saw Bill
(45a) will be evaluated as true just in case Mary saw something, and for all values
of x such that Mary saw x, it is not the case that Mary saw Bill. (45b) will be true
just in case someone saw Bill, and all values of y such that y saw Bill, it is not the
case that Mary saw Bill. So (45a) and (45b) will have different presuppositions,
which, given (43), will affect the truth conditions of sentences (44a) and (44b). For
instance, if Mary saw Ann, Tom, and Michael, but not Bill, and nobody in fact
saw Bill, (44a)-(45a) will be true, but (44b)-(45b) will fail to receive a truthvalue.
At the same time, (45a) entails that Mary didn't see Bill. Thus (43) is almost
reducible to classical negation-at least when all presuppositions are satisfied.
The difference between (43) and classical negation, then, is that not is treated like
a restricted, presuppositional quantifier.
Clearly, one can utter Mary didn't see Bill without presupposing that Mary
saw anything at all, or that Bill was seen by anybody, or that any relation exists
between Mary and Bill. In this case, we assume that the whole sentence is
focused, viz., Mary didn't see Bill is interpreted as in (44d). This corresponds to a
structure like (46).
(46)
notp c3aBij Mary saw Bill
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(46) will be evaluated as true iff whatever is the case, it is not the case that Mary
saw Bill. The only requirement on the restriction of not is that there be some true
proposition in the domain of discourse.
It is important to observe that, while in regular quantificational structures
the quantifier typically binds a variable in both its restrictive clause and its
nuclear scope, in the structures above not only binds a variable in its restriction.
This is at odds with Kratzer's (1989b) Prohibition Against Vacuous
Quantification, which states that every quantifier must bind an occurrence of
some variable both in its restrictive clause and in its nuclear scope. 11 This may
not be an insurmountable problem, however. We know that association with
focus is not like run-of-the-mill quantificational structures, since the restriction
on a focus-sensitive operator is not straightforwardly obtained from the syntax. I
will leave this issue open for now, and move on to the problem at hand.
11 The reason why we may want to assume that the variable needs to be bound in both the RC
and the NS comes from Kratzers' (1989b) account of the following facts:
(i) a. * When Mary knows French, she knows it well.
b. When a Moroccan knows French, she knows it well.
c When Mary knows a foreign language, she knows it well.
d. When Mary speaks French, she speaks it well.
e. * When Mary speaks French, she knows it well.
f. * When Mary knows French, she speaks it well.
(ii) a. * (ALWAYS: knows(Mary, French)) knows-well(Mary, French)
b. (ALWAYS x : morocc(x) A knows(x, French)) knows-well(x, French)
c (ALWAYS.: foreign-lg (y) A knows(Mary, y)) knows-well(Mary, y)
d. (ALWAYSp : speaks(Mary, French, e)) speaks-well(Mary, French, F)
e. * (ALWAYS : speaks(Mary, French, /)) knows-well(Mary, French)
f. * (ALWAYS: knows(Mary, French)) 3, [speaks-well(Mary, French, F)]'
The illformedness of (iia), (iie) and (iif) is explained as a violation of the prohibition against
vacuous quantification in all cases. In (iia) the quantifier ALWAYS has no variable to bind at all. In
(iid) ALWAYS binds a spatiotemporal variable-which is assumed to be present in the 8-grid of
stage-level predicates like speak; in (iie) and (iif), this same variable is not available in both the
RC and the NS, hence Kratzer's principle is still violated. In this respect, the not-structures
discussed in the main text are parallel to the (e) cases above.
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Can this general approach help us in dealing with cases like (26a)? Perhaps
one of the verbs in (26a) is focused, as in (47):
(47) a. John does not ASSUME that I convinced Sue to speak to a (certain)
professor.
b. John does not assume that I CONVINCED Sue to speak to a (certain)
professor.
c. John does not assume that I convinced Sue to SPEAK to a (certain)
professor.
Or maybe I or Sue is focused, as in (48):
(48) a. John does not assume that IF convinced Sue to speak to a (certain)
professor.
b. John does not assume that I convinced SUE to speak to a (certain)
professor.
According to our current assumptions, this sentence would be assigned the
structure in (49).
(49) a. Interpretation of (47a):
3x
not John assume that I...aprof.
John n that I...a prof x
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b. Interpretation of (48a):
3x
noty John assume that l...a profx
John assume that y ...a prof x
(49a) presupposes that John bears some relation to the proposition that the
speaker convinced Sue to talk to a certain professor, and asserts that this relation
is not one of assuming the proposition in question; (49b) presupposes that John
assumes that someone convinced Sue to talk to a certain professor, and asserts
that this person is not the speaker. In other words, the constituent (D in both of
(49) must be satisfied for some value of x; hence the DP a professor, which is inside
4, must also be satisfied (for some value of x).12 The same holds, with minor
modifications, for the interpretations of (47b-c) and (48b).
But, unfortunately, this is not enough to guarantee a correct treatment of
indefinites in monl environments. Intuitively, it does not seem that (47) and (48)
exhaust the entire range of readings for (26a). In particular, there is one reading
of (26a), perhaps the most natural one, which does not appear to involve any
major subconstituent focus. Rather, it would seem that the entire sentence-or
12 Here, as with other CP embedding verbs, we need to assume that the lexical meaning of, say,
convince is such that its propositional complement should not contain the impossible proposition.
In other words, in both cases in (49) we would have a formula of the kind
3x... convince(y, Sue, kXw [prof, I(x) A speak,(Sue, x)]), which becomes Bx ... convince(y, Sue, Xw.O) if
x is not a professor in w0. If we were to allow for this possibility, then-despite our current
presuppositional treatment of the restriction of not-we would still end up with inappropriate
truthconditions for (49a-b), due to irrelevant values of x.
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the negation itself-is focused. (26a) could be uttered, for instance, during the
following exchange:
(50) A: I've heard stories that you always try to get people to do things for
you. Of course, I don't believe these stories, but I'm sure John does.
B: Oh, don't think so. For instance, I know that John does not assume
that I convinced Sue to speak to a (certain) professor (on my behalf).
He knows I spoke to this person directly.
What B is doing here is denying the proposition that John assumes that B
convinced Sue to speak to a certain professor. In other words, in an exchange like
(50), the entire content of the proposition expressed by (26a) is focused. As with
(46) above, (26a) would have a structure where it is only presupposed that some
proposition must be true:
(51)
notp 4
I John assume that I...a prof xP
In this case, there is nothing to guarantee that the indefinite description will be
satisfied, so the problem of weak truth conditions is not solved.
Notice that it is not uncommon to find a wide scope indefinite occurring
inside a focused constituent:
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(52) A: What happened?
B: Bill didn't see a rock that was sitting in the middle of the road, and
hit it.
(53) A: What did you do yesterday?
B: Well, I did the laundry and worked on my paper, but I didn't get
around to killing a big weed in the far corner of my backyard.
Here, again, in B's answers above the focused constituent contains the indefinite
noun phrases. In (52) the whole sentence is focused, and in (53) the VP's are
focused.13 This means that, according to our system so far, the indefinites in (52)-
(53) are in the nuclear scope of negation. Thus they are not part of a logical
constituent that must be made true.
To recapitulate, we have seen that a presuppositional treatment of
quantifier restrictions may not be as desirable as one would hope. And
furthermore, even if this treatment were to be adopted and extended to the
analysis of negation, it is not possible to guarantee that a wide scope indefinite
will always be interpreted inside a presupposed constituent. Nevertheless, it still
seems plausible that an indefinite which is bound at the text level ought to be
treated as generating an existential presupposition. To see that this should be the
case, let's extend the dialogue in (50):
13 Of course, it may be the case that these exmples contain nested foci, so there could be more
presuppositional structulre than meets the eye. It seems to me, however, that (50), at least, canciot
be analyzed as having any combination of sub-foci that would sound natural in that context.
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(54) A: I've heard stories that you always try to get people to do things for
you. Of course, I don't believe these stories, but I'm sure John does.
B: Oh, don't think so. For instance, I know that John does not assume
that I convinced Sue to speak to a (certain) professor (on my behalf).
He knows I spoke to this person directly.
A: Well, THAT's not true. In fact, neither you nor John know any
professors.
As a dpnial of (26a), A's last utterance seems a bit odd, roughly on a par with
denying the existence of something satisfying the content of a definite
description occurring in the place of a (certain) professor. According to Abusch's
analysis, A's reply should sound completely natural. Yet there is a whole body of
literature (e.g., Groenendijk and Stokhof 1980, and to some extent Ludlow and
Neale 1991, Higginbotham 1994) which tries to show that these 'specific'
indefinites must be analyzed from a pragmatic point of view, in that specificity
correlates with an existential presupposition (at least in the mind of the speaker).
In the next subsection I will show that, in order to overcome the problem of
weak truth conditions, it is sufficient to assume that just those indefinite
descriptions which are associated with wide scope existential closure are
presuppositional. This result will not be stipulated but rather derived from the
topical status of these DP's.
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4. Hypothesis 1: Wide Scope indefinites are Topics
Consider again B's reply to the what-happened-question in (52), repeated here as
(55):
(55) Bill didn't see a rock that was sitting in the middle of the road, and hit it.
In order for the DP a rock... to be interpreted as 'specific' it needs to be associated
with text level existential closure.' As suggested in Ch.2, section 2, we may want
to assume that, at any given level, existential closure must obligatorily capture all
free variables in its scope. For sentence (55), this means that the DP a rock... must
scramble over the VP-level 3 operator, and perhaps over negation. This latter
operation is not strictly necessary to guarantee that the indefinite be interpreted
as presuppositional. However, it seems most plausible in view of that fact that in
a language like German, which has overt scrambling, a sentence like (55) does
indeed involve raising of the indefinite over negation:
(56) a. Bill hat einen Stein in der Strafenmitte nicht gesehen,
Bill has a stone in the street-middle not seen
b. # Bill hat (nicht einen > keinen) Stein in der StraBenmitte gesehen,
Bill has not one stone in the street-middle seen
und hat ihn angefahren,
and has it on-driven
Diesing (1992) argues that, in this respect, German essentially "wears its LF on its
sleeve," while English, which does not have overt scrambling, must achieve the
same LF covertly. In other words, English (55) will look like German (56a) at LF.
1 This will also insure that the pronoun it in the second conjunct will be properly bound, without
recourse to an E-type pronoun analysis.
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Furthermore, scrambling in any language correlates with a presuppositional
reading of the scrambled constituent. 2 But why exactly should this correlation
hold? Von Fintel (1994) suggests that scrambling is a symptom of topichood. He
thus incorporates Diesing's 'partitioning' effects into a more general theory of
topic (and focus) articulation. Specifically, the presuppositional quality of a
scrambled constituent is derived from a topic marking mechanism applied to this
constituent. This mechanism consists of an operator, =, adjoined to a topic, which
introduces a discourse anaphor C in the form of a set of propositions 'about' the
topic. The operator = carries the presupposition that the value of C is constrained
to be a subset of the set of all propositions about the topic.
(57) a. [ p = C]O = I91 (no effect on assertion)
b. [(p = C1 = f =p" f  (no effect on focus)
c. Presupposition:
[C]o c p: 3x (p = [•q0e ·x )), with t of the lowest type such that
[(plj o x (i.e., either [0Vp]o(i) or
gC([<p]o) is of type (s, r).
Von Fintel's theory is constructed to be compatible with Rooth's 'alternative
semantics' illustrated above. In particular, "[t]he - and = operators are not
supposed to interfere with each other [p. 53]," and may or may not be associated
2 This is what Diesing refers to as "semantic partition(ing)". For Diesing, the dividing line
between presuppositional and nonpresuppositional material is the VP, Other authors have
argued that this may be incorrect: Krifka (1992) proposes that semantic partition is determined by
focus; Tsai (1994) proposes that it is determined by predication, in the sense of Williams (1980).
All authors agree, however, that some form of scrambling or topic-marking is involved. I will
follow Diesing's line when it comes to illustrate instances of scrambling, although clearly what is
important is that presuppositional elements must be outside of whatever constituent corresponds
to nonpresuppositional material.
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with the same discourse anaphor. Consider, for instance, the simple example in
(58):
(58) A: How does John get to school?
B: [He]T usually [WALKS]F.
A's question above sets up a discourse topic, C, which acts as a restriction on the
adverb usually. C, in this case, is a set of propositions of the form 'John gets to
school in manner x,' i.e., a subset of the set of all propositions about John. At the
same time, C is the focus anaphor for B's reply, as the reader can easily verify.
Thus we have:3
(59) a. Discourse Topic: C = fp: 3x [p = John gets to school in manner x] )
b. IP
usuallyc IP
IP -C
DP VPF
DP C I1 walks
He
In other cases, the topic anaphor may be shared with one or none of the focus
anaphors of a sentence. An example of this is taken from L. Carlson (1983):
3 The notation 'uC' on usually indicates that the adverbial quantifier is restricted by the set
theoretic union over C, since C is a set of propositions (i.e., a set of sets of worlds/situations),
while usually needs a restriction which is a set of situations. See Rooth (1985).
101
(60) a. [THESEF examples]T I found [in GUNDEL]F.
b. Where did I find which example?
Where did I find these examples? Where did I find the others?
I
These examples I found in Gundel.
(60a) could be uttered in a context like (60b). This context suggests that THESE is
contrastively focused; in this case, there would be a DP-adjoined focus anaphor
of the form 'x(-kind) examples' which contrasts the examples demonstrated with
other contextually salient examples; furthermore, at the sentential level there is
another focus anaphor of the form 'I found these examples in/at y'. The
topichood of THESE examples is presumably related to a set of propositions of the
form 'These examples have some property,' or more specifically, as suggested by
(60b), a set of propositions of the form 'These examples (have the property that) I
found (them) in/at y.' Hence the topic anaphor would be the same as the
sentential focus anaphor:
(61)
these examples
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IJUIIU 1 U·V
Alternatively, the focus value of (60a) could be a set of propositions of the form 'I
found x examples in/at y,' while the topic anaphor would remain as above:
(62)
DF
these
II
Now, we may easily assume that C9 in the examples above is anaphoric: its
antecedent can be found in a fragment of discourse such as (60b). But what about
the cases that we are interested in, those sentences which contain specific
indefinites? Sentence (55), as it appears in the context in (52), is-by hypothesis-
entirely composed of new information. In particular, the fact that there is a rock
(in the middle of the road) is also new information. How can there be a set of
propositions about this rock already present in the discourse?
Clearly, the topichood of a rock in this case is somehow introduced by this
particular utterance of (55). The 'anaphor' C, in this case, is not supposed to have
an antecedent in prior discourse, so it must in some sense 'generate' one at the
top of the LF for (55), where the rock-variable is introduced. The situation we are
looking at is as follows:4
4 I am assuming, for illustrative purposes, that the scrambled indefinite in this case ends up
underneath the sentential negation. This is in all likelihood incorrect--cf. the German ex imple
(51a), but it is a simple case to start with. The point is to show that the topic marking of a .rock is
sufficient to circumvent the problem of weak truthconditions even when the negation is not
bypassed by scrambling.
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(63) a. John didn't see a rock (that was sitting in the middle of the road).
b.
3 IP
e
not
DP
DPCc a VP
a rock , ~C DjN
John V
seew
c. New Discourse Topic (at IP level):
CC p: 3r [p = that x, is a rockin wo and x, has propertynl])
What we see in (63c) is that our topic anaphor must be a set of propositions
'about' x1, where x, is a variable which is free within the matrix IP. At the point
where x, is existentially bound, we would like to 'activate' our presupposition
with respect to an appropriate variable assignment, so that in a situation where
(63a) is true, we find ourselves discussing that particular rock that makes this
sentence true. In other words, suppose the entity r is that particular rock that
makes (63a) true. Then C would be a set of propositions of the form
C (p: 3t [p = that r has property i]). So C could be viewed as the result of
applying a function from entities to discourse topics, which, in the case at hand,
would have the form: C = J(r).
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This idea also brings to light the interaction between components of C that
are bound by operators such as 3, and the strictly aniaphoric component. For
instance, (63b) would now be represented as in (63b'):
(63) b'.
3x, IP
e
not
DP 3 VP
a rock,) • (x,) John see, t,a rock f ()see,,,(John, x,)rock ,, (x,)
Clearly, in (63b'), the x, component of C = j(x,) is a bound variable; but the J
component is free. So von Fintel's (57c), which in this case takes the form (63c), is
actually a statement of the form
(63) c'. New Discourse Topic (at IP level):
1(x,) c {p: 3Stp = Xw [rock,,(x) An(x)]
Since x, is bound by existential closure at the text level, we arrive at an apparent
paradox: according to (63b'), J(x,) must be a set of propositions about (properties
of) a rock that is newly introduced in the discourse; but since I is free, it needs to
be evaluated somehow, and if the discourse does not provide an antecedent for
it, this antecedent must be accommodated in one way or another.
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One might think, at this point, that this puzzle arises from the 'fact' that
indefinites cannot be topics. But, as Prince and Ward (1991) have shown,
indefinites can be topics, though their relation to prior discourse is not
straightforward. In some cases they are clearly partitive in character, as in the
following:
(64) A: What did you do with those books I gave you?
B: Well, one (book) I read immediately, another (book) I decided to
save for my upcoming trip, and a third one I found really boring ...
In other cases, the topic appears to have no relation whatsoever to prior
discourse:
(65) Have you seen a guy with a blue hat that was standing outside of the
pharmacy? And if so, in which direction did he go?
Apparently, indefinite DP's of the kind we've been looking at are more similar to
the case in (65) than to that in (64). In any case, examples like (65) show that we
need to account for topics which lack an antecedent in the discourse. To make
matters simple, suppose that when an antecedent for a (component of a) topic
anaphor I is not found, there is a default rule that generates topics, of the
following form:
(66) J is that function from individuals to discourse topics such that,
for any x, 1(x) = {p: 3i [p = that xhas property it]}
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Given this rule, the anaphor J(x,) in (63c') will acquire an antecedent of the
following form:
(67) I(x) = {p: 3B [p = XAW.w(x,)])
Is this an appropriate antecedent for our discourse topic? Given that (67) does not
seem too disturbing on a conceptual level, the answer will depend on whether it
does any work for us. So, let's consider the predictions the system makes: note
first that, for any x,, if x, is a rock in w0 its topic anaphor J(x,) will satisfy (63c').
In fact we have:
(68) {p: 3]i[p = w.t,,(x,)]} C p: 37 [p = Xw[rock ,(x,) A w(x,)]
where p{: 3 p= Xw[rock(x,) Ax)]
=(p: n[1P= Xw[IA A (X,)])
= (p: 3nB[p= Xw.y(x,)]}
The notation '1' above represents a statement that is always true. As shown in
(68), J(x,)-which is assigned the value (p: 3nB[p = Xw.,yXx,)]) by the default
rule (66)-turns out to satisfy the requirement of being a subset of the relevant
set of propositions.
Now, suppose thatthhere is some x, which is not a rock in w,. In this case
J(x,) will be a set of propositions about whatever x, is, and since rockw(x,) in this
case is not satisfied, the set {p: 3B [p = w[rock,(x,) A iwXx,)]] will contain only
the impossible proposition. In fact, when rock,b(x,) is not satisfied we have:
{p: B [p = w [rok,(x,, A i,(x,)]]} = {p: i [p = Xw[ oA ,(x,)I} = { Xw.o} .
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At this point we must ask ourselves if (63c') is satisfied in this latter case. In
other words, when x1 is not a rock in wo0 (63c') will be equivalent to the
requirement R(xl) c {X:w.0), which essentially means either that J(x,) is the
singleton set containing the impossible proposition ((xl)= {Xw.O) ), or that J(x,)
is the empty set (J(x,)= 0). This in turn would mean that J(x,) contains no true
propositions. But since the value of j(xl) is provided by our default rule (66),
which supplies sets of propositions about objects in the universe of discourse, it
is strongly implausible that it wouldn't contain any true propositions.5 Therefore,
von Fintel's topic marking mechanism, combined with our default rule (66) that
generates new topics, provides us with a way of generating the appropriate
presuppositions for topic marked indefinites.
To reiterate, the idea of treating certain indefinite DP's as topic marked
seems quite promising, since it brings us closer to the particular presuppositions
that we need, and does not require excessively strong assumptions about
quantifier restrictions, focus articulation, etc. At the same time, however, it needs
to be supplemented by a few additional requirements on topic anaphors, as
mentioned above. To get an idea of where we are right now, let's consider in
detail the entire derivation of our rock example. Below I give an LF for this
example, as we would currently have it:
5 The only way that J(xl) could be { Xw.O) or 0 would be to assume an ontology that includes
'absurd' objects, objects with only contradictory properties or with no properties at all. I see no
need for this kind of assumption.
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(69)
B1  IP
e
not
DP VP
DPI  DC
a rock,,, C(1) John V
seew t
The notation 'C(O)' indicates that the topic anaphor in (67) is translated as a
function of the variable x, (or, more generally, C(, ., n)- > J(x, ..., xn)). In
accordance with (57), we have the following:
(70) DP
DPI =C ()
a rock,,
(71) a. [(58)]o = [[a rock1,] J 0 = P [rock,(x,) A P(x,)] (no effect on assertion)
b. [(58)jf = [Ja rockwI ]ll (no effect on focus)
c. Presupposition:
[C(,J c: p:3t (p = w[[a rockoI , ) =
J(x,) C {p: i (p = w[· P[rock w,(x) A P(x )] (,,)] =))
J(x,) c P: Bit (p = Xw[rockq(x,) A^rt(x,)]
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I assume that the presupposition in (71c) is projected up to the IP level in (69)
(see Chapter 4 on how this can be accomplished). We get:
(72) The 'current' variable assignment satisfies
a. Assertion: -, [rock,(x,) A seew,(John, x,)]
b. Presupposition: J(x,)_c {p: 3t (p = Xw[rock ,(x,) A A(,x)]
At the same time, J(x,) does not have a 'true' antecedent, so rule (66) will provide
as a value for J(x,) the set {p: 3n (p = Xw.,,t(x,))}. So (72) becomes:
(73) The 'cu!..ent' variable assignment satisfies
a. Assertion: [rock,(x,) A see,(John, x)]
b. Presupposition:
p: 3n (p = Xw.t,,(x 1)) ) p: B3n (p = Xw[rock%(x,) A x,,k)]
Suppose the 'current' variable assignment assigns some entity xl to x . (73a)
clearly does not require that x, be a rock in wo; (73b), however, will supply this
requirement, since
(74) a. Case: x, is a rock in wo: rock,(x,) = 1
{p: 31 (p = Xw.i,,(x,)) c p: 3n p = Xw[rockw(x) Ax,)]
• 1; (73b) is satisfied.
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b. Case: x, is not a rock in w0o: rock,(x, ) = 1
p: H3 (p = Xw.n4xi)) g p: H3n (p = Xw[rock,(xI) Ax)]
S p: H3 (p = Xw.xd))} c{p: H3n p = w[O A nJXI)i)
* ({p: 3n (p = X•ac., x,))), I (Xw.O)
• 0; (73b) is not satisfied.
As we can see above, for any given variable assignment, the requirement thatJ(x,) , p: = w[roc.Ii(x) A ,)xl) will potentially fall under two
cases. Case (i): the object assigned to x, is a rock in wo; in this case this expression
will be equivalent to rock,,(x,) A J(x1) C (p: 3H: (p = Aw.nwSx,))). Or Case (ii): the
object assigned to x, is not a rock in wo; in this case the same expression will be
equivalent to -rock,,(x,) A J(x,) { ;w.0 }. We can then rewrite these two cases as
a disjunctive statement, and (72b) becomes:
(75) [rock •o(x,) A J(x,) cp: ; 3 (p = wr..xx,))]
v [-rockwOC(x) A J(xi) { w.0)]
and, since we know that J(x1) cannot be a subset of (•w.0) (see discussion
above), (75) reduces to
(75') rock,(x,) A J(x,) ~ p: ni (p = kw.=nx,))
So in fact the combined import of (72a) and (72b) becomes essentially the
assertion that John didn't see (the entity assigned to) x, where it is presupposed
that x, is a rock and properties of x1 are under discussion. If (72b)=(75') is
projected at the IP level, x, will be presupposed to be a rock at that level, and (63)
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will not be subject to the problem of weak truthconditions discussed in previous
sections.
To simplify things a little, in what follows I will only make reference to the
first conjunct of presuppositions like (75'), since the other is inconsequential for
our present purposes. Nevertheless, technically (75') cannot be reduced to its first
conjunct, so the reader should keep in mind that these presuppositions are
always present wherever there is a 'descriptive' presupposition such as rockI(x,)
in (75').
Now I would like to discuss whether the presuppositions associated with a
topic-marked indefinite are effectively always projected up to the vicinity of the
binder of the indefinite. If it turns out that they are, we will have, in some sense,
obtained presuppositional structures that are similar to Abusch's regular
semantic structures. There would still remain an important difference, however:
namely, that we do not posit any special semantic mechanism for obtaining the
assertive content of our LF's, since in our translations, indefinite expressions are
evaluated in their LF position. In our system, a topic marked indefinite will
generate an existence presupposition that is available at the appropriate level, in
accordance with the general rules that govern presupposition projection. As we
will see, there are no special inheritance rules for presuppositions associated with
topic marking, as the principles we will exploit for all the cases considered here
have been proposed in earlier literature, quite independently of von Fintel's
proposal or my own.
Thus we maintain a more streamlined semantics; and, as I will show in
Chapter 4, we do not encounter the problems associated with indefinites
containing bound variables, as discussed in Ch.2, §3.2.
Furthermore, we predict that in general, (an utterance of) a sentence
containing a specific indefinite cannot be denied on the grounds that no object
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fulfilling the indefinite description exists (in a given context); rather, if the
indefinite fails to pick out an object in the appropriate context, we would predict
the sentence to be truthvalueless, due to presupposition failure. Abusch's
analysis, on the other hand, would predict such denials to be perfectly
acceptable. To see this, consider the general format of a sentence containing an
indefinite interpreted as specific, as translated by Abusch vs. in our system. The
former is given in (76a), and the latter in (76b).
(76) Suppose we have a sentence S which contains an indefinite DP that is
interpreted as 'specific'. If S translates as y, and DP translates as p(x)
(or ? [q(x) A P(x)]), and x is free in \i, then the truthconditions for any
utterance of S are:
a. Abusch: 3x: x) A [V...x...]
There is an object x such that p(x) and w. (Assertion)
b. DMC: 3x: [,...[q(x)= C]...]
There is an object x such that: yv Assertion
qp(x) Presupposition
Thus for Abusch any sentence of the kind in (76) will be false in situations where
there is no object satisfying the indefinite description. For our system, on the
other hand, in the same situations there will be a presupposition failure at the
level of the sister of the 3 operator. As I will argue in the next chapter, this results
in the absence of a truthvalue for the whole utterance.
What do our intuitions tell us, concerning these different predictions? Let's
consider again the exchange in (52), augmented as in (77).
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(77) A: What happened?
B: Bill didn't see a rock that was sitting in the middle of the road, and
hit it.
C: That can't be true! There were no rocks sitting in the middle of the
road!
Here it is not so clear that our predictions are better than Abusch's. C's denial of
B's assertion, in this case, seems rather plausible. I think this is because B's
assertion, in this context, is an answer to a what happened-question; thus it is
focused in its entirety (i.e., we have a situation as in (44d)-(46) above). The way
the conversation proceeds in (77), I believe, is as follows: A's utterance sets up a
set of propositions of the form: 'something is true', or 'something happened'. B's
reply is then roughly: 'What happened was: Bill didn't see a rock that was sitting
in the middle of the road, and hit it.' And C's contribution is: 'No, that's not what
happened: (the reason that's not what happened is that) there were no rocks
sitting in the middle of the road!'
If this rendition of what's going on in (77) is correct, then the reason why
C's denial of B's statement seems natural is that C is denying that what
'happened' is as B says. The fact that there were no rocks sitting in the middle of
the road is used as circumstantial evidence that B's statement cannot be true, and
not as a direct denial of this statement. In other words, the indefinite a rock... in
(77) can be thought of as a 'local' topic, in the sense that its presuppositional
content is not outside of the set of propositions introduced by A. There is no
notion that, whatever happened, there has to be a rock that was sitting in the
middle of the road in the context of (77).
Now, clearly this line of reasoning is rather weak. At best, we can conclude
that (77) does not provide evidence for or against our approach (as opposed to
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Abusch's). What we need is cases that are a bit more clear than this one. So
consider the senator example from Chapter 2, augmented as in (78).
(78) A: Things would be different if a (certain) senator had grown up to be
a rancher instead.
B: I don't think so. In fact, there are no such senators.
In this case it seems rather difficult to accept B's reply as a plausible denial of A's
utterance. Yet Abusch's system would predict just this. So the discourse in (78)
ought to sound perfectly felicitous. Again, the difference between her system and
mine is not in the LF, but in the semantic and pragmatic manipulations
undergone by the indefinite. (79) then is the basic structure associated with A's
utterance in (78):
(79)
IP
'p
if IP
things...
DPs
a senator,
1 3 VP
From (79), Abusch derives the expression in (80) by means of her percolation
mechanism:
(80) 3x, [senator,(x,) A (WOULD.,: rancherJ x)) things-are-different.,
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(80), of course, will be false if there are no senators in wo. Thus B's reply to A's
utterance in (78) should be quite natural in a world where there are no senators
(the reader may try replacing senator with their favorite fictitious entity in the
dialogue in (78), to get a better feel for the issue at hand). I think it is pretty clear
that this prediction is too strong for this case.
In the system advocated here, we also obtain the LF in (79)--except that, by
assumption, the DP a senator is topic marked. Given what we've said so far, this
would correspond to a local structure of the kind in (81).
(81) IP
DP
DPI C:C,
a senator,%
This adjoined operator actually has no effect on the regular semantic value of its
sister (and in fact the extra structure will be eliminated in the next chapter). So
basically (79) is interpreted as we would expect, viz., as in (82).
(82) 3x, (WOULD,,: senator,,(x ,) A rancher,(x ,) ) things-are-different.,
But on a presuppositional level, =C(I, requires that x1 be a senator in wo:
(83) C(, ~-> J(x,)
< oJ(x,) C {p: 3 (p = w [senator,(x,) AI.Xx,)
4z senator (x,) A J(x,)B(p: lt (p = w.xtx,))}
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Furthermore, assuming that this presupposition can be inherited at the matrix IP
level of (79), and ignoring all but the descriptive part of (83) we will obtain the
following complete meaning for this structure:
(84) There is an entity x, such that:
senator.(x,) Presupposition( senator (x,)
WOULDw: athings-are-different , AssertionA rancher Jx,))
(There is an entity x, such that: it is presupposed that xl is a senator in
wo, and it is asserted that in all worlds w where x, is a senator in wo and
a rancher in w, things are different in w).
According to (84), A's assertion in (78) can only get off the ground if there is a
senator in wo which can be made salient; so B's reply is expected to sound odd,
since the lack of senators irn wo would inhibit A's utterance from having any
assertive content, and thus from being confirmed or denied.
Is this an accurate rendition of what's going on, on an intuitive level, with
the dialogue in (78)? Of course, the most 'natural' way to deny a conditional
statement is to deny the consequent from within a situation where the antecedent
is true. So perhaps there is no 'natural' way of evaluating our intuitions for the
particular situation(s) where there are no senators. However, note that Abusch
would make a straightforward prediction in this case, a prediction which seems
not to be borne out. The system advocated here at least avoids this result.
Let's consider another kind of example. As argued earlier, the exchange in
(54)-repeated here as (85)-also seems odd:
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(85) A: I've heard stories that you always try to get people to do things for
you. Of course, I don't believe these stories, but I'm sure John does.
B: Oh, I don't think so. For instance, I know that John does not assume
that I convinced Sue to speak to a (certain) professor (on my behalf).
He knows I spoke to this person directly.
A: Well, THAT's not true. In fact, neither you nor John know any
professors.
Here B is bringing up one of the 'stories' that A heard, which involves a
particular professor. A then tries to deny the truth of the second sentence in B's
utterance on the grounds that there are no professors in the relevant context.
Again, it seems to me that this denial is not appropriate. In a situation where
there are no professors, A would probably dismiss B's statement as irrelevant to
the issue at hand. This, again, suggests that the descriptive content of the
indefinite is presuppositional.
The LF associated with the relevant part of B's utterance, repeated below as
(86a), can be taken to be roughly as in (86b).
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(86) a. John does not assume that I convinced Sue to speak to a (certain)
professor.
b.
-3 IP
DP,
John not VP
V CP4
assumew '/\,
Xw IP
DP 2  AgrP
I
DP5  VP
Sue
V CP 6
convinced,,
PRO5  /DP3 f 3 VP
a professor.
t5 speak, to t3
The interpretation that Abusch would assign to this structure-after her
percolation of U-sets-is given in (87a); the one obtained according to my
method is as in (87b).
(87) a. Abusch:
prof 0o(X3) A
Xw.convince ,(I, Sue, nW.speak V(Sue, x) )
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b. DMC:
3x3 assume ,John, Xw.convince( I. Sue, kw' speakr Sue, X33 X3 WVWspeak,,k(Sue, x3)t))
The expression in (87a) will turn out false when there exist no professors in a
certain context. Thus the dialogue in (85) should be felicitous. The expression in
(87b) will not have this drawback, but as it stands it is too easy to make true. On
the other hand, (87b) is not assumed to convey the entire meaning of (86a). The
presuppositional component of this sentence determines that the DP a professor-
which is scrambled and hence topic-marked--will have an anaphor adjoined to
it, which requires the variable indexed 3 to be a professor:
(88) a.
3 IP
CP
DP3  =C-(3) 3 VP
a professor,%
where C(3) -> J (x3)
b. Presupposition(s): the current variable assignment satisfies
JI(x) c (p: 3B (p = w [profw(x 3) A (nj-x)])
c= prof, 0b(x3) A (x3) { p: i3x (p = Xw.xJ(x3)) }
As we will see later in more detail, the presupposition associated with J(x3) is
preserved at the CP6 and CP4 levels in (86b) (I encourage the reader to verify that
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this is intuitively correct), and ends up being evaluated at the matrix IP level.
From (87b) and the presupposition in (88b) inherited at the text level we derive:
(89) There is an entity x3 such that: it is presupposed that x3 is a professor in
the utterance world (prof,b(x3)), and it is asserted that John does not
assume that you convinced me to speak to x3 [and x3 is a professor in
wo].6
Now I will turn to the examples with quantificational noun phrases. The
challenge there was to obtain truthconditions that aren't too weak, while at the
same time maintaining a conventional (i.e., nonpresuppositional) treatment of
QNP's. I will show that for these cases the topic marking approach will yield
truth conditions that are neither too strong nor too weak.
What we want to derive, for instance, is the fact that intuitively the
sentences in (90) can be evaluated as true in a situation where I had no work to
do (cf. (90a) = (19b) of the previous chapter), or where Ann didn't ask me to do
any work (90b-c), but are not assigned a truthvalue if there is nobody called Ann
in the domain of discourse.
(90) a. I did all the work I had to do.
b. I did all the work Ann asked me to do.
c. I did all the work (that) a friend of mine called Ann asked me to do.
I.e., it is asserted that .-assume) John, Xw.convince 4 I, Sue, W1 speak'.(Sue, a)
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For the first two sentences there isn't much to say. The relevant interpretations
are roughly as in (91).7
(91) a. (Vz: work(z) A had-to-do(I, z)) did(I, z)
b. (Vz: work(z) A asked-to-do(Ann, me, z)) did(I, z)
At this point we are not assuming a presuppositional analysis of quantifier
restrictions. All we need is a general compositional principle to the effect that if
any node in a tree lacks a truthvalue, 8 then every node dominating it will also
lack a truthvalue. This principle must override any other composition rule. So,
for instance, the definition of the truthconditions for all /every will not require
an extra clause which stipulates that the restriction of this quantifier must be
non-empty-cf. (11) at the beginning of this Chapter:
(92) For any variable assignment g:
aUfxl I = 1 iff for all x-alternatives g' of g s.th. [p'flp=1,
= 0 otherwise.
Thus in (91a) and (91b), if there is no z which satisfies had-to-do(I, z) or
asked-to-do(Ann, me, z) (resp.), the expressions will be evaluated as (trivially)
7 For simplicity I am ignoring the import of the definite determiner in these sentences.
Furthermore, I am treating the noun work as a count noun, roughly meaning 'task'. The reader
can easily verify, with the aid of the apparatus in Chapter 1, that the results obtained in this
section are not affected by this choice. It is also inconsequential for my present purposes that I
treat have-to-do and ask-to-do as unanalyzed predicates.
8 We can say that a node receives a truthvalue if its presuppositions are fulfilled; i.e., for any node
ax, which translates as ' and is associated with presupposition(s) Pa, a' has a truthvalue only if
pa = I. I assume that a node which does not itself contribute (or inherit) any presuppositions is
associated with a 'tautological' presupposition.
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true. This seems appropriate enough. If, however, Ann in (91b) fails to denote (an
individual), we may assume that the expression asked-to-do(Ann, me, z) simply
cannot be evaluated, hence (91b) would lack a truthvalue.
The interesting case, now, is (90c). We want the constituent a friend of mine
called Ann to be associated with text level existential closure. Since this DP is
already in the subject position of its clause, we just need to raise the universally
quantified DP outside of its VP, an assumption which is usually made
independently of our present concerns. We obtain the structure in (93a), with the
presuppositional content (93b) and the assertive content (93c).
(93) a.
.3 IP
DPI
I DP2  7>3 VP
all 2  NP
tdid t2
N CP
work
02 IP
DP3  =C (3) 3 VP
a friend of mine t3 asked me to do t 2
callej Ann
where C 3), -> J(x3)
b. Presupposition(s): the current variable assignment satisfies:
f.o.m(x 3) A call.Ann(x• ) A (x3 ) {p: Bit(p = w.xlSx))}
work (x2) A [f.o.m.(x 3) A call .Ann(x 3)] did( )
c. 3x3 (Vx2:) did(I, x2)^ asked--to--do(x, , me, x2)
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The indefinite DP 3 is outside of the scope of all 3-operators except the text level
one. In particular, it is outside of its VP; thus, by hypothesis, it is topic marked.
The topic anaphor is adjoined to DP3, hence the presupposition that x3 is a friend
of mine called Ann. Again, we assume without discussion that the
presupposition associated with J(x3) is inherited at the matrix IP level. So we end
up with a complete interpretation for (90c) along the lines of (94).9
(94) There is an entity x3 such that: it is presupposed that x3 is a friend of
mine (f.o.m(x3) A call.Ann(x3)), and it is asserted that I did all the work
that x3 told me to do [and x3 is a friend of mine called Ann].
Since the descriptive part 'f.o.m(x3) A call.Ann(x3)' is not only asserted but
presupposed, it cannot be evaluated as false-or (93c)::(94) will lack a truthvalue.
However, if for instance there is no y such that 'y is work that x3 asked me to do,'
(94) will be evaluated as trivially true (cf. the definition of all /every in (92)),
which is the result we want.
However, an LRQ approach of the kind that Abusch advocates would make
the excessively strong prediction that (90c) should be true in a situation where
there is no work 'h.at Ann asked me to do, but false in a situation where I have no
friend called Ann, since the translation assigned to (90c) would be an existential
statement of the form in (95).
f.o.m.(x3) Acall.Ann(x 3)(vx9: work(x2) A asked-to-do(x3, me, x2)) did(I, x2)
9 I am assuming that this example is completely extensional, so everything is (understood to be)
evaluated in the utterance world.
124
An even more interesting example where a presuppositional treatment of QNP's
would not work was (27a) above, which is repeated below as (96).
(96) Nobody believes that I have seen a certain BuRluel movie.
The problem here was that an expression of the form [no XRc XNs] can only be
evaluated as true when the intersection of XRC and XNs is empty:
(97) [nol = (XRcXNS) r0(E)xO(E) IXRc n XNs = 0}
If we were to treat no as presuppositional, we would add a clause that requires
XRc to be noneinpty: certainly we cannot require XNs to be nonempty, for the
reasons mentioned earlier. But in (96) the indefinite DP is in the XNs constituent,
so we have no way of guaranteeing appropriate truthconditions for this sentence
under a presuppositional treatment of QNP's.
Fortunately, our topic marking mechanism allows us to eschew this
problem entirely. Let's assume that (96) has an LF as in (98a), where the topic
marker =C( 3) induces the presupposition in (98b), and otherwise the assertive
content of (96) is simply as in (98c):
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(98) a.
-3 IP
DP I VP
no body,, ,
V CP4
believes,
mw IP
DP2
DP3  =tC() 7
3 VP
a Buf. movie ,,
t2 seen, 13
where C(3), > J(x3)
b. Presupposition(s): the current variable assignment satisfies:
Bufiuel-movieH(xl) A Jf(x3) (p: 3n (p = Xw.x,(x3))
Bufluel-movie w(x)
C. 3x, (Nox,: person (x ) ) beievew x1, wX B uel-movie W(x
0 /A seen 4(I, x3)
The presuppositions in (98b) are projected up beyond CP4 and the VP headed by
believe, and over the QNP nobody. Thus (98b) is evaluated as a sister of 33. So the
'complete' interpretation of (96) is as in (99).
(99) There is an entity x3 such that: it is presupposed that x3 is a Bufluel
movie in the utterance world (Bufiiuel-movieo(x3 )), and it is asserted
that nobody believes that I have seen x3 [and x3 is a Bufiuel movie in
wol .
If we check this result against the relational definition of no in (97), we see that
the truthconditions of (99) are still appropriate. (99) essentially corresponds to
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(98c) restricted to values of x that make Bufiuel-movieHb(x3) true. This means that
the intersection of the set of people with the set of entities x, of which
believes%(xi,, .seen,,(I, x,)) is true--i.e., the set of entities who believe that I've
seen a particular Bufiuel movie--is empty. In other words, the set of people who
believe I've seen that movie is empty.
To reiterate the point made for the other examples, Abusch's theory would
predict that an utterance of (96) could be appropriately denied by saying that
there exist no movies by Buftuel, since in her system (96) would presumably
receive a translation as in (100).
Bufiuel-movie 1b(x3) A
(.ox,: personm,)(x,)) believeb(x,, Xw.seentI, x,))(
In our current system, an appropriate denial of (96) could only be some
statement to the effect that the set of people who believe that I've seen this
particular Bufiuel movie is not in fact empty, but contains, say, Martha.
Having said this much, we need to turn to the question of how
presuppositions are projected, where they are blocked, and whether topic
anaphors can be shown to behave like presuppositions in general. This will be
the topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
PRESUPPOSITION PROJECTION AND TOPICALITY
1. Introduction
The system outlined so far promises to achieve optimal interpretations for
sentences involving indefinites, by means of a Heim-inspired treatment of these
DP's combined with vor. Fintel's topic marking mechanism (which is correlated
with scrambling, either at s-structure/spellout or at LF). Topic marking on an
indefinite is assumed to generate the presupposition that the descriptive content
of the indefinite is satisfied by the variable assignment that is 'current' at any
given node; furthermore, this presupposition is claimed to be projected up to the
appropriate node (e.g., the text level for 'specific' indefinites) by mechanisms that
regulate the inheritance of presuppositions in general.
If this latter claim is correct, then the existential closure/topic marking
approach advocated here can be considered a substantial improvement over an
LRQ account, on the grounds that: (a) the LRQ analysis must either stipulate that
indefinites are immune to the well known constraints on QR, or posit an
additional mechanism (with respect to QR and existential closure) to achieve the
attested scope configurations (cf., for instance, Abusch's percolation mechanism);
and (b) the LRQ analysis predicts truthconditions that are too strong, as argued
in the previous chapter.
Although point (b) might be subject to dispute, point (a) is a plain matter of
fact. If we can account for the same range of data without adding extra
stipulations or grammatical operations to our model, general methodological and
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learnability considerations will compel us to prefer the more streamlined model.
The question, then, is whether the claim that presuppositions associated with
topics are projected exactly in the same way as any other presupposition-which
amounts to saying that there are no special rules to be added to our current
model-can be shown to be correct. The purpose of this chapter is to show that
this is indeed the case.
2. Cancelability and Other Anti-Presuppositional Effects
The task we have on our hands is not as simple as it might seem at first. The
existing literature on presupposition projection has hardly produced a uniform
terminology (see below), let alone answered the question of whether certain
kinds of inferences can or cannot survive in a given environment.
We must be aware that even some prototypical kinds of presuppositions
can be canceled in the appropriate environment. Consider, for instance, the case
of factives, like regret, and definite descriptions. Sentence (la) is generally
assumed to presuppose (ib), and sentence (2a) is usually taken to presuppose
(2b):
(1) a. John regrets failing.
b. John failed.
(2) a. The king of France stole my wallet.
b. There is a (unique) king of France.
129
However, as argued, e.g., by Gazdar (1979), these presuppositions can be
canceled in cases like the following: 1
(3) John doesn't regret failing, because, in fact, he passed.
(4) Since he doesn't exist, it really isn't possible for the king of France to
have stolen your wallet.
As pointed out by Gazdar, sentence (3) clearly does not presuppose (Ib), and
similarly sentence (4) doesn't presuppose (2b). I will not have much to say about
cases like these, except for the following. It seems to me that sentences like (3)
and (4) involve some very particular focus patterns. We have seen earlier that
focused constituents are in general nonpresuppositional; and in fact, it might be
the case that some kinds uf focus (perhaps what is called 'contrastive focus')
could somehow have an 'anti-presuppositional' effect. Of course, this latter
consideration is very speculative and shouldn't be taken as anything more than a
hunch. Nevertheless, I think that intuitively sentence (3) has a peculiar quality,
that I can best explain as follows: this sentence seems to be understood as
involving some kind of 'quotation' of a previously uttered sentence. An example
of this could be the exchange in (5) below, where the constituent in quotes is, in
some sense, brought into focus:
(5) A: John really regrets failing!
B: What are you talking about?! John doesn't "regret failing,,, because,
in fact, he passed!
I Sentence (3) is taken verbatim from Gazdar; sentence (4) is a modification of another of his
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examples (see Gazdar 1979, p. 110).
If this observation is correct, what is being denied is somehow the whole quoted
proposition (Johni) regrets failing-including whatever presuppositions it may
have. 2
Sentence (4) is somewhat more complex. As already mentioned in footnote 6
of the previous chapter, definite DP's may not be uniformly presuppositional in
the first place. Of course, focus articulation may also play a role here, but it is not
entirely clear how this occurs. Another factor that seems to influence the
presuppositions generated by definite descriptions seems to be the kind of
predicate they combine with. Compare (2a) and (4) with the examples in (6).
(6) a. The king of France is very old.
b. Since he doesn't exist, it really isn't possible for the king of France to be
very old.
Sentence (6a) presupposes (2b) just as much as (2a) does. But, unlike (4), sentence
(6b) seems a bit odd. We may agree that a predicate like old cannot be applied to
nonexistent entities; but (6b) seems to suggest that if something like the king of
France does exist (in the actual world), then it must be young. I will not dwell on
what's going on in these cases, though see Percus (???). It is worthwhile to note,
however, that if the presuppositions generated by a definite description can be
canceled in environments such as (4), we might expect that the presuppositions
generated by topic marked indefinites are also susceptible to these kinds of
phenomena. One such case might be that of the exchange in (77) of the previous
chapter, repeated here as (7).
2 This, I believe, is the essence of what some authors have referred to as 'external negation'. See
Rooth (1994) for an interesting perspective on this.
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(7) A: What happened?
B: Bill didn't see a rock that was sitting in the middle of the road, and
hit it.
C: That can't be true! There were no rocks (sitting in the middle of the
road!.
Compare the discourse in (7) with a similar exchange involving a definite DP:
(8) A: What happened?
B: Bill didn't see the little Buddha in the lower righthand corner of
Leonardo's Last Supper, and now he's very disappointed.
C: That can't be true! There is no Buddha in the lower righthand
comer of Leonardo's Last Supper!
It seems to me that (8) is just as acceptable as (7). On the other hand, compare our
example (90c) from the previous chapter-repeated below as (9a)-with a
parallel case involving a definite DP:
(9) a. I did all the work (that) a friend of mine called Ann asked me to do.
b. I did all the work (that) my friend Ann asked me to do.
In both cases, a reply such as (10) seems equally inappropriate.
(10) That's false! You don't have any friends called Ann.
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These latter examples seem to indicate that topic marked indefinites are not
significantly different from definites, as far as concerns the 'strength' of the
presuppositions they generate.
In general, it appears that the defeasibility of presuppositions is a rather
complex and heterogeneous phenomenon. I will not be able to deal with these
facts in a satisfactory manner in this dissertation. But I think that, in any case, we
should be able to control for these cases so that the example sentences which
contain indefinite topics are of the kind that has a uniform effect on other
presuppositions. In what follows, I will show that the presuppositions associated
with indefinite topics do not behave differently from typical presuppositional
expressions.
3. Presupposition Projection: the Data
Let's consider the various cases that were claimed to allow inheritance of the
presuppositions associated with an indefinite topic. Since, by hypothesis, these
presuppositions are akin to those generated by definite descriptions, factive
predicates, and lexical items like stop (or quit), yet, too, we should expect that
wherever these better known kinds of presuppositions are inherited, a topic
anaphor is inherited as well.
3.1. Object of a Transitive Verb
The first case we consider is whether the presuppositions generated by an object
DP are in general affected by its predicate. If we look at the case of definite DP's,
we see that their presuppositions appear to be inherited at the sentence level:
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(11) a. Yesterday I washed my car.
b. The speaker has a car.
The definite mny car generates the presupposition in (11b). Clearly (11a) also
presupposes (11b). Thus we could say that the presuppositions associated with
object DP's are not affected by their verb.
However, once we assume that object DP's can scramble we might expect
their presuppositions to be unaffected anyway by the verb, since the
presuppositions themselves are generated outside VP. Perhaps a more
meaningful question would be whether any presuppositions associated with VP-
internal DP's can get out of VP. I'm afraid I won't be able to do justice to this
question. But let me simply observe that, under the assumption that a DP in an
existential construction is blocked inside VP, we might be lead to conclude (along
with Diesing and many other authors) that VP-internal DP's cannot be
presuppositional-cf. (12a); and furthermore, that presuppositional DP's cannot
remain inside VP-cf. (12b).
(12) a. There is a CD on the floor.
b. * There is my favorite CD on the floor.
So perhaps the question of whether the presuppositions associated with an object
DP can 'get out' of VP does not really make sense.
In any case, since an indefinite object may or may not be topic marked, it
should give rise to an ambiguity. According to our model, this ambiguity ought
to correlate with the presuppositional/outside VP vs. nonpresuppositional/
/inside VP status of the indefinite. Now, if we consider a sentence like (13)
below, we might be somewhat skeptical about the claim that it is ambiguous:
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(13) Yesterday I found a pen.
Yet a good number of authors have argued that, at tlh' very least, there are two
different uses of a sentence like (13). For instance, Higginbotham (1994) argues
that:
[T]here is a distinction between
The speaker represents himself as believing that
[e.g.: Rvx pera(x) A found(I,.V)] ]
and
The speaker represents himself as believing that
[e.g.: pen(a) A found(l, a) ]
for some sense a put for x. [pp. 18-19]
This distinction allows Higginbotham to account for the possibility of an
ambiguity in sentences like (13) that is not, according to the author, truth-
conditional. In our system, these perceived 'intentions of the speaker' could be
thought of as being encoded in the topic marking mechanism. However, our
mechanism does predict a truthconditional difference between the two
(potential) readings of (13). Aside from the arguments in favor of this prediction
made in Chapter 3, there is another general scenario where this truthconditional
difference shows up. Consider the following exchange:
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(14) A: Do you (happen to) have a blue pen?
B: Sure. In fact, I have a whole bunch over here.
A: No, I mean a particular blue pen; the one that is usually sitting in
the living room.
B: Oh! No, I'm afraid I don't have it.
The dialogue in (14) is a case of speaker B's misunderstanding A's initial inquiry,
due to the fact that A's question is ambiguous (at least in English). Although A
intended the referent of the object DP to be topical, B understood it as being non-
topical. Thus, B's initial reply, basically "Yes, I have a blue pen" is later amended
to "No, I don't have a (particular) blue pen". Since B's situation with respect to
having this particular pen (namely, he doesn't have it-though he does have
other blue pens) does not change during the conversation, we must conclude that
an utterance of I have a blue pen on the part of B is true under one reading but
false under the other reading.
3.2. Negation
The question of whether presuppositions can survive negation is somewhat
circular. This is especially true if we use a Strawsonian notion of presupposition,
viz.:
(15) a presupposes pa iff the truth of pa is a prerequisite for the truth
or falsity of a.
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Thus, by definition, if a presupposes pa then --a also does.3 To test the adequacy
of (15), we simply need to check triplets of the form [ac, -na, Pa], and make the
inverse deductions from the ones Hausser made, as discussed in Chapter 3. In
other words, if we know a and Pa, and we find that Pa= p.,, then we can
conclude that negation is 'transparent' with respect to Pa. What we find is that, at
least in 'simple' cases like those below, the presuppositions involved are
unaffected by negation.
(16) a. Jeanie regrets having visited Katmandu.
b. Jeanie does not regret having visited Katmandu.
c. Jeanie visited Katmandu.
(17) a. George has quit smoking.
b. George hasn't quit smoking.
c. George has smoked in the past.
In all these examples, the (a) sentences represent a, the (b) sentences --, a, and the
(c) sentences pa. Examples (16) and (17) illustrate the behavior of
presuppositions associated with regret and quit. Examples (18) and (19) illustrated
the behavior of presuppositions associated with definite DP's:
3 (15) can be schematized in Kleene's three-valued logic, as given in (i). Note that when pa is
false, a is neither true nor false.
1 1
0 1
# 0
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(18) a. Sue came to the party that I had organized in her honor.
b. Sue didn't come to the party that I had organized in her honor.
c. There was a party that I organized in Sue's honor.
(19) a. Al saw the movie that I had recommended to him.
b. Al didn't see the movie that I had recommended to him.
c. There is a movie that I recommended to Al.
In all the cases above, the (c) sentences are assumed to be true given the truth of
either the corresponding (a) sentence or the corresponding (b) sentence. Now,
compare the triplet in (18) to that in (20), and the triplet in (19) to the one in (21):
(20) a. Sue came to a party that I had organized in her honor.
b. Sue didn't come to a party that I had organized in her honor.
c. There was a party that I organized in Sue's honor.
(21) a. Al saw a movie that I had recommended to him.
b. Al didn't see a movie that I had recommended to him.
c. There is a movie that I recommended to Al.
The inferences that can be drawn from the triplets in (20)-(21), under a topical
reading of the indefinites involved, are exactly parallel to those in (18)-(19).
Insofar as the (a) sentences in (20)-(21) are felt to presuppose the corresponding
(c) sentences, their negations are felt to yield the same presuppositions. Thus we
could conclude (i) that negation is transparent to presupposition projection, and
(ii) that topic anaphors associated with indefinite DP's behave like any other
presupposition with respect to negation.
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Some authors, however, have argued that negation cannot be treated as
uniformly transparent to presupposition projection, on the basis of examples like
(3) and (4) above. Recall that in these cases the presuppositions associated wvith
grgret and the definite DP are explicitly denied by means of a particular use of
negation. Authors such as Karttunen and Peters (1979-henceforth K&P) have
proposed that there are two kinds of negation: one 'internal', which is essentially
the kind of negation relevant in (15), and one 'external', which is the kind
involved in sentences like (3) and (4).
This idea has been criticized, particularly on conceptual grounds, by authors
such as Gazdar (1979). Furthermore, a good number of facts that have been used
as evidence for the need of these two types of negation have recently been
analyzed, quite satisfactorily, as scope phenomena, thus leaving us with a
dwindling body of data that would require an ambiguity based account of
negation. With respect to cases like (3) and (4), we have already observed that
these 'external negation' effects might be due to particular focus patterns. So
hopefully these kinds of environments shouldn't worry us too much.
Perhaps more important to note is the fact that all of the examples in (16)
through (21) could be analyzed as involving scrambling of the constituent that
generates (or is associated with)4 the presupposition over the negation. In such
case, we haven't shown that negation is transparent to presupposition projection,
since the presuppositions are external to the scope of negation at LF. Since we
have seen that scrambling in German generally bypasses negation, this
observation is of crucial importance. What we need to do, then, is to find
examples where a presuppositional constituent is embedded far enough under
4 This argument might be harder to make for (16) and (17), since the presuppositions involved are
controlled by the verbs (regret and quit, resp.). I will not dwell on this issue here.
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negation that even after scrambling it is still within the scope of this operator.
One such case was our professor example from Chapter 3:
(22) John does not assume that I convinced Sue to speak to a (certain)
professor.
This example presupposes the existence of a particular professor. This
presupposition was claimed to be generated within the most embedded clause
(since scrambling of the indefinite is clause-bound) and to then bypass the
various CP nodes, and finally the matrix negation, and finally surface at the text
level. Is this a property of other presuppositions? Let's consider again the case of
a definite DP:
(23) a. John does not assume that I convinced Sue to speak to my Mathl
professor.
b. There exists an individual who is the speaker's Math professor.
Intuitively, (23a) presupposes (23b). No significant difference seems to obtain, in
this respect, between (23a) and (22). Another example is taken from Gazdar
(1979):
(24) a. The repairman didn't tell me that my camera was suitable for color too.
b. Speaker has a camera.
c. Speaker's camera is suitable for something other than color.
Here, as well, the presupposition associated with the definite my camera-cf.
(24b)-is unaffected by the matrix negation. Furthermore, there is a
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presupposition associated with too (under one reading of (24a)), as expressed in
(24c). This kind of presupposition is also immune to the effects of negation in the
matrix clause.
Of course, there are other components of these latter sentences that are
bypassed by these presuppositions-most notably the non-factive verbs assume
in (22)-(23a) and tell in (24a). Since there has been some dispute in the literature
as to whether verbs like these are transparent, opaque, or semi-opaque 5 to
presupposition projection, I will devote the next subsection to a more detailed
discussion of these and other CP-embedding verbs.
3.3. Assume, Believe, Convince
The question of which CP-embedding verbs let through the presuppositions
we're interested in is by no means trivial. What we need to do here is keep in
mind exactly what we mean by 'presupposition'. K&P, who have made explicit
claims about these verbs, prefer to not use the term 'presupposition' at all.
Following Grice (1975), they argue that we should distinguish between varieties
of implicatures, notably 'conversational' implicatures vs. 'conventional'
implicatures. The former are highly dependent on the context of utterance, while
the latter are considered to be, in essence, part of the lexical properties of certain
words or grammatical constructions. Accordingly, conversational implicatures
are easily cancelable, while conventional implicatures are not. K&P discuss
examples such as those in (25) and (26) below to illustrate this point:
5 Or, using terminology from Karttunen (1974), wether they are 'holes', 'plugs', or 'filters'.
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(25) a. John criticized Harry for writing the letter.
b. Harry is responsible for writing the letter.
c. John criticized Harry for writing the letter. Since the letter was actually
written by Mary, it was quite unfair of John.
The verb criticize seems to facilitate an inference from sentence (25a) to (25b). But
clearly, K&P argue, it cannot presuppose (25b), because in a fragment of
discourse like (25c) it does not license this same inference. Thus the relation
between (25a) and (25b) must be one of conversational implicature. By contrast,
the inference from (26a) to (26b) below is argued to be an instance of a
conventional implicature, triggered by the presence of even in (26a). This can be
seen by the fact that the sentence in (26c)-which might be expected to destroy
the inference (26b)-is perceived to underlie a contradiction:
(26) a. Even Bill likes Mary.
b. Other people besides Bill like Mary.
c. Even Bill likes Mary but no one else does.
The property of (non)cancelability is then taken as a discriminating factor in their
model. Essentially, whatever is correlated with the presence or the inheritance of
conventional implicatures is encoded directly in the grammar, whereas anything
connected with conversational implicature is left to be taken care of by principles
of cooperative conversation and the like.
Given these assumptions, K&P opt to treat a good number of CP embedding
verbs as opaque or semi-opaque with respect to presupposition projection. For
instance, verbs like believe, hope, suspect are treated as items that allow
conventional implicatures to be filtered up in a much weakened form; and verbs
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like say, claim, tell are treated as killing these implicatures alltogether. Their
argument goes as follows. Consider the cleft construction in (27a):
(27) a. It wasn't Bill who tapped Mary's phone.
b. Someone tapped Mary's phone.
The inference from (27a) to (27b) is considered a standard example of a
conventional implicature. Now, what happens to this implicature when the
clefted clause is embedded? Three cases are presented:
(28) a. John forgot that it wasn't Bill who tapped Mary's phone.
b. John hoped that it wasn't Bill who tapped Mary's phone.
c. John told Sue that it wasn't Bill who tapped Mary's phone.
In the case of (28a) the inference (27b) is inherited at the matrix level. This is not
surprising, given that forget is a factive predicate. But in the other two cases, K&P
claim, (27b) is blocked; or, more precisely, it can only survive as a conversational
implicature. This claim is motivated by the fact that the implicature (27b) is
"clearly cancelable in connection with [28b] and [28c] [p. 20, fn. 8]". This
difference in cancelability can be illustrated by the following:
(29) John mistakenly believed that Mary's phone was tapped, and ...
a. # ... he forgot that it wasn't Bill who tapped it.
b. ... he hoped that it wasn't Bill who tapped it.
c. ... he told Sue that it wasn't Bill who tapped it.
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Since (29b) and (29c) in this context do not presuppose (27b), their CP embedding
verbs cannot be treated as transparent with respect to conventional implicatures.
In particular, verbs like tell are treated in K&P's model as blocking all inferences
(hence the name 'plug' for these verbs).
This argument is criticized by Gazdar (1979), who points out that, for
instance, K&P's classification will not adequately account for the properties of
verbs like realize or discover. These verbs seem to pattern with forget or regret in
cases such as (30), but they diverge from these predicates in other cases.
(30) a. Louis didn't realize that Boris was after him.
b. If Arthur discovers that I mangled his car, then I shall be ruined.
c. # John mistakenly believed that Mary's phone was tapped, and he
realized/discovered that it wasn't Bill who tapped it.
The patterns above seem to indicate that realize and discover are factive and
should be treated as 'holes'. But in the following cases, these verbs clearly do not
sustain the inference in (31d) at the matrix level. This contrasts with the behavior
of regret in (31c), where the inference goes through:6
(31) a. If I realize later that I have not told the truth, then I will confess it to
everyone.
b. If I discover later that I have not told the truth, then I will confess it to
everyone.
c. If I regret later that I have not told the truth, then I will confess it to
everyone.
d. I have not told the truth.
6 The antecedent of a conditional is classified as a 'hole' by K&P. See § 3.4 for further discussion.
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These facts suggest that the criterion of cancelability by itself is too coarse
grained to capture between lexical (i.e., 'conventional') and conversational
implicatures. If cancelability is what guides us in deciding whether to encode
presuppositional content in the semantics, we are left with a model that does not
have much to say about our intuitions with regard to what sentences presuppose.
Furthermore, as Gazdar points out, it is not clear how something which is
classified as a conventional implicature in (27a) can be 'transformed' into a
conversational implicature when (27a) is embedded, as for instance in (28c). It
might be more insightful to simply admit that what K&P call 'conventional
implicatures' are context dependent after all. In fact, it seems difficult to
understand why a more impoverished context, as in (28c), would give rise to a
conversational implicature, while a richer one, as in (29c), would bring out the
'true nature' of (a verb that cancels) conventional implicatures. Consider another
(slightly modified) example from Gazdar:
(32) a. Harry claims that even Fred likes your car.
b. Addressee has a car.
c. Fred is the least likely person to like addressee's car.
In K&P's system, (32a) conventionally implicates neither (32b) nor (32c). Thus
our intuitions about this sentence have to be explained by some special
pragmatic theory of some kind. But why this extra burden, just to explain an
inferential pattern that would seem rather simple? The fact of thematter is that
(32a), in its most out-of-context reading, presupposes both (32b) and (32c)-
which were argued to be exactly the conventional implicatures associated with
the lexical meanings of definite DP's and of the word even. How does the verb
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claim, all by itself, first cancel these presuppositions and then 'regenerate' them
by some extragrammatical mechanism? I agree with Gazdar, here, that it seems
preferable to have a semantics which generates the above presuppositions and
treats cancelability as a 'special' phenomenon.
Of course, this argument holds for earlier examples as well. In the same
unmarked context, sentence (24a) above is naturally understood as presupposing
(24b) and (24c); and similarly (23a) seems to straightforwardly presuppose (23b).
In view of our present concerns, I will then assume that verbs like tell, claim,
assuime do let through presuppositional material. In particular, they allow the
inheritance of presuppositions associated with definite descriptions; and where
this is the case, we also find that the presuppositions associated with a topic
marked indefinite behave like those of a definite DP:
(33) a. Suzie did not say/claim/assume that I could calculate the square root
of n in my head.
b. Sophia did not say/claim/assume that I could calculate a particularly
complex square root in my head.
(34) a. George says/claims/assumes that Francesca trusts his friend Pat more
than she trusts him.
b. George says/claims/assumes that Francesca trusts a friend of his
called Pat more than she trusts him.
The same can be said about verbs like believe,fear, hope:
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(35) a. Marty believes/fears/hopes that I will introduce him to my best
friend.
b. Marty believes/fears/hopes that I will introduce him to a certain
friend of mine.
(36) a. Nobody believes that I have seen Bufluel's first movie.
b. Nobody believes that I have seen a certain Bufiuel movie.
Under the most natural readings of these sentences, the DP's in question are
interpreted de re. Given what we've said in earlier chapters, this is simply
analyzed as the DP description being evaluated in the utterance world, e.g.:
(37) a. -isay,( Suzie, Xw[(THEx: sqrt.of . (x)) calc,,(I, x)])
b. 3x -say. iSophia, [compl.sqrt ,(x) A calc , (1, x)]
(38) a. hope iMarty. Xw[(THEx: best.frl,(x, me))introd,(l Marty, .x)])
b. 3Bx hope,(Marty, w[certn.fr.(x, me) A introd,(I, Marty, x)]
In this system, then, the presuppositional DP does not actually move out of its
CP. Its presuppositions, however, are inherited at the text level. Whatever theory
regulates this inheritance, it will have to do so for any presuppositional DP---or
any other presuppositional constituent, for that matter. Under such theory, the
presuppositions associated with topic marked indefinites will receive no special
treatment, since they do not exhibit any atypical behavior in this respect.
Before leaving this subsection, I should briefly mention that there seems to
be no controversy concerning the inheritance properties of control verbs like
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convince, which appears in sentence (23a) above. Aside from differences in what
kinds of presuppositions are contributed by each particular control predicate, the
presuppositions of its complement are generally 'passed up' even in K&P's
system. With respect to indefinites, in any case, it is well known that there exist
de dicto/de re ambiguities--cf. the famous Mary wants to marry a Swede examples.
3.4. Restriction of a Quantifier
In this subsection I will discuss universal quantifier restrictions of two kinds:
basic 'extensional' restrictions and conditional/modal restrictions.
Recall that these were among the earliest cases we talked about. They are
typical scope islands, but at the same time they are known to allow indefinites to
'scope out' of them:
(39) a. Professor Himmel rewarded every student who read a book he had
recommended.
b. Things would be different if a senator had become a rancher instead.
These cases are perhaps the ones that our theory handles most elegantly. For
instance, it is not particularly controversial that the antecedent of a conditional is
transparent to presupposition projection. K&P state this point very clearly with
regard to cases such as the following:
(40) If JOHN drinks too, then the bottle is empty.
To see what implicatures are inherited, recall that [the sentence] JOHN drinks
too, where too focuses on John, conventionally implicates that there is
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someone else who drinks besides John. Sentence [40] clearly commits the
speaker to this proposition just as much as [JOHN drinks too] does. This is a
consequence of what appears to be the general rule that a conditional
sentence inherits all the conventional implicatures of its antecedent clause. [p.
35, e.a.]
Similarly, the restrictive clause of a universal quantifier like every is generally
assumed to let presuppositions through. In K&P's system, if an expression ý is
associated with conventional implicature(s) ý', then a quantificational structure
of the form [(every ý) y] will have conventional implicatures that include a
statement of the form '3x i(x)'. In general, whether or not these presuppositions
are existentially quantified, there seems to be no problem projecting them out of
the restriction of every:
(41) a. I did all the work (that) my friend Ann asked me to do.
b. I did all the work (that) a friend of mine called Ann asked me to do.
c. I have a friend called Ann.
(42) a. Every article relating to the issue of specific indefinites has been put in
that box.
b. Every article relating to an issue that I've been working on for the last
two years has been put in that box.
c. There is an issue: the issue of specific indefinites/the issue that I've
been working on for the last two years.
If we consider the original problem introduced in Chapter 2, as described by
Fodor and Sag, we arrive at the conclusion that, under our account, there is no
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such problem. Scope islands are just what they are; in fact, perhaps they are
merely a subcase of the clauseboundedness of QR. But presupposition projection
is not QR, and the apparent 'atypical' behavior of indefinites is actually a subcase
of presupposition projection. Therefore, any presuppositional indefinite that is
bound at the text level is expected to exhibit exactly the behavior that Fodor and
Sag observed.
3.5. Nuclear Scope of a Quantifier
The case of what happens to presuppositions that come from the nuclear scope of
a quantifier is rather complex. In K&P's system, the general rule of thumb is that
these kinds of presuppositions are 'filtered' through the regular semantic value
of the quantifier plus its restriction. Since K&P use a nonquantificational analysis
of conditionals (and other adverbial/modal constructions), their projection rules
seem to diverge in the two cases of QNP's vs. QAdverbs. However, if we
abstract from their general framework we can see that their rules for these
operators are essentially the same:
(43) a. K&P rule for every:
For any a of the form (everyx: ; ) y, where p( carries presuppositions p(
and w carries presuppositions Py, Pa = 3x[P, ^A A]  (Vx: (0) Py
b. K&P rule for if-clause:7
For any a of the form if-9c-then-w, where (p carries presuppositions p,
and y carries presuppositions pw Pa = Jp ^ [(p Pw]
7 K&P's actual rule for if-clauses is slightly more complex than (43b). Cf. their (54), p. 36.
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In both cases, the presuppositions associated with the 'V' constituent are made
dependent on (the truth of) the regular semantic value of the 'Tp' constituent. We
can easily see that, if we assume a more current semantics where conditional
sentences are analyzed as tripartite quantificational structures, rule (43b) will
become equivalent to rule (43a). Let's imagine, then, that we have a generalized
methodology for filtering presuppositions through quantifiers, with a rule for
any kind of universal quantifier as in (44).
(44) For any a of the form (Va:" ) N, where a is a sequence of one or more
variables, and p( and y carry presuppositions p, and pw, respectively,
Pa = 3a[p(pA(] A (Va:q9)py
Notice that if there are any variables that are part of a above, and that are free in
p,, the filtering effect of the quantifier will be felt on the component of p. that
relates to p,. Otherwise, pw will surface unchanged (in p,). To see that this is the
case, let's consider a range of examples.
In (45) below I reproduce Hintikka's 'Englishman' example, together with a
couple of comparison examples:
(45) a. Every Englisman, adores [a certain woman] 2.
b. Every Englisman 1 adores [his l wife]2.
c. Every Englismanl adores [the Queen] 2.
As observed earlier, (45a) is ambiguous. A person uttering this sentence could be
intending to express a meaning similar to that in (45b), which corresponds to a
functional reading of a certain woman; or (s)he could be intending to express a
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meaning more similar to (45b), where the indefinite simply takes wide scope,
either by QR or by text-level existential closure.
Now, the definite DP in (45b) generates a presupposition of the form he1 has
a (unique) wife. Clearly, since the pronoun he1 is bound by Every Englishman1, this
presupposition does not surface unscathed at the text level. However, our K&P-
style rule (44) will predict that (45a) presupposes that every Englishman has a
wife. This prediction, of course, is not immune to criticism. As numerous authors
have observed, it seems more intuitively correct that the presupposition he1 has a
wife. should somehow be 'absorbed' into the restriction of every, so as to yield a
meaning for (45b) that is closer to 'Every Englishman who has a (unique) wife
adores his wife.'8 On the other hand, as argued e.g. by von Fintel (1995), once we
take into consideration contextual restrictions on every, for a given utterance of
(45b), the presupposition predicted by K&P turns out to be more palatable: in a
well-behaved conversation it should be easy to accommodate into the restriction
of every in this case that a subset of Englishmen is under consideration, and it is
this subset that is expected to satisfy the presupposition in question.
Consider now (45c). Here the DP the Queen generates the presupposition
that there is a (unique) Queen. 9 Since this presupposition contains no variables
bound by the c-commanding QNP (pace fn. 9), rule (44) will essentially have no
effect on it, and it will surface undisturbed; in other words, (45c) presupposes
that there is a (unique) Queen.
Now, we can easily verify that sentence (45a) behaves exactly like (45b)
under its functional reading, and exactly like (45c) under its non-functional,
'wide scope' reading. Insofar as we can infer from (45b) that every Englishman
(from a contextually relevant set) has a wife, we can deduce from (45a), under its
8 For recent arguments in favor of this view, see Beaver (1994), Berman (1989, 1991).
9 Again, note that we have no difficulty accommodating the notion that the uniqueness of the
Queen in this presupposition is relative to England.
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functional reading, that every Englishman (from a contextually relevant set) is
associated with a particular woman to whom he bears some (contextually salient)
relation. Under its non-functional reading, the one similar to (45c), (45a)
presupposes the existence of a particular woman-which, it is asserted, every
Englishman adores.
Thus it seems that the presuppositions associated with topic marked
indefinites behave like any other presupposition in this respect as well. More
examples from the previous chapter are given below as further evidence for this
claim:
(46) 'Unbound' p from NS of montI QNP:
a. Nobody believes that I have seen Bufluel's first movie.
b. Nobody believes that I have seen a certain Bunfuel movie.
c. Nobody believes that even Meg likes pasta.
d. Nobody was impressed with my friend Ed.
e. Nobody was impressed with an old friend of mine called Ed.
f. Nobody was impressed with Bill's regretting having failed.
(47) 'Bound' p from NS of mon $ QNP:
a. No doctor (from Clinic X) believed the claim that her boss had been
arrested.
b. No doctor (from Clinic X) believed the claim that a certain member of
her profession had been arrested.
c. No doctor (from Clinic X) believed the claim that Sandra regretted
taking her advice.
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(48) 'Unbound' p from NS of universal quantifier:
a. Everybody loved the haircut that I got last year.
b. Everybody loved a particular haircut that I got last year.
c. Everybody loved the idea of buying a gift even for Sally.
d. If you can't help me carry the groceries, I'll have to ask my friend Patsy
to do it.
e. If you can't help me carry the groceries, I'll have to ask a friend of mine
that I really don't want to see right now (to do it).
f. If you can't help me carry the groceries, I'll be even more crabby than I
am being now.
(49) 'Bound' p from NS of universal quantifier:
a. If every Italian in this room would stop bragging about his Country's
food, we would/might have a more interesting culinary discussion.
b. If every Italian in this room could manage to watch a certain program
about his Country, we would/might have an interesting discussion
tomorrow.
c. Everyone who used the bathroom between 2 and 4 pm was questioned
about his actions during that time.
d. Everyone who used the bathroom between 2 and 4 pm was questioned
about a sink that he could have broken.
In all these cases, the 'unbound' presuppositions are projected at the text level,
while the 'boudd' ones may surface only in a modified form, depending on the
meaning of the quantifier that binds them.
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In what follows, I will present a sketch of a theory of presupposition
projection. The purpose of this is to give an impression of how the system could
be put together, given all the assumptions we have adopted so far.
4. A Maximally Simplified Model
In the previous chapter I introduced the idea that specific indefinites are topics in
the sense of von Fintel (1994). According to this idea, an indefinite topic is
scrambled at LF, and a topic anaphor is adjoined to it, as in (50).
(50)
This anaphor is translated as a set of propositions, which may be a function of
one or more variables; the '' operator requires this anaphor to have a certain
presuppositional content-something like 'properties associated with DPi are
under discussion'. In particular, assuming that DPi in (50) translates as
XP[p(xi) A P(xi)] (or even simply as p(xi)), and that Cg) translates as J(xi), the
presuppositions associated with this DP, by virtue of this topic marking
mechanism, will include a statement of the following kind:
(51) The current variable assignment satisfies
qK~i) A J(X1 C{P: 3n [p = %W·nHkx)]
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More in general, I assume that a topic marked DP may have zero or more free
variables in it, and that the topic anaphor associated with it may or may not find
an antecedent. If the antecedent is not provided by the discourse, it will be
generated by our default rule (66) of Chapter 3, in the form J(xi) =
(p: 3x [p = Alw.r,.(xi)] . So our notation would have to encode a dependence on
any number of variables which are free within the DP (e.g., an array of the form
xo,...,x n for n >0), plus a dependence on a possible antecedent, which I assume to
be expressed by an index on the functional component of the topic anaphor, J.
Thus we have the following situation:
(52) a. DP
DPi Ck(i)
where =Ck(i)"> Jk(x)
b. (52a) ~> DP4;
Presupposition(s):Jk (d (C;p: 3 n (p = 41 [DP * eg,]
As we can see in (52b), which is a generalization of (51), the adjunction structure
in (52a) (or in (50), for that matter) does not really affect the regular semantic
value of the DP. On the other hand, since topic marking is associated with a
presupposition which is generated derivationally (i.e., the DP's themselves don't
'come with' the presuppositions associated with topic marking), we can try to
employ this structure to derive a 'complete' meaning (viz., a meaning which
includes both assertive content and presuppositional content) for the higher DP
node in (52a) by assigning an appropriate meaning to the '=' operator. But first
we need to introduce a way of interpreting 'complete' meanings in a
compositional manner.
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Since our goal here is to show that topic anaphors behave like any typical
presupposition, we may want to adopt a system which employs a more
generalized notation for presuppositions of all kinds. I will use the slash-notation
introduced by Belnap (1970) for this purpose. In Belnap's system, the label p,/oa
is used to annotate the translation of a node XPa that has (regular) semantic
value a and carries presupposition(s) Pa. When ca and Pa are of type t, a node
that translates as Pa/a (under a given variable assignment) will only be defined
when Pa is true (for that variable assignment). Thus, depending on the truth of
Pa, the composite Pa/U will have whatever truthvalue a has:
(53) For any variable assignment g, any expressions oa, p, of type t :
[Pa/'• •" = 1 iff [pjj = 1 and [afE g = 1;
= 0 iff [pajjg = 1 and [afcg = 0;
undefined otherwise.
(53), however, is not sufficient to describe the function of this '/' operator
entirely-at least given the way we want to use it. Let us say that for any
aO = p /Pf, , 3, and pp must all be of the same semantic type.'0 Next we add the
following rule to our interpetive component:
(54) For any variable assignment g, any a of type ra, v of type T,:
[F1v.a~)] is the partial function f
whose domain is (v e D a is defined ,
and for all v in the domain of f, f(v) = [a] /v
10 Thus '/' can be thought of as a function of type (r, (r, 1)) for any (appropriate) type -.
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With this much in mind, let's go bas.< to our rule (52) above. This rule must be
reformulated so that it yields a composite semantic value that utilizes Belnap's
slash notation. As mentioned earlier, I will place the burden of this task on the '='
operator:
(55) a. DP
DPi Ck (i)
> Jki) p:3n p=w Pi w]) DPi
DPi J (xi)
b. = := P[irc p:r n r(ptaw.np Es) / P OP
Next I propose the following interpretation rules for 3 and V:
(3) For any variable assignment g (where a is a sequence of n Ž 1 vbls):
if defined,
if defined,
is defined iff there is a a-alternative g' of g such that
[Epl g is defined;
S3B$ =1 iff there is a g' such that [p)]' =1;
= 0 otherwise.
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For any variable assignment g (where a is a sequence of n 2 1 vbls):
S= 1 iff there is a a-alternative g' of g such that
[q)Plg is defined, and
for all g' such that [qP,=1 = I, IT• = 1;
= 0 iff there is a g' such that [08]J = 1 and
[n4Je =0;
undefined otherwise.
Let's first consider a simple example, like our rock example from the previous
chapter:
(56) a. John didn't see a rock (that was sitting in the middle of the road).
b.
e
not D
DPD
=.I/a rock1 h 1,
3 VP
John
see t
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(V)
C.
rock .(x,) /[rock o(xt) A see (John, x,)]
not
DP VP
rock, (xI) / rock 4(x) 1 / see,(John, x,)
In accordance with (3), (56c) will have the following meaning:
(57) For any variable assignment g, [(56c)J g is defined iff there is an entity
x, such that [IPJJ xJ , is defined; in such case, [(56c)] = 1 iff
.IPj]x/ = 1; otherwise [(56c) = 0.
Now, .IP1' s,1 is defined just in case rock,,(x,) = 1, i.e., just in case x, is a rock
in the utterance world. So the truth or falsity of [(56c)]]g will depend exclusively
on the value of - [rock,;(x,) A seew(John, x,)]. Thus (57) becomes:
(58) For any variable assignment g, [(56c) gf is defined iff there is an entity
x, such that ock,,(x,) = 1; in such case, [(56c)]1g = 1 iff
-[rock, (x,) A see,(John, x)] = 1; otherwise [(56c)J g = 0.
Now let's consider a slightly more complex example that uses both (3) and (V),
like the 'extensional' example (90c) from Chapter 3-repeated here as (59a).
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I did all the work (that) a friend of mine called Ann asked me to do.
For the sake of space, I will simplify the translations of the constituents in (59b) to
the bare minimum. We get the following representation:
(59) c.
x x2
'P
DP VP
1 /did(I, x2)
Vx1  NP
Ann(x3) /wk(x 2) A Ann(x3) A ask(x3, me, x2)
1 /wk(x 2) CP
I
IP
Ann(x3) /Ann(x 3) A ask(x 3, me, x,)
7 VP
DP 1 /ask(x 3, me, x2)
Ann(13) /Ann(j 3)
(59) a.
b.
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3 IP
DPI
I DP2 3 VP
all 2  NP
tj did t 2
N CP
work
02 IP
=IJ / DP3 3 VP
a friend of mine t3 asked me to do t2
calle Ann
II
(60) a. For any variable assignment g, [(59c)]J g is defined iff there is an entity
x3 such that [IPJJJ .is defined; in such case, I(59c) g = 1 iff
[IP]gI/x. = 1; otherwise [(59c)] g = 0.
b. [1IP 1g'x/ = 1 iff there is an x2 such that [NPf(/ x2 is
defined, and
for all x2 such that [NPj{Xk -X2 1
X "3/ )X2
[vVP]J(g /x 2 =1;
[rIP] gx = 0 iff there is an x2 such that [NPJl g 3,) 2
and ['VP]] (X3)g •x2 =0;
[IPJ]g /x is undefined otherwise.
Now, [VPJ]J g 'XJ "x2 is always defined (because it has no non-tautological
presuppositions), and the definedness of [IPTg9 x depends on the definedness
of oNP •'  x - viz. n the truth of Ann(x3). Therefore [(59c)]a is defined
just in case there is an x3 such that Ann(x3) = 1. The truthconditions of [(59c)]J
then depend on the assertive content of [NPI X 2 and [VP(9 X,)X /X2
(60) can be rewritten as follows:
(61) a. For any variable assignment g, [(59c)J g is defined iff there is an entity
x3 such that Ann(x3) = 1; in such case, [(59c)J = 1 iff
for all x2 such that [wk(x2) A Ann(x 3) A ask(x3, me, X2)] = 1, did(I, X2) = 1;
otherwise [(59c)]]g = 0.
Now, how does our system deal with cases where a presupposition seems to be
'absorbed' by its environment? Consider the pair in (62).
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(62) a. John's child is happy.
b. If John has a child, his child is happy.
The definite DP in (62a) generates a presupposition for the entire sentence that
there exists someone called John, and that this person has a child. However, if
(62a) is embedded in a conditional statement like (62b), the presupposition that
John has a child disappears. Van der Sandt argues that the presupposition is not
somehow 'canceled' by the embedding conditional; rather, it is bound by the
conditional operator.
Suppose sentences (62a) and (62b) have the LF's in (63a) and (63b)
(respectively), with every DP bearing an index as shown:
(63) a. IP
DP2  VP
DP t2 is happy,
John 's NP
child,
b. IP
i w IP IP
DPI DP 2  VP
John 32  VP
his, NP t2 is happy,,
t Ichild
hasw , DP2
a chil
The possessive morpheme is analyzed as presupposing the descriptive content of
its sister NP and a two-place possession relation:
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(64) DPi's child,, carries the presupposition: 3x[ch,(x) A ps, DPi, x)]
Now, in the case of (63a) these presuppositions will surface at the text level,
giving us a representation essentially as in (65).
(65) IP
3x2[ch,(x,) A ps1 (J, x2)] / (THEx2: ch,,(x) A ps,,(J, x2)) hpy,,(x,)
DP x2. I / hpy,,(x 2)
P x2 ch,,(x,) TH~ x2 ch,,,(x ) Aps,(xJ, ) ] / (THsEX 2  J x) P4(X2) hpy(2 )
Now consider the case of (63b). In this case, the presupposition associated with
the possessive in the consequent clause will not be able to project beyond the
conditional operator, because it is an existential statement which is dependent on
the value(s) of it (cf. (64)), which in the case of (63b) is bound by the conditional
operator. This is illustrated in (66):
(66) IP
1/x2 [ch,,(x 2) A ps ,(J1 , x,)]
'P
x2ch,(x 2) A TH chw(x 2) A
[X2 ps, he,, x2) ]/ x2: p(he,, ) (x)
Given our (V) rule, (66) will come out essentially as follows:
164
(67) For any variable assingment g:
a. [(66 )]jg = 1 iff there is a world w where '1'; and for every world w such
that ('1' and) 3x,[ch,,(x,) A ps,0(J,, x2)], 3x2[ch,(x2) A ps,(he, x2)] and
(THEx 2: ch,,(x2) A ps,(he,, x2 )) hpyW(x,);
I( 66 )1] = 0 iff there is a world w such that (1 and)
3x2[ch ,(x1) A psA,(J,, x2)] and 3Bx2[ch(x 2) A ps,(he,, x2)], and it is not the
case that (THEx,: ch,,(x,) A ps,,(he,, x2)) hpy,(x9);
otherwise-i.e., if there is a (contradictory) world w, where both
3x,[ch1,(x,) ^ ps,(he1, x,)] and -,3x,[ch,(x2) A ps,~he,, x2)]-- (66)J] is
undefined.
b. [( 66 )1g is true iff in every world where John has a child, John has a
child and his child is happy; false if there is a world where John has a
childand his child is not happy; undefined only in a contradictory
world, as in (a).
Note that the assertive content of (67) is simply a statement to the effect that if
John has a child, it (=John's child) is happy. Among the presuppositions that
surface at the 'top level' of (67) there is one concerning children that John may
have. But this presupposition is a trivial one. As we can see, all that is
presupposed is that in all worlds where John has a child, John has a child.
Another suggestive case that lends itself to this kind of treatment is the
problem of 'requantification' first noticed by K&P. This problem is illustrated
below.
It is known that certain lexical elements, like stop, start, manage, etc. generate
presuppositions associated with their sentential complement. (68a), for instance,
presupposes (68b).
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(68) a. John managed to open the door.
b. It took John some effort to open the door.
Suppose that manage contributes the following meaning: a sentence of the form X
managed to Y is associated with the assertive content X Y'd (in a given world), and
the presuppositional content it was not easy (in that world) for X to Y-for short
-easy ,(X, Y) (see later for details). So (68a) will simply be asserting that John
opened the door, and presupposing that it took him some effort to do so, as
stated in (68b).
So far, so good. However, K&P observed, if the subject of a sentence like
(68a) is an indefinite DP, the procedure outlined above for encoding the relevant
presuppositions will produce inappropriate results. Consider the following
example:
(69) a. Someone managed to succeed George V (on the throne of England).
b. It took someone some effort to succeed George V (on the throne of
England).
(69a) presupposes that whoever actually succeeded George V on the throne of
England had to go through some effort to do so. But this is not what (69b) says.
For (69b) to be satisfied, it is sufficient that some random individual had tried,
with some effort, to succeed George V on the throne of England. And this
individual need not necessarily be the same person who actually did succeed
George V on the throne of England. Yet (69b) is seemingly constructed by the
same method used to produce (68b). Clearly, something has gone wrong.
Intuitively, what we need to do in this case is to establish some sort of
connection between the subject of (69a) and the subject of (69b). In our system,
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this can be accomplished rather easily (see also Van der Sandt 1992). In fact, once
we assume that presuppositions may contain bound variables, we simply need to
allow the quantifier associated with someone in (69a) to bind the presupposition
associated with manage.
For concreteness, I'll assume that a CP selected by a control verb like manage
is translated as a property (rather than a proposition), with PROi being translated
simply as Axi:
(70) CP X AwXx,.succ1,(x1, GV)
IP
PROI VP
George V
succeed ,, X 2  GV
succ,,(O,, 02)
Furthermore, I'll assume that the CP in (70) does not contribute any
presuppositions. Thus, as mentioned earlier, the full translation of this node will
actually be Xwkx, [ I /succ,,(x,, GV)] since, given our definitions above, we know
that for any c(, 1/ot s= ac. I will also assume, for simplicity, that the DP someone in
(69a) does not contribute any presuppositions of its own. This way, we only have
to deal with the presuppositions associated with manage. The meaning of this
verb is assumed to be as in (71).
(71) manage., -> -easy,,;(O , 02) / 2(wiX ,)
Our computation of the full meaning of (69a) then proceeds as in (72).
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(72) T
3x,
IP
someone - -- .
hxl VP
X 1  V'
manage, X0 2  CP
-,easyi,(0,, 02) / 02(wOX 0) XwXx, [1 /succx,, GV)]
For illustrative purposes, I will go through the derivation of (72) step by step;
(73) a. V' = X02 [-easye(,. 02) / 02(w( 0,)] (Xw)x [ /succ,,(x,, GV)])
= --,easy,,,(1, w1 X x,[ l/succJx,, GV)]) /
Xwkx, [ 1 /succ,,x,, GV) ] (wo)(0,)
= -easy 11,,(O,, Xw2x,.succ,(x,, GV)) / succ4(0,,. GV)
VP = ~l [-easyl,(O,, XwXx,.succjýx,, GV)) /succ,z(0,, GV)] (x,)
= neasy ,(xI, XwXx,.succ"x I, GV)) /succjx,0(x, GV)
IP = -easyw(x,, 1wXx,.succJx,, GV)) /succw(x,, GV) A l/persw(x,)
= -neasy,(x,, Xwkxtx.succ,ý(x,, GV)) /persW(x,) Asucc^ i Gx,, V)
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b. For any variable assignment g:
[(72)1W is defined iff there is an a such that
,easyH (a, Xwvkx,.succ,(x
,, GV))
E(72 )1 1 g = 1 iff there is an a' such that
-,easy ,,(a', Xw kx,.succ H(x,, GV)) and
pers ;(a') A succ ,(a', GV)
(72) " = 0 otherwise.
The meaning calculated in (73) is adequate enough as a rendition of (69a), at least
insofar as it does not have the problem of 'requantification' observed by K&P.
What we see, then, is that the general model I propose is indeed
independently applicable to presuppositional material unrelated to topic
marking. If this approach turns out to be correct, then it wouid seem to
corroborate the idea introduced in the previous chapter that topic anaphors,
which essentially introduce presuppositional material, may be treated as
descriptions containing variables, along with other kinds of presuppositions. To
make this point even further, let us recall that this general analysis was proposed
to deal not only with 'specific' indefinites, but with all indefinites. It was shown
in Chapter 2 that these DP's have exceptional scope-taking properties even when
they are not interpreted as specific. So, at this point, I would like to show that the
class of indefinite topics is larger than the class of specific indefinites. Let us say
that an indefinite topic is felt to be 'specific' when-in our current terms-it is
bound by an existential closure operator at the text level, and when the
presupposition(s) associated with it are inherited at that level. Given this
informal definition of a 'specific' indefinite, we note that nothing in our model
prevents an indefinite from being topic marked but not 'specific'. And in fact, my
169
claim is that topicality may very well obtain at a more embedded level, and that
an indefinite topic, together with its topic anaphor, cen be bound from a position
lower than the text level. As we will see in the next section, topic marking and
binding at an embedded level is not just an abstract possibility, but has clearly
visible effects.
Consider now our examples (39) and (51) from Chapter 2. Recall that these
were the cases that were shown to be problematic for Abusch's model. For
instance, (39a), repeated here as (74a), was assumed to have the assertive content
expressed in (74b):
(74) a. Every true Englishman adores a certain woman.
b. 3f (Vx: Engl(x)) [woman(f(x)) A adore(x, f(x))]
The issue here was that the indefinite description woman(f(x)) should be c-
commanded by the universal quantifier, that needs to bind x. But at the same
time, if the indefinite is interpreted inside certain environments, we run into the
usual problem of weak truthconditions: any function we pick would make such
cases true.
Our solution, once again, will be to assume that a certain woman in (74a) is
topic marked, and is thus associated with the presupposition J(f(x)) =
woman(f(x)) which should be projected at the text level, where f is bound. But of
course, J(f(x)) is subject to the same binding restrictions that affect the assertive
content of the indefinite, viz., x must remain bound by the universal quantifier.
The derivation involved in this case is shown below:
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(75) a. T
3IP
every Eng W. XP
2-
=C(2) a woman,,. VP
t1 adores t2
b. T
3f2 /P
Vx, i1/Eng(x,)
worn(f2(X)) / worn (f(x,)) A adore(x,, f2(x,))
worn (f2(x,)) /wo m (f2(x,)) VP
adore(x,, f (XI))
The meaning we get, according to (75b), is roughly as follows. [(75b)j] g is
defined iff there is an f such that: for every Englishman x, f picks out a woman
f(x); if defined, [(75b)] g is true iff there is an f such that: for every Englishman
x, f picks out a woman f(x) and x adores f(x). Thus the presupposition that
surfaces at the matrix level is, appropriately, as expected-given our discussion
in the previous section.
Now let's consider the examples in (51) from Chapter 2. I repeat them here
as (76).
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(76) a. If every Italian in this room (could manage to) watch a certain program
aboutis Country (that will be aired on PBS tonight), we might have an
interesting discussion tomorrow.
b. No doctor believed the claim that a (certain) member of her profession
had been arrested.
c. Everyone who used the bathroom between 2 and 4 pm was questioned
about a sink that he could have broken.
The argument made in Chapter 2 was that in a sentence like (76a), the indefinite a
certain program about his Country contains a variable bound by the QNP every
Italian (in this room); and since this QNP cannot escape the if-clause island, the
indefinite description must also remain inside the island.
Next I showed that an indefinite DP can be topic marked, thus generating a
presupposition that its description is satisfied, and this presupposition can
project out of the island, thus yielding appropriate truthconditions for the
sentence.
But in the case of the sentences in (76), we run the risk of falling back into
the original trap of weak truthconditions, if we cannot lift (some version of) the
presupposition associated with the indefinite up beyond the QNP that binds into
it. Again, our rules for (3) and (V) allow us to avoid this problem:
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IP
might, IP'
DPI we havw
every Itw.
C (1,2)/i
a prg,, al
hisl Cou
P"
1,l
DP2
3 VP
bout
ntryw. t1 watch, t2
b.
IP
tiy '7
DP
prg,,(x, x2) /pr
I/we.discuss ,
prg, (xl, x-) /prg,(x ,xl.) A WtC,,(x1, x2,)
VP
gl 1(xI x,) /wtcx 2)
(78) For any variable assignment g:
a. 'IP'II5 is true iff there is an x, such that '1', and for all x, such that ('1'
and) It;(x,), prg,,(x,, x2) and [prgw(x,,x,) A wtc w(x,, . 2);
[IJElY is false if there is an x, such that It,,(x 1) and prg,,(x,, x) and it
is not the case that [ prg,(x 1,x,) A Wtcw(X, x2);
otherwise-i.e., if there is an x, such that It,(x,) and --,prg,,(x,, x,)-
[Ip'jg is undefined.
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(77) a.
DP
Vx, 1/It•,l(xl)
e-discuss,
)"
b. [jIP'J is true iff for all Italians (in wo) x,, x2 is a program about x,'s
Country in wo and x, watches x2 in w; false if there is an Italian x, (in
wo) and x2 is a program about x,'s Country in wo and x, does not watch
x, in w; undefined if there is an Italian x, (in wo) such that x2 is not a
program about x,'s Country (in wo).
(79) For any variable assignment g:
a. EIP]h is true iff there is a world w such that [IP']Jg is defined-i.e., a
world such that for no x , It,(x,) and - prg,,(x,, x2)-and for every w
such that [for every x, s.t. It ,,(x,), prg,(x,, x2) and wtcx,,x2)], [IP" g
is true-i.e., ('1' and) we.discuss,,;
[IPJl is false if there is a world w such that [for every x, s.t. It,,(x,),
prg,,(x,, x2) and wtc,~x,,x,)], [IF']P" is false-i.e., ('1' and)
--we.discussV,;
otherwise-i.e., if [IIP'" is not defined (-= there is an x, s.t. It,(xI,)
and -, prg (x,, x2)) or [IP" fl is not defined (which cannot happen,
since [IP" ]g has no nontautological presuppositions).
b. EIPfl is true iff there is no Italian x, (in wo) such that x2 isn't a
program about xj's Country (in wo), and for all worlds w such that [for
all Italians x, (in wo), x2 is a program about x,'s Country (in wo) and x,
watches x2 in w ], we have a discussion in w ; false if there is a world w
such that [for all Italians x, (in wo), x2 is a program about xi ,'s Country
(in w0 ) and x, watches x2 in w ], we don't have a discussion in w;
undefined if, for some Italian x, (in wo), x2 is not a program about x,'s
Country (in w0).
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Finally, at the text level we have:
(80) For any variable assignment g:
a. (77b)]] is defined just in case there is an x2 such that [JIP3J is
defined;
if defined, [( 77b)]g is true iff there is an x2 such that [JIPfl is true,
and false otherwise.
b. 9(77b)]1 E is defined just in case there is an x, such that for no Italian x,
(in two), x isn't a program about x,'s Country (in wo)-i.e., if there are
Italians in iw0, x, must be a program about these people's Country;
if defined, [(77b)J]j is true iff there is an x2 such that for all worlds w
where [for all Italians x, (in iw0), x2 is a program about x,'s Country (in
wo) and x, watches x, in w ], we have a discussion in w ; false
otherwise.
In conclusion, I hope to have proven that indefinite topics are not a particularly
strange creature, and that they can be analyzed as unambiguous with respect to
their ability to generate presuppositions. In essence, indefinite DP's (and perhaps
other kinds of DP's as well) are never lexically associated with any kind of
presuppositions, but they may (and must) acquire presuppositional content
when they are topic marked.
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